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1 THE LAW COMMISSION
 Report on a reference to the Law Commission under section 3(1)(e) of the Law
Commissions Act 1965
 RENTING HOMES
 To the Right Honourable the Lord Falconer of Thoroton, Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain
PART I 
INTRODUCTORY MATTERS
THE STATUS OF THIS REPORT
 1.1 When this project was formally launched at the end of March 2001, it was planned
that a Final Report, together with draft Bill, would be published in the summer of
2003.
 1.2 This time scale has proved over optimistic because:
 (1) there was a far greater response to the two consultation papers than we
had anticipated; thus analysis of the responses took much longer than had
been initially envisaged;
 (2) the scope of the first stage of the project was considerably broadened by
the decision to consider not only questions relating to succession to
agreements, but also those relating to joint occupation and the transfer of
agreements; this added substantially to the complexity of the issues to be
determined;
 (3) as a consequence, the process of preparing instructions to Parliamentary
Counsel, who draft the Bill, has taken longer than anticipated.
 1.3 However, given the importance of the project, and the attention it is now attracting
both within Government and more broadly in the housing world, the Law
Commission has decided to publish the following narrative report. This should
assist those whose task it will be to consider the implementation of the scheme to
proceed with their thinking and planning, without waiting for the final outcome of
the Bill drafting process.
 1.4 In essence, this report sets out the Law Commission’s recommendations for the
reform of housing law, which we are likely to make in the Final Report and Draft
Bill. The following points must be carefully noted.
POINTS TO NOTE
 1.5 One of the features of the legislative process, not perhaps obvious to those outside
it, is that drafting Bills does not involve a simple transformation of policy decisions
into legislative form. Ideas that may seem straightforward to policy-makers may be
hard, if not impossible, to translate into legislative form. There is a lengthy process
of discussion and refinement of ideas that takes place between policy-maker and
draftsman, particularly of points of detail.
2 1.6 Thus, while this report sets out the principal features of the scheme we
recommend to Government, it cannot be stated too emphatically that the
contents of this report still remain subject to final decisions particularly
on points of legislative detail.
 1.7 When the draft Bill and Explanatory Notes on the Bill have been completed, they
will be published, in the normal way, preceded by the Commission’s Final Report.
 1.8 Secondly, in taking this project forward, the Law Commission has worked closely
with Ministers and officials, especially in the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister
(ODPM), without compromising the independence that is essential to the work of
the Law Commission. Indeed, publication of this report is designed, at least in
part, to assist ODPM with their own procedures for developing legislative
proposals. It again cannot be overemphasised that any decision as to whether or
not the Bill the Commission finally produces is introduced into
Parliament is wholly a matter for Government. The publication of this
Report of our recommendations should not be taken as any indication of a
commitment by Government to enact our proposed scheme.
 1.9 Thirdly, and conversely, if in the interval between the publication of this Report
and the publication of our Final Report and Draft Bill it emerges that thinking
within the ODPM is beginning to run on lines different from those adopted by the
Commission, the Law Commission will not be tailoring its recommendations just
to accommodate the policy of the ODPM. The recommendations that will
appear in our Final Report and Draft Bill will remain those of the Law
Commission.
NOMENCLATURE
 1.10 In this report, we have followed the nomenclature of agreement types and parties
used in the two consultation papers.1 Thus the agreement types are “type I” and
“type II” and the parties are “occupiers” and “landlords”. With the exception of
the last, we accept that these terms are inadequate, and they will be replaced in the
Bill. However, the exact terms have not been finalised, and therefore we concluded
that the simplest solution was to continue with these terms for the time being.
“Occupier”, in particular, causes difficulties. Generally, it is used to indicate the
party contracting with the landlord. Where it might not be clear whether we are
referring to that person or to another person who is physically occupying the
premises, but is not a party to the contract, we have specified “contractual
occupier” for the former and “non-contractual occupant” for the latter.
 1.11 In relation to terms of the agreement, we have slightly amended the expression
“compulsory term” to “compulsory-minimum term”, to emphasise the point that
(for the most part) these terms provide a minimum of occupiers’ rights, which can
be varied so as to give greater rights. The “core terms” of CP 162 become “key
terms” and “default/negotiable terms” become “other terms”, made up of default
1 Renting Homes 1: Status and Security (April 2002) Consultation Paper 162 (henceforth
“CP 162”); and Renting Homes 2: Co-occupation, Transfer and Succession (September
2002) Consultation Paper 168 (henceforth “CP 168”).
3terms, substitute terms for default terms, and additional terms. We have also
created a new category of “special terms”. The reasons for these changes are
explained at the appropriate point in the text.2
2 See Part VIII.
4PART II 
BACKGROUND TO THE PROJECT
INTRODUCTION
 2.1 Rented housing remains a very significant part of the housing market in England
and Wales. Almost a third of the population rent their homes. Although this
pattern of tenure is very different from the situation 100 years ago, when the vast
majority of people lived in rented accommodation, there is no indication that the
rental sector will continue to decline. Indeed, there is some evidence that it has
started to increase in size. Whether or not this happens, it is essential that there is a
comprehensible and practical regulatory framework which both landlords and
occupiers of rented housing can use.
 2.2 The need for legislative intervention has arisen from the fact that there is an
inherent imbalance in the relative bargaining power of landlords and occupiers.
While many landlords provide excellent services to their occupiers, some do not.
On key issues, such as ensuring that occupiers get value for money and an
appropriate level of security of tenure, history suggests that there is always the
possibility of exploitation. Legislation seeks to provide a regulatory framework to
minimise such exploitation.
 2.3 Historically, the way in which this has been achieved has been through the creation
of a large number of statutory provisions that need to be read alongside the
tenancy agreements that landlords and tenants may have entered into. This
legislative strategy makes for an extremely complex body of law, not readily
understood by most of those to whom it should apply, or indeed their advisers (if
any).
 2.4 There has long been criticism of the complexity of the law regulating the
relationship between landlords and the occupiers of residential accommodation.1 A
primary objective of this project has been to devise a scheme for the reform of
housing law that would address this fundamental problem.
 2.5 Our recommendations for the reform of housing law will, if enacted, represent
radical legislative change to the regulation of the rented sector of the housing
market. The proposed Bill will not only include detailed changes to the existing
rules, but also fundamental change to the legislative approach to the regulation of
this sector of the housing market. In particular the historic linkage between
principles of property law and housing legislation will, so far as is practicable, be
abandoned; instead, a new approach based on contract which incorporates
consumer law principles of fairness and transparency is proposed.
1 An early comment on the effects of excessive complexity in housing law is to be found in
Parry v Harding [1925] 1 KB 111. Lord Hewart CJ observed (at p 114): “It is deplorable
that in dealing with such a matter as this, a Court, and still more a private individual, and
most of all a private individual who lives in a small tenement, should have to make some sort
of path through the labyrinth and jungle of these sections and schedules. One would have
thought that this was a matter above all others which the legislature would take pains to
make abundantly clear.”
5Terms of reference
 2.6 The terms of reference for the project, announced on 26th March 2001, were:
“To consider the law relating to the existing forms of housing tenancies in the
rented sector and their creation, terms and termination, with a view to its
simplification and reform; and in particular to review the law on
 (1) the forms of housing tenancy let by:
 (a) local authorities and other social landlords, and
 (b) private landlords,
with a view to providing a simple and flexible statutory regime for both the
social and the private housing sectors;
 (2) the remedies available in respect of harassment and unlawful eviction;
 (3) tenants’ statutory rights of succession; and
 (4) such other aspects of Housing Law as may be agreed between the Law
Commission, the Department of the Environment, Transport and the
Regions and the Lord Chancellor’s Department.2”
 2.7 It was always envisaged that the project would be undertaken in two phases. The
original intention was to deal with item (1) in the first phase, and leave items (2)
and (3) to the second. Government authority for work on phase 1 was granted at
the outset; authority for phase 2 would be determined subsequently.
 2.8 As work on the questions of status and security progressed, however, it became
increasingly clear that the matter of succession could not be left to a later stage. It
also became clear that other issues about the ways in which people live in their
homes, including joint occupation, could not be left to the second phase. In the
event phase 1 of the project became considerably more substantial than originally
planned.3
 2.9 At the same time, we have come to the view that in phase 2 there is more to be
done than simply review the law and practice of unlawful eviction and harassment.
At the end of this Part we set out our ideas on further work that we think needs to
be done before the final goal – the creation of a code of housing law – is achieved.
These ideas are currently the subject of further discussion with Government.
Fortunately, the original terms of reference were drafted with sufficient flexibility
to permit these additions to the scope of the project.
2 Now the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister and the Department of Constitutional Affairs,
respectively.
3 This can be seen from the two consultation papers that arose from phase 1.
6DEVELOPING OUR PROPOSALS
Objectives
 2.10 In developing our proposals, the Commission has sought to keep a number of
fundamental objectives in mind:
 (1) the law should be simpler;
 (2) the law should be more comprehensible; and
 (3) the law should be more flexible.
Principles
 2.11 In addition, the project is underpinned by four main principles:4
 (1) that the regulatory framework must include provisions guaranteeing
security of tenure, though not to the same degree for all categories of
occupier;
 (2) that possession should, in general, not be able to be obtained without the
landlord going through due process and establishing a ground for
possession before a court;
 (3) that a clearer consumer perspective should be brought to housing law, that
would emphasise both the rights and the obligations of both landlords and
occupiers; and
 (4) that there must be compliance with principles of human rights law.
 2.12 While these objectives and principles have been broadly welcomed, some will be
difficult to achieve. For example, a body of law that is too simple may not
adequately reflect the ways in which people actually live their lives and may thus
lead to injustice. Our proposals which emphasise the centrality of the occupation
agreement may result in its being longer and thus less readily comprehensible than
some might hope. We recognise that these aims and objectives may not be wholly
consistent, one with another. Nevertheless, we have found them useful tests against
which to judge our recommendations for reform.
OUR WORKING METHODS
 2.13 Realising the importance of proposals that could affect the lives of nearly a third of
the population of England and Wales, and also impact on the economic interests of
a wide variety of people and bodies who have invested in the provision of rented
housing, we determined from the outset that we should consult as widely as
possible with those who would have an interest in these matters.
4 These are discussed in more detail in CP 162 paras 1.17 – 1.36.
7Housing Advisory Group
 2.14 We have been considerably assisted by a broadly based housing advisory group
with whom, over the life of the project, we have had a number of meetings. The
members of the group are set out at Annex A. The members of the group have not
been involved in the drafting of this report, and nothing in it should be taken as
representing their views, or the views of the organisations they represent.
Supported housing
 2.15 In addition, we have benefited greatly from the assistance of an informal group of
supported housing providers, who have explained to us the complexity of the
arrangements they enter into in providing accommodation for some of the most
vulnerable individuals in our community. Members of that group are set out in
Annex B.
Public meetings, conferences and seminars
 2.16 A large number of bodies and agencies have offered us platforms to introduce our
ideas and to encourage debate and discussion on them. The Team has addressed
over 70 events, at venues throughout England and Wales. These have ranged from
meetings with landlord groups, tenant groups, and specialist advisers to large
public meetings and conferences. For the first time, a Law Commissioner engaged
in an on-line web-based discussion. A full list of conferences and other events
attended is set out in Annex C.
Responses to the Consultation Papers
 2.17 The Law Commission received a substantial written response to both CPs. This
was perhaps as the result of the importance of the subject, the stimulus of the
public meetings, or a combination of factors. Lists of respondents are set out in
Annex D.
Media
 2.18 There have been a small number of pieces in the broadsheet newspapers. The
specialist press, both housing and legal, has covered the project in some
considerable detail and have also taken pieces written by members of the Law
Commission team. We are extremely grateful for the coverage we have received.
 2.19 Nonetheless, at a recent housing conference organised by the Chartered Institute
of Housing (June 2003), it was striking that around half of an audience of
experienced housing managers, who might be expected to be aware of it, on a
show of hands indicated that they had no knowledge of the Law Commission
project. This reinforces the need for a very full publicity campaign to explain the
new scheme, should the Government decide to implement it.
REGULATORY IMPACT
 2.20 Before any Bill is presented to Parliament, it is subjected to a Regulatory Impact
Assessment (RIA). The task of carrying these out is primarily one for the relevant
sponsoring Department, in this case the ODPM. While the Law Commission does
not have the expertise and resources to carry out a full RIA, we have been trying to
identify, as part of the consultation process, what some of the costs and benefits of
our proposals might be. Our respondents have drawn attention to a number of
8issues that will need to be addressed in any more sophisticated cost-benefit analysis
of our proposals.
 2.21 These included the following points.
 (1) Local authorities and housing associations were concerned about the
initial costs of preparing the new occupation agreements which our
recommendations would require.
 (2) Similarly, private landlords’ groups thought that the costs of
implementation would be considerable.
 (3) There were those who accepted that the production of model agreements
could contribute to a reduction in costs.
 (4) Many respondents pointed to the need for a generous budget for publicity
and training, prior to the introduction of any new scheme. The
importance of not forgetting private landlords and occupiers was stressed.
 (5) A number of respondents observed that adequate resources for housing
advice and other agencies would be required to enable proper advice to be
given, both at the start of the new scheme and on a continuing basis, and
both to landlords and occupiers.
 2.22 The Commission accepts that there will be a substantial initial cost in moving to
the new system. In the longer-term, we think that reductions in costs will be
achieved by the following:
 (1) the creation of model agreements, which will reduce the need for the
individual drafting of agreements;
 (2) the standardisation of the law, which should allow advisers to deal with
issues more easily;
 (3) the added clarity which should allow occupiers and landlords to know
their legal position more readily without the necessity to obtain costly
advice;
 (4) more generally, the commercial opportunities for investment in housing
that might follow from the adoption of a more flexible regulatory regime;
and
 (5) increased used of IT which should enable much of the present cost, for
example, of posting documents such as copies of the agreement, to be
significantly reduced.
THE RELATIONSHIP OF OUR PROPOSALS TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF HOUSING
POLICY
 2.23 The focus of the work of the Law Commission is on reform of the law. In this
project, we cannot ignore the housing policy context which surrounds our work. In
particular, the position of local authorities in the housing market has changed.
There is decreased emphasis on the direct provision of housing and an increased
strategic role. The flexibility of our proposals should make the interface between
local authorities, arms-length management organisations (ALMOs) and other
9social landlords – whether registered or unregistered – much more responsive to
local housing needs. Housing associations which are increasingly developing mixed
portfolios of housing (not only for those in social need, but also other groups such
as key workers and those wanting to rent in the market) should also find the
flexibility of the proposed scheme helpful. Our scheme should facilitate the
development of new partnerships between local authorities and private sector
landlords, who should be encouraged to use the new contractual framework to
improve standards of housing management. We hope our proposed framework
could also encourage a new professionalism amongst private landlords, not only
those with large numbers of property for rent, but also for the small “hobby”
landlord. And it could be the foundation for new partnerships between tenants and
landlords.5
 2.24 The precise extent to which different parts of the rental sector take advantage of
these opportunities is not, of course, a matter for the Law Commission. That is the
responsibility of Government and other stakeholders in the housing market. But
the scheme should provide a much more flexible framework within which these
and other policy initiatives can be taken.
THE SCOPE OF THE PROJECT: EXCLUSIONS
 2.25 Notwithstanding the scope of the project, there are a number of important matters
relating to housing law and policy that we have not directly addressed. These were
set out in CP 162.
Disrepair
 2.26 We noted that we were not going to revisit the law on disrepair, not least because
the Law Commission had completed a project on this topic in 19966 and in
relation to which the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) is doing
further work. We did not consult on the issue. In the event, we have recommended
that the proposals we made in Law Com 238 should become part of the
compulsory-minimum terms we recommend should appear in the occupation
agreement.7
Tenancy deposits
 2.27 During the period of our consultation, we were aware that schemes relating to
tenancy deposits were being tested and evaluated by ODPM. In 2003, the
outcome of this evaluation was produced.8 It has become clear that policy makers
see considerable potential for building contractual obligations relating to the taking
5 Adoption of many of the ideas floated in The Joseph Rowntree Foundation – Shelter
Commission on the Private Rented Sector, Private Renting: A new settlement: A
commission on standards and supply (2002) would be greatly facilitated by the introduction
of the scheme proposed here.
6 Landlord and Tenant: Responsibility for State and Condition of Property (1996) Law Com
No. 238.




and repayment of deposits into the scheme we are proposing, even though we did
not consider the issue as part of our project.
Rent control and regulation
 2.28 A number of consultees criticised the Commission for not revisiting the law
relating to rent control and regulation. This was never envisaged as being part of
our remit. The present government had, in effect, accepted that the policy of
market rents in the private rented sector was one that was not to be disturbed.
 2.29 However, given that landlords are now able to derive market rents from their
lettings, it is reasonable to expect landlords to respect their contractual obligations.
We recommend we should do further work on the mechanisms needed to ensure
that both landlords and occupiers meet their obligations under the terms of the
agreement.
Housing benefit
 2.30 We made it clear at the outset of the project that we would not be looking at
housing benefit, either the rules relating to the scheme or its administration. The
policy is currently undergoing major review within the Department of Work and
Pensions. A number of our respondents expressed regret about this decision, given
the important role it plays in sustaining a large number of landlord-occupier
relationships, and that failures in housing benefit administration trigger many
possession proceedings.
 2.31 We can see ways in which reform of housing benefit could usefully underpin some
of the reforms of substantive housing law which we are proposing. For example, if
the Department of Work and Pensions required those, renting under type II
agreements who were in receipt of housing benefit, to be granted, at least initially,
a six month fixed term agreement, rather than a periodic agreement, this would
resolve a possible difficulty with our proposal to abolish the existing moratorium
on the making of a possession order during the first six months of an assured
shorthold.9
The right to buy and the right to acquire
 2.32 At present there are clear links between the status of tenants of local authorities
and housing associations and their rights to buy or acquire the properties in which
they live. We have not used this project to revisit the scope of the right to buy or
acquire. We regard these as matters of policy for government. We accept that those
who currently have the right to buy or acquire should have their rights preserved.
We also need to ensure that those who enter occupation agreements after our
scheme comes into effect will continue to be able to exercise their rights on an
equivalent basis.
The right to manage
 2.33 The right to manage currently allows local authority tenants, acting collectively, to
set up a management organisation to take over the management of their own
9 See paras 6.3 – 6.16 belo
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properties. In CP 162, we included the right to manage in the list of matters which
we thought fell outside the proper scope of the project, by analogy with the right to
buy. We were persuaded by our consultations that this was too simple a view.
Unlike the right to buy, the right to manage is properly an aspect of the landlord-
tenant relationship, albeit, on the tenants’ side, a collective one.
 2.34 We have considered whether the existing right to manage should be extended to all
type I occupiers, including those of RSLs. We do not think we can recommend
this. First, we are not in a position adequately to assess the desirability of such an
extension. Secondly, we have been told by all sides that a right to manage scheme
for RSLs would require significantly different mechanisms from the current local
authority system (indeed, there is some dissatisfaction with the existing system in
any event).
 2.35 We have concluded that we should aim to preserve the existing right to manage,
while making incremental increases to its possible coverage in specific situations
and providing the Secretary of State with power to make broader changes if he or
she considers it appropriate.
 2.36 We therefore recommend:
 (1) that the existing right to manage be retained for local authority type I
occupiers;
 (2) that the Secretary of State have power to bring defined housing stock
where the landlord is an RSL within the right to manage, as if the landlord
were a local authority;
 (3) that RSLs could voluntarily opt-into the right to manage; and
 (4) that the Secretary of State be given a broad power to amend the existing
right to manage scheme to make provision for a single scheme to apply to
both local authorities and RSLs, or for there to be distinct but comparable
schemes for the two classes of landlord.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK
 2.37 In the light of responses to the consultation, we have become aware that there are
other issues on which further law reform work would be desirable and which
follow closely from this initial project.
Promoting landlord responsibility
 2.38 The initial terms of reference envisaged that, after Phase 1, we should go on to
look at the specific rules relating to unlawful eviction and harassment. We are now
persuaded that, though valuable, this would be too narrow a project. We
recommend that more work be undertaken looking at a range of options for
regulating landlord behaviour and ensuring that the contractual principles that lie
at the heart of our scheme are delivered in practice. We think there should be a
wide-ranging review of the incentives that should be created to encourage
responsibility, and the sanctions that might be imposed where landlords fall short.
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Promoting responsible occupier behaviour
 2.39 One of the most controversial aspects of the first stage of our work related to our
provisional proposals for dealing with anti social housing behaviour. Our
recommendations on this issue – which relate largely to occupiers of
accommodation provided by social landlords – are found in Part XV.
 2.40 Many consultees complained, rightly, that anti social behaviour was not exclusively
an issue for the social rented sector. Private sector tenants, and indeed owner-
occupiers, could be just as guilty of anti social behaviour. The strength of feeling
on this has led us to recommend that this should be another topic on which we
should do further work. We need to explore what the current law is; how it works
in practice; whether it could be made to work more effectively; and whether
changes to the substantive law are required to address the issue further.
Adjudication
 2.41 A third issue on which we did not consult, but on which we invited comments,
related to modes of adjudicating housing disputes. In relation to this, we were
surprised at both the level of complaint about current procedures and the degree
of support for a study of alternatives, including alternative dispute resolution
(ADR). We recommend that there should be a further project on the adjudication
of housing disputes and how the law and practice in this area might be reformed.
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PART III 
THE SCHEME IN OUTLINE
 3.1 This Part provides an outline of the scheme we recommend. Detailed
consideration of the issues is found in the Parts that follow.
THE CONSUMER APPROACH (PART IV)
 3.2 At the heart of the proposals we made in CP162 was the proposition that housing
law should be shaped by a “consumer approach”. There was very broad, if not
universal, support for this. The proposition that both landlords and occupiers
should be able to find an accurate statement of their legal rights and obligations in
the occupation agreement was welcomed.
 3.3 In developing these ideas, we built on the fact that the Unfair Terms in Consumer
Contract Regulations 19991 (“UTCCR”) were already in force and applied to
tenancy agreements. The Office of Fair Trading, who are responsible for
enforcement of the UTCCR, were strongly in favour of our approach.
Implications of this approach
 3.4 This approach has a number of practical implications:
 (1) the regulatory framework governing the relationship between landlord and
occupier will apply wherever there is a contractual agreement (other than
an excepted agreement) for the occupation of a dwelling as a home;
 (2) the principles underlying the UTCCR will extend to all landlords and
occupiers; and all terms save key terms that are also core terms2 will be
subject to the UTCCR principles of fairness and transparency;
 (3) the language of occupation agreements should be as comprehensible as
possible; and the structure of agreements should be as clear and user-
friendly as possible.
Fairness
 3.5 We recommend that the detailed content of occupation agreements be prescribed
by regulation. The regulations will contain schedules setting out different model
agreements. These will, by definition, be “fair” for the purposes of the UTCCR.
(Terms that are varied and other negotiated terms may be open to challenge as
unfair.)
Language and layout
 3.6 We recommend that occupation agreements should use language that is as easy to
comprehend as is practicable. Further, the layout of the agreement should be
1 SI 1999 No 2083, based on Council Directive 93/13/EEC.
2 See para 4.19 below.
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considered carefully in order to assist the understanding of those who will use the
documents.
AGREEMENT TYPES AND THEIR USE (PART V)
 3.7 We recommend that there should be two basic agreement types.
 (1) Type I agreements with a high degree of security of tenure protected by
the Act; these will be periodic agreements only.
 (2) Type II agreements with a low degree of security of tenure provided by
statute. Landlords will be able to enter either fixed-term or periodic
agreements. (Fixed-term agreements may offer a much greater degree of
security to occupiers.)
Landlord-neutrality and the definition of agreement types
 3.8 A key feature of the proposed scheme is that the identity of the landlord should not
be part of the definition of the agreement types. The “landlord condition” for a
secure tenancy under the Housing Act 1985 should not be replicated in the new
scheme. To do otherwise would prevent the creation of a single social tenancy,
which is one of the Government’s objectives. It would also seriously restrict the
flexibility of the scheme, which is one of our key objectives.
Use of the agreement types
 3.9 Nevertheless, we recommend that there should be regulation of the use to which
the two agreement types can be put. In particular, social landlords will be required
to use type I agreements unless the conditions set out in a defined list of
exceptions are met.
 3.10 In default, agreements entered into by social landlords will be type I agreements;
those entered into by private landlords will be type II agreements.
“Writing up” agreements
 3.11 The extent to which landlords provide their occupiers by contract with more
advantageous terms than those required by the legislation will be a matter of
negotiation and landlord policy. In order to encourage this, we recommend that
the majority of terms in agreements can be varied in favour of the occupier.
SCOPE OF THE SCHEME (PART VI)
 3.12 Our broad objective is that, unless there are compelling reasons for excluding
them, all occupation agreements should come within the scope of the scheme we
propose. For this purpose the historic distinction between the lease and the licence
will no longer be of importance.
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 3.13 We recommend abolition of the “six-month moratorium”3, which we do not
believe to be an effective measure of tenant protection. Abolition is essential if the
simplification of the scheme we seek is to be achieved.
Inclusions within the scheme
 3.14 We recommend that a number of types of agreement currently outside the
principal statutory schemes should be brought within the proposed scheme. These
will include, for example, service occupancies and student accommodation
provided by universities and local authorities.4
Exclusions from the scheme
 3.15 Although we are anxious to reduce the number of special cases falling outside the
scheme – a particular cause of current complexity – we acknowledge that there
have to be exceptions. We recommend that there should be two classes of
exception from the scheme.
 (1) Agreements covered by other statutory schemes. These include business
tenancies, agricultural holdings, and mobile homes.
 (2) Certain types of agreement excluded on social policy grounds. These
include holiday lets; agreements granted as a temporary expedient to
persons who entered the premises as trespassers; agreements where the
occupier is sharing accommodation with the landlord; agreements relating
to certain categories of sheltered accommodation; and agreements relating
to accommodation provided on a temporary basis to meet duties to house
the homeless under Part VII of the Housing Act 1996.
 3.16 While this may seem like a long list of exceptions, the actual number of agreements
affected by them will be very modest compared with the total number of
occupation agreements that will come within the scope of our proposed scheme.
Removal of statutory tests
 3.17 Because of the “inclusive” approach that we contemplate, many of the tests
currently used to define the scope of statutory protection will be removed. For
example, requirements that the rent should be under a defined rent limit or that
occupation must be related to the “only or principal home” will not be retained.
Contracts with minors
 3.18 In accordance with this inclusive approach, we recommend that there should be
special provision to facilitate the ability of landlords to enter agreements with 16
and 17 year-olds. This can be a problem under the present law, particularly for
social landlords wanting to provide secure accommodation for persons in this age
group.
3 See paras 6.3 – 6.16 below.
4 Though excluded from the current principal schemes, these were still covered by the terms
of the Protection from Eviction Act 1977 and were thus not wholly outside statutory
regulation.
16
Application of the new scheme
 3.19 Obviously, these recommendations will apply to all new agreements entered into
after the coming into force of the legislation. But we also recommend that existing
agreements should, as far as possible, be brought within the scope of the new
scheme. This will greatly simplify the state of the law.
 3.20 There will be two exceptions. The first is tenancies still covered by the Rent Act
1977. The consultation revealed widespread anxiety among this group of tenants
about the prospect of their incorporation into the new scheme. Though they would
be fully protected in law, they were not convinced that in practice landlords might
not seek to take advantage of them. The second is agreements still covered by the
Rent (Agriculture) Act 1976.
THE WRITTEN AGREEMENT (PART VII)
The need for an agreement
 3.21 For the scheme we propose to work, it is essential that there should be a
contractual agreement between the landlord and the occupier.
Making the contract
 3.22 Writing will not be a crucial element in the creation of the contractual relationship.
In other words, it will be possible for a landlord and occupier to reach a binding
occupation agreement orally.
Evidencing the contract
 3.23 However, once made, it will be essential that a written statement of the agreement
is provided by the landlord to the occupier. There are two reasons for this.
 (1) It will provide evidence of the existence of the relationship; this will be
essential in cases where the relationship breaks down and court
proceedings of some kind are in contemplation.
 (2) The whole point of the consumer approach is to ensure that both parties
should have a document setting out their respective rights and obligations.
 3.24 Where the landlord is happy to adopt the relevant model agreement (see below,
paragraph 4.12), it will not be essential for the landlord to provide his/her own
personalised version of the whole agreement. Evidence of the agreement will then
comprise a front page, which sets out the key terms, states that the agreement is
subject to the relevant model agreement, and sets out any additional terms or
variations to terms that may be agreed by the parties, to which a copy of the
relevant model agreement is appended.
Sanctions
 3.25 As the provision of a written statement of the agreement is essential, there must be
sanctions against landlords who fail to comply with this requirement. There was
broad support from consultees for this approach. We do not recommend criminal
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penalties. We do not think that they are appropriate in this context. Current
criminal sanctions have not worked well. Indeed, we recommend that the existing
law on rent books5 should be repealed.
Rent sanction
 3.26 We recommend that landlords who fail to provide a written copy of the agreement
are liable to a civil penalty related to the rent payable. We think that this will
provide a proportionate and appropriate incentive to landlords to comply with the
requirement to provide a written copy of the agreement.
Procedural sanction
 3.27 Where the landlord under a type II agreement fails to provide a written copy of the
agreement, we also recommend that there be a procedural sanction which will
prevent the landlord from being able to take immediate advantage of the notice-
only ground for possession.
STRUCTURE AND CONTENT OF THE AGREEMENT (PART VIII)
Structure and language of the agreement
 3.28 We recommend that the structure of the agreement should be determined by
accepted approaches adopted in other types of consumer agreement. The details
will be determined in secondary legislation.
Content of the agreement
 3.29 We recommend that the agreement should contain four categories of terms:
 (1) The first will contain key terms, providing information about the parties
and setting out the fundamentals of the agreement such as the
description/address of the property and the rent payable.
 (2) The second will contain compulsory-minimum terms. These will (a)
prescribe the circumstances in which a landlord may seek possession
against an occupier; and (b) set down the duties imposed by law on
landlords (such as statutory repairing obligations). It will be possible for
parties to agree to amend these terms but only so that they are rendered
more favourable to the occupier. Where the term contains a statutorily
defined obligation (such as statutory repairing obligations), the term will
also be able to be varied if the relevant statutory test is changed. It will not
be possible for either party to contract out of these terms.
 (3) The third will contain special terms, which impose obligations on
occupiers for social policy reasons (in particular, those relating to anti-
social behaviour).
 (4) The fourth will contain other terms. This part will include default terms,
which will deal with a list of issues needed to make the contract work. The
5 Sections 4 to 7 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985.
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model agreements will contain default terms covering these matters,
though the parties may substitute their own terms for the default terms.
Any substitute term will have to be fair and transparent. In addition, this
part of the agreement will contain additional terms dealing with other
matters not otherwise considered.
Varying the terms of the agreement
 3.30 We accept that in many cases, particularly with type I agreements and some fixed-
term type II agreements, the original contract may need to be varied from time to
time. Apart from anything else, rent levels will need to be adjusted to match
inflation. We therefore recommend that agreements contain terms allowing for
variation of the agreement. We also make recommendations about the
requirements for landlords to provide written evidence of any variation. Failure to
provide written evidence of any variation will also be subject to the sanctions
mentioned in paragraphs 3.26 and 3.27.
Issues to be dealt with outside the contract
 3.31 Notwithstanding the primary objective of making the contract the source of
information about the respective rights and obligations of landlords and occupiers,
we have accepted that there are issues which will remain outside the agreement.
These include a number of matters relating to tenants of local housing authorities,
such as the right to repair and rights relating to consultation and information.
TERMINATION OF AGREEMENTS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR POSSESSION (PART
IX)
 3.32 This part considers first the processes which landlords must undergo to obtain
possession of their premises lawfully; termination by the occupier is discussed
more briefly at the end of this part.
Termination by landlords
Due process
 3.33 The principle of due process, whereby a landlord may not lawfully recover
possession without an order of the court, will be retained in the proposed scheme.
Nonetheless, where the notice-only ground for possession is available, we
recommend that a possession order should be capable of being obtained by
summary procedures, as is currently the case.
 3.34 We also recommend that the related principle, that proceedings should not be
commenced without the landlord first issuing a notice of his intention to take
proceedings, should also be retained. We recommend some rationalisation of the
notice periods required. In the case of proceedings for anti-social behaviour, we
recommend that court proceedings should be capable of being started at the same
time as the notice is issued to the occupier.
 3.35 We have taken the view that, once a notice has been issued, the landlord should
decide whether or not to start possession proceedings. Thus we recommend that
landlords will have a defined period within which to commence proceedings.
Failure to do this will result in the notice of intention to take proceedings lapsing
and a new one having to be issued.
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Grounds for possession
 3.36 We recommend that type I agreements will only be capable of being finally brought
to an end by the exercise of discretion by a court; type II agreements will be able to
be ended on mandatory as well as discretionary grounds.
 3.37 A consequence of this recommendation will be that housing associations, which
currently let on assured tenancies and which therefore have a number of
mandatory grounds for possession available to them (including the right to obtain
possession where two months’ arrears of rent have accrued), will lose these
mandatory grounds.
 3.38 In the process of consultation we learned that many housing associations in fact
impose a self-denying ordinance, whereby they undertake with their tenants not to
use the mandatory grounds. On the other hand, there were those who argued that
it was an important mechanism for tackling problems with rent arrears. In many
cases, rent arrears were not the fault of the tenant but a consequence of the poor
operation of the housing benefit system.
 3.39 We have had to reach a judgement on this question. We cannot achieve the
simplification of the present law that we seek if we retain mandatory grounds for
possession in the type I agreement. To do so would reduce the status of secure
(local authority) tenants to an unacceptable extent. We have concluded that all
those occupying under agreements with social landlords should do so on the same
terms.
 3.40 We accept the argument made by many landlords, whether or not they were able to
use the mandatory ground, that they found the courts too inconsistent in their
approach to decision taking. We make recommendations for structuring the court’s
discretion which we hope will tackle the problem of inconsistency.6
 3.41 We recommend that possession may be sought by the landlord under a type I
agreement, on the ground either that the occupier is in breach of the terms of the
agreement or that other prescribed circumstances relating to estate management
are satisfied. In the latter case, the landlord will have to ensure that suitable
alternative accommodation is available. In addition, the landlord under a type II
agreement may seek possession on the (mandatory) ground of serious rent arrears,
or the notice-only ground.
Procedural requirements
 3.42 Currently the procedural steps that landlords must take before they can commence
proceedings in court vary, depending on which statutory code is relevant. We
recommend changes to the various rules relating to the notices that landlords must
give in order to make them more coherent. Failure to issue proceedings following
the expiry of the notice period will, after a prescribed period of time, result in its
becoming ineffective. Thus before court proceedings can be taken, a further notice
will be required.
6 See paras 9.81 – 9.90 below.
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Powers of the court
Discretionary grounds for possession
 3.43 The consultation process revealed widespread dissatisfaction with the role of the
court in determining possession proceedings. We recommend that the Bill contain
provisions to structure the discretion of judges when making these orders. In
exercising their discretion, judges will be required to balance the interests of (a) the
occupier against whom proceedings are being taken, (b) the landlord (whose
cashflow may be disrupted by failures to pay rent) and (c) other occupiers and
neighbours (who are often aggrieved when their fellow occupiers do not pay the
rent on time or are a nuisance or are in other ways in breach of their agreements).
 3.44 The present system provides for a hearing when a possession order is sought to
which most occupiers do not turn up – often encouraged by the landlord not to –
but does not require a hearing when the question of execution of the warrant for
possession is at issue. In CP 162,7 we considered that this system represented a less
than satisfactory use of the court to ensure fairness. We have been persuaded that
to adopt the most radical proposal – prohibiting the use of suspended possession
orders – would not at this stage be appropriate. We will however be recommending
the creation of a power to enable new procedures to be piloted and evaluated on a
trial basis, designed to ensure not only that landlords can still effectively collect
rent arrears, but also that occupiers threatened with eviction have a realistic
opportunity to state their side of the case.
 3.45 We also make detailed recommendations about the point at which the occupation
agreement should be regarded as terminated, once a suspended possession order
has been breached. These are designed to eliminate the problematic concept of the
“tolerated trespasser”.
Mandatory grounds for possession
 3.46 These will only be available in relation to type II agreements. (The discretionary
grounds will also be available.) We recommend retention of the accelerated
possession procedure currently available to landlords using the notice-only ground
for possession.
CHALLENGING DECISIONS BY PUBLIC BODIES
 3.47 A “public body” in public law terms is subject to judicial review of its
administrative decisions, in principle including decisions about taking possession
proceedings (such as using a mandatory ground for possession, or using the
notice-only procedure). A “public authority” for the purposes of the Human
Rights Act 1998 is also subject to challenge on the basis of breach of a right under
the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
particularly Article 8, which guarantees respect for the home.8 Until recently, the
7 See paras 12.33 – 12.41 below.
8 There is academic debate on whether or not the domestic category of “public body” for
judicial review purposes is the same as the “public authority” category under the Human
Rights Act 1998: see for instance Dawn Oliver, “The frontiers of the State: public authorities
and public functions under the Human Rights Act” [2000] PL 476. The dispute is not
relevant to our proposals in this area.
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courts had held that any eviction “engaged” article 8(1), the basic guarantee, and
so had to be justified under Article 8(2) as proportionate and necessary in a
democratic society.9 The House of Lords, in Qazi v London Borough of Harrow,10
has now put that broad approach into doubt, although without undermining the
basic accountability in administrative law of landlords who are public bodies. The
courts will doubtless continue to wrestle with these issues for some time to come.
However, a significant problem in coping with public law challenges has been that
judicial review must be taken in the High Court, whereas possession actions take
place in the county court. We therefore recommend that the county court should
be given a jurisdiction to review decisions relating to mandatory possession cases,
along the lines of those granted to them by section 204A of the Housing Act 1996
(as inserted by the Homelessness Act 2002). In exercising these powers, county
courts would apply judicial review principles.
Termination of fixed-term agreements
 3.48 Where a fixed-term agreement ends because its time has expired, we recommend
that the occupier will automatically become a periodic type II occupier, on as
many of the same terms as before as are relevant.11
Abandonment
 3.49 Where accommodation is abandoned by an occupier, we recommend that the
landlord should have available a procedure enabling him to recover possession
following service of notice. If the occupier has not actually abandoned the
accommodation he or she will be able to challenge the notice in court.
Termination by the occupier
 3.50 We recommend that the occupier, under a periodic agreement, should have the
right to give a month’s notice to terminate the agreement. The agreement will
continue until the expiry of the notice period. If the occupier continues to occupy
after the period is over, he or she will become a trespasser and the landlord may
take steps to evict on that basis. In the case of a type II agreement, the landlord
will have the right to treat the occupier’s notice as a landlord’s notice of intention
to seek possession on the notice-only ground; thus the landlord can obtain
possession through the accelerated possession procedure. The occupier will be
entitled to continue in occupation until the court orders possession and the order
is acted upon.
 3.51 Where all joint occupiers give notice, this will similarly terminate the agreement.
 3.52 Where one or more, but not all, joint occupiers give notice, we recommend that
this has the effect of terminating only the interest in the agreement of the person
giving the notice; it will not, as is currently the law, have the effect of bringing the
whole agreement to an end.
9 For a discussion of the case law as it was in April 2002, see CP 162 paras 5.70 – 5.77.
10 [2003] UKHL 43, [2003] 3 WLR 792.
11 See para 9.79 below.
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SPECIFIC ISSUES
 3.53 Although anxious to achieve the greatest possible degree of simplification in the
scheme we propose, we also have to make sure that the scheme will reflect the ways
in which people lead their lives. The fact is that, particularly as a relationship
between landlord and occupier can last for some time, arrangements made at the
start of an agreement may not always remain appropriate or workable. A person
may start occupying premises on his or her own, but subsequently wish to bring
another person into the dwelling. A group of occupiers may start off getting on
well, but then one may want to leave; and the rest of the group may wish to
introduce a new occupier to the dwelling. The possibilities are endless.
 3.54 There is a great deal of law which currently exists, but it is piecemeal and
incoherent. We seek to bring order to these issues to make the law more workable
and – more importantly – to help landlords and occupiers understand better where
they stand legally.
(1) Consent (Part X)
 3.55 While an occupier may wish to alter the initial agreement, for example by adding a
new person to the agreement, the landlord may well not wish to do so. For
example, he may be worried about the ability of a new party to look after the
premises properly; or, in the case of social landlords, the new occupier may not
have that degree of social housing need that would justify the allocation of a scarce
publicly-funded resource to them. There will, therefore, be many situations where
it is right that the landlord should be able to turn down a proposal that a new
person come into the premises.
 3.56 Three possibilities can be envisaged.
 (1) The landlord has an absolute right to veto a proposal put to him.
 (2) The occupier must seek the landlord’s consent to do something, but the
landlord may only withhold consent on the ground that it is reasonable to
do so.
 (3) There should be no requirement for consent – the landlord should not be
able to prevent the occupier doing what he or she wants.
 3.57 In situation (2), where consent is required, the occupier must submit any request
in writing; consent would be deemed to have been granted if the landlord failed to
respond to a request within two months of the request being made (or within two
months of any request for further information being complied with); and, where
consent was denied, a short statement of reasons should be given by the landlord
to the occupier.
 3.58 Any action taken by an occupier in the teeth of a landlord’s veto or reasonable
refusal of consent would not bind the landlord and would expose the occupier to
proceedings for possession for breach of the agreement.
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(2) Joint occupation (Part XI)
Joint and several liability
 3.59 We recommend that the contractual liabilities of joint occupiers should be joint
and several. Thus, if one of a number of joint occupiers defaults on his or her part
of the deal, the other occupier(s) will remain fully liable under the agreement,
albeit with the right to seek compensation from the defaulter. Joint and several
liability is the only practical way to ensure that the proper economic interests of the
landlord are protected.
Altering the identity of the occupiers
 3.60 We also need to make provision for the common situation where relatively fluid
groups of occupiers share a home. We need to provide mechanisms for altering the
parties to the agreement. In so doing, we need to balance the rights of the landlord
to control the numbers and identity of those living in the home with the rights of
the occupier to be able to take in a new occupier.
 3.61 Three separate issues will be dealt with:
 (1) adding new occupiers to an agreement;
 (2) permitting a joint occupier to leave the agreement;
 (3) dealing with non-contractual occupants.
ADDING NEW OCCUPIERS TO AN AGREEMENT
 3.62 We recommend that this should be possible, subject to the occupier obtaining the
consent of the landlord.12 The legislation will define the extent to which the new
occupier will take over the rights and liabilities of the other occupier(s).
PERMITTING A JOINT OCCUPIER TO LEAVE AN AGREEMENT
 3.63 We recommend that a joint occupier under both a type I and type II agreement
should be able on notice to terminate his interest in the agreement without it
bringing the whole agreement to an end.
 3.64 Where a joint occupier leaves without properly bringing the agreement to an end,
we recommend that the landlord should be able to use the new abandonment
procedure to seek a declaration from the court that the former occupier has indeed
abandoned the premises.
DEALING WITH NON-CONTRACTUAL OCCUPANTS
 3.65 We recommend that, in normal circumstances, the occupation agreement should
contain a default term providing that the occupier should control who else
occupies the premises on a non-contractual basis. We also recommend that non-
contractual occupants should, under the Civil Procedure Rules, be notified of any
12 The landlord will be able, subject to UTCCR, to determine the number, age and general
characteristics of any proposed new joint occupier, subject to the overall law on
overcrowding.
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possession proceedings being brought in relation to the premises in which they are
living.13
(3) Lodgers and sub-occupation agreements (Part XII)
 3.66 We recommend that:
 (1) type I occupiers should have the right to take in a lodger, over which the
landlord will have no right of veto;
 (2) the default position in respect of type II occupiers will be that they are
able to take in a lodger subject to the consent of the landlord; and
 (3) lodgers will not be entitled to a written agreement.
 3.67 We further recommend that any (head) landlord (that is, a person other than the
occupier who enters into the lodging agreement) will not be bound by any lodging
agreement.
 3.68 We do not think that occupiers, either under a type I or a type II agreement,
should have a statutory right to grant a sub-occupation agreement, even with the
consent of the landlord. Thus we recommend that there should be a default term
that will give the landlord a veto on the granting of any sub-occupation agreement
by the occupier.
 3.69 Where the head landlord does give consent, the sub-occupation will usually be a
type II periodic agreement. The head landlord who has given consent will also
become the landlord of the sub-occupier should the original occupier subsequently
leave the agreement.
(4) Transfer of rights of occupation (Part XIII)
 3.70 We recommend, as a general principle, that landlords should have the right to veto
any request for the transfer of rights of occupation from one contractual occupier
to another not a party to the contract. This will be subject to three specific
exceptions.
(Mutual) exchange
 3.71 The secure tenants of local authorities are currently able to exchange their
tenancies, subject to securing the consent of the landlord.14 We recommend that
this should be incorporated into the new scheme and extended to apply to all type
I agreements granted by social landlords. The right will remain exercisable only
with the consent of the landlord.
13 This will be similar to the notification requirements now required in relation to occupiers of
premises where possession proceedings are brought arising out of mortgage default: see CPR
Rule 55.10.
14 Housing Act 1985, s 92 and Schedule 3.
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Transfer to potential successor
 3.72 Secondly, we recommend that occupiers under type I agreements should have the
right to transfer their contractual rights of occupation to a potential successor.
Again this should be subject to obtaining the consent of the landlord. (Rights of
succession are outlined below, paragraph 3.76)
Transfer by order of family courts
 3.73 Thirdly, we recommend that section 24 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 and
Schedule 1, paragraph 1 (2)(d)–(e) to the Children Act 1989 should be amended
to enable the court to make orders in relation to all occupation agreements coming
within the proposed new scheme, whether or not they create a property interest.
(5)Effect of death on the occupation agreement (Part XIV)
 3.74 We recommend that where there are joint occupiers, the normal position should be
that the surviving joint occupier(s) will take over the agreement. However, there
should be some flexibility in the case of fixed term type II agreements.
 3.75 We want to address the uncertainty that arises when an occupier dies leaving no
joint occupier or other successor. We recommend that periodic agreements should
be deemed by law to end on a defined date after the death of the occupier (or the
last of joint occupiers).
 3.76 Building on existing provision, we also recommend that there should be a statutory
scheme of succession available to spouses (broadly defined), other members of the
family and carers. Any person in these last two groups must have lived in the home
for a defined period before the death of the occupier before the right arises. Where
more than one person is potentially entitled, joint succession will be possible. The
Bill will provide a framework for the resolution of disputes arising from the
statutory succession scheme, with the details set out in regulations.
ANTI-SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR (PART XV)
 3.77 We recognise that landlords have a role in the control of anti-social behaviour. Our
scheme is designed to provide them with the necessary legal tools. We have
recognised concerns with our provisional proposals expressed in responses to CP
162 and have decided not to proceed with those relating to summary eviction and
the further structuring of discretion.
A general target duty on social landlords
 3.78 We consider that the prime purpose of extending the powers of social landlords to
respond to anti-social behaviour is the protection of their occupiers.
 3.79 We recommend that a general “target” duty is imposed upon local authority
landlords to take into account in the management of their rented property the
need to deal with anti-social behaviour on behalf of their occupiers. We also
recommend that a similarly-worded duty be placed on registered social landlords,
which the Housing Corporation would be obliged to take into account in the
performance of its regulatory functions.
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Special anti-social behaviour term
 3.80 We recommend that both the type I and the type II agreement should contain a
special term which prohibits anti-social behaviour by the occupiers of the property
or by visitors. The term will also prohibit use of the property for criminal
purposes.
 3.81 This term may be enforced by possession proceedings or by injunction. Where an
injunction is breached, the landlord will be able to seek a possession order as part
of the proceedings for breach without having to issue separate possession
proceedings. Possession may only be ordered by the court where it is reasonable to
do so.
Additional powers for social landlords
 3.82 For the purposes of powers to deal with anti-social behaviour, we recommend that
“social landlord” be defined more broadly than elsewhere in our Bill to include
non-registered housing associations and charitable housing trusts.
 3.83 We recommend that social landlords, as thus defined, should be able to obtain a
free-standing injunction against anti-social behaviour. Where the anti-social
conduct consists of or includes the use or threatened use of violence, or where
there is a risk of significant harm to a person in the locality of the property, the
social landlord will be able to obtain an order excluding an occupier from the
property. A power of arrest may also be attached to the order.
Exceptional use of type II agreements
 3.84 Social landlords will be able to let on a type II basis where the letting is for an
initial probationary period. The probationary period will normally last twelve
months, but the period may be extended to eighteen months where the behaviour
of the occupier warrants such an extension.
 3.85 In addition, use of type II agreements will be available when in the course of
possession proceedings for breach of the anti-social behaviour term the social
landlord requests, as an alternative to eviction, that a type I agreement is demoted
to a type II. Demotion will only be ordered where the social landlord produces a
plan of support to the court. Demotion will last for a maximum period of one year.
After this, the occupier will either be promoted back to a type I agreement, or
other arrangements will be made.
Domestic violence
 3.86 Domestic violence will constitute breach of the anti-social behaviour term.
Landlords will be able to take possession proceedings against the perpetrator.
Where the perpetrator is a joint occupier, the proceedings will operate to terminate
the occupation of the innocent party. However, the court will be able to consider
the re-housing arrangements of the innocent party as part of its deliberations on
reasonableness. This should provide the innocent joint occupier with sufficient
protection.
 3.87 Social landlords will additionally be able to apply for orders to restrain anti-social
behaviour. Where there is violence, the threat of violence or risk of significant harm
to another occupier of the property, they should be able to obtain orders which
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exclude a perpetrator. A power of arrest may be attached to such order for use in
the event of breach.
SUPPORTED HOUSING (PART XVI)
 3.88 The provision of supported housing raises complex issues as to how it should fit
into our proposed scheme. Our original proposal was to exclude supported
housing from our statutory scheme.
 3.89 Many respondents pointed out that this was not appropriate. We had failed to
appreciate the extent to which providers were committed to enhancing the rights
of occupiers. We have benefited greatly from extensive discussions with the key
stakeholders in this area and we are grateful to them for their time and expertise.
Status
 3.90 We recommend that different types of supported housing attract different levels of
security.
 3.91 Direct access accommodation, that is accommodation provided for immediate
occupation, will be excluded from our scheme.
 3.92 Temporary supported accommodation such as short stay or respite
accommodation will also be excluded. However, once the provision of temporary
accommodation exceeds four months it will be brought within our statutory
scheme.
 3.93 Temporary accommodation provided for the purpose of assessment will also be
excluded from our statutory scheme for a period of four months. Again, once the
accommodation provided is for a period of longer than four months it will come
within our scheme.
 3.94 All other supported housing will be treated consistently with our statutory scheme.
Social landlords will be required to provide accommodation on a type I basis
unless the provision falls within an exception to the statutory requirement.
 3.95 We recommend a limited exception to the requirement to provide type I
agreements where the landlord is providing supported housing. The exception will
last for the first two years of provision. After that time we consider that most
occupiers will have acquired the necessary skills to justify the provision of
permanent accommodation on a type I basis. Social landlords will have powers
available to them to respond to anti-social behaviour by occupiers with type I
agreements.
 3.96 For some residents the responsibilities and autonomy implied by the type I
agreement will not be appropriate and their landlords will consider that those
residents require greater control. In those circumstances social landlords will be
able to continue to use the type II agreement following an assessment of the
support needs of the resident and in particular a statement justifying the continued




 3.97 Managing a supported housing project imposes particular responsibilities upon a
landlord. It must ensure appropriate use of scarce accommodation, it must be able
to respond to the particular needs of residents and it must be able to act swiftly to
protect the safety of residents and workers where necessary.
 3.98 We recommend that a specific model agreement is drafted by the Secretary of
State, assisted by representatives of both providers and residents of supported
housing, in order that the needs of this type of provision are fully recognised.
 3.99 We recommend that where supported housing is provided on a type II basis
managers should be able to ask the police to exclude an occupier for a period of 48
hours without the necessity of going to court. The police exclusion order will only
be available to the police following a request by a designated manager when he or
she believes that a serious act of violence has occurred, that the safety of someone
on the premises is in danger from a resident or a visitor, or that the ability of a
resident to benefit directly from the support provided by the project has been
seriously impeded by the behaviour of a resident or a visitor.
 3.100 Police exclusion orders may be followed by an injunction to exclude the occupier
from the project if the management of the project decide that this is advisable. The
application for the injunction may be issued contemporaneously with possession
proceedings and the injunction in such circumstances will last until effective
eviction.
 3.101 The modified type II agreement and the police exclusion order will only be
available to relevant landlords. Relevant landlords will be defined more broadly
than our normal definition of social landlords since it will include charitable
housing trusts and housing charities. We do not consider that the broader powers
should be available to private landlords who have no public accountability.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PROPOSED SCHEME AND PRINCIPLES OF
LAND LAW
 3.102 Our scheme is designed to render the distinction between the lease and the licence
irrelevant for the determination of the rights and obligations of landlords and
occupiers. We anticipate that there will still be a number of related situations where
rights will need determination, not by our proposed scheme, but by the application
of principles of land law. One important example will be where a landlord transfers
his rights in the land to a third party. These consequential issues are not discussed
in this report; they will be considered further in the Final Report.
APPLICATION TO WALES
 3.103 The basic position under the devolution settlement is that, in Wales, the National
Assembly for Wales exercises powers that in England are exercised by the Secretary
of State. The National Assembly has responsibility for housing policy. We have
considered whether different provision for Wales would be appropriate. On one
important issue – the rule that social landlords should generally be required to use
the type I agreement – we have concluded that the National Assembly should have
greater powers than the Secretary of State in England. In other areas, however, we
have not considered it appropriate to recommend that the National Assembly have





 4.1 As noted in Part III,1 a central feature of the provisional proposals made in this
project was that reform of housing law should be shaped by what we described as
the “consumer approach”.
 4.2 In the past, housing legislation attempted to protect tenants against the weakness
of their bargaining position under unregulated principles of land law and contract
by overlaying separate statutory rules on top of the tenancy agreement. Our
proposed scheme seeks to create the appropriate levels of protection directly
through the terms of the agreement, by subjecting the terms themselves to
statutory regulation.
 4.3 Two essential principles underpin this approach:
 (1) agreements between landlords and occupiers should be more transparent;
so far as possible the rights and obligations of both parties to the
agreement should be set out there, and should not have to be discovered
by reference to supplementary rules in Acts of Parliament, law reports or
legal textbooks;
 (2) agreements should be fair; there should be a fair balance of rights and
obligations on both sides of the agreement, for both landlords and
occupiers.
 4.4 For some, this will be seen as representing a radical new approach to housing law.
In our view, it builds on developments that have already occurred. In particular,
the application of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999
(UTCCR)2 to rental agreements is now an established part of housing law. The
Office of Fair Trading have recently issued guidance on the fairness, or otherwise,
of terms in rental agreements.3 As might be anticipated, the OFT supported this
approach. But there was also broad, if not unanimous, support from a wide range
of consultees.
 4.5 At the same time, anxieties were expressed about the implications of this approach.
Some were concerned about the amount of detail that might need to go into the
occupation agreement. It was suggested that not many occupiers would in practice
read their agreements from cover to cover. This is a concern we share, and which
we suspect cannot be wholly eliminated. Nonetheless, the object of ensuring that
parties could potentially understand their relationship from a single document was
welcomed. It was also noted that the prospective use of the “model agreements”
we propose would increase the similarity between occupation agreements. This
1 Para 3.2.
2 SI 1999 No 2083.
3 Office of Fair Trading 381 (March 2003).
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would make it much easier for housing advisers – whether for landlords or
occupiers – to give advice about the parties’ rights and obligations.
 4.6 One or two respondents wondered whether the analogy between occupation
agreements and other forms of consumer contract was as close as we had
suggested. They observed that, unlike the position with other consumer contracts,
the residential occupier could not easily go to another supplier to purchase housing
goods or services, particularly in areas of the country where there remained
significantly high demand for housing and shortage of supply. Our response is that
one of the justifications for regulatory intervention to protect the consumer arises
where suppliers of services are able to use their market power to impose possibly
unfair terms on consumers. Our project seeks to create a fair balance of rights and
obligations.
 4.7 Some noted that, of itself, a consumer approach would not necessarily result in any
realignment of the power imbalance that exists in the landlord-occupier
relationship.4 While this may be true, we think that we need to create an
appropriate legal framework for the residential-rental relationship. We can then
consider the appropriate mechanisms for encouraging good practice and
discouraging inappropriate behaviour (on the part of occupiers as well as
landlords), which can be built on this foundation.5
IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONSUMER APPROACH
 4.8 The adoption of the consumer approach has a number of important implications,
which need to be spelled out clearly at the outset.
The focus on the contractual agreement
 4.9 First, in making our proposals for the reform of housing law, we want to move
away from the approach adopted hitherto that the right of an occupier to occupy a
home should depend on the grant of an estate in land (a leasehold interest)
however notional.
 4.10 In the past, much protective legislation in the housing context has only been
triggered where there was a tenancy, not where there was a licence. This generated
much litigation, particularly as the successful creation of a licence would take the
agreement outside the scope of the statutory schemes.
 4.11 For the purpose of the new scheme, we seek to ensure that this historic distinction
between a lease and a licence will no longer be of any importance.6 We think that it
4 For a critique of this approach, see Susan Bright, “A Consumer Perspective in Housing Law:
Rhetoric or Reality?” unpublished paper presented at the Socio-legal Studies Association
Conference, Nottingham 2003. Her complaint, in essence, is that we have not taken the
implications of this approach further; in part at least some of her criticisms may be
addressed in phase 2 of the project, assuming that it gets the go-ahead.
5 We anticipate that this will be a key part of Phase 2 of the project.
6 This aspect of the practical significance of the distinction fell away with the introduction, by
the Housing Act 1988, of the assured shorthold tenancy, with market rents and limited
security of tenure. The distinction will remain of significance in relation to the acquisition of
the landlord’s interest by third parties even under our scheme: see para 3.103 above.
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was not easy for people – either landlords or occupiers – to understand. Linking
rights to occupy to contractual agreements will be more comprehensible. We
received considerable support for this from consultees.
Model agreements
 4.12 Secondly, the UTCCR currently provide that terms prescribed by statute are
outside the scope of the UTCCR.7 They are, by definition, “fair” within the
meaning of the regulations. We recommend that the Secretary of State should have
power to prescribe model agreements, which will be found in secondary
legislation. We expect that the Secretary of State will ensure that, both as regards
the drafting and as regards the layout, these model agreements will conform to the
principles of fairness and transparency.
 4.13 The question of whether or not occupation agreements are UTCCR compliant is
currently a matter of considerable confusion and uncertainty for landlords. One of
the great advantages of our proposed scheme will be that those who use one of the
model agreements can be certain that all the terms in the model agreements will
be UTCCR compliant.8
Adapting the principles of the UTCCR
 4.14 Thirdly, there are important respects in which, to be effective as regards their
application to occupation agreements, it will be necessary to adapt the principles of
the UTCCR so that they are effective in the context of occupation agreements.
Negotiated terms
 4.15 One of the current features of the UTCCR is that the principles of fairness and
transparency in the regulations extend only to those terms in the contract that have
not been negotiated between the parties. We recommend that these principles
should cover individually negotiated terms in occupation agreements as well.9 We
do not think that this represents a major shift in the policy of housing law, which
has always been to try to ensure that there is fairness in the legal rights and
obligations of the parties; we merely seek to achieve this objective by a different
legislative route.
 4.16 Naturally, the degree to which a term was freely negotiated will be a factor in the
assessment of the fairness and transparency of the particular term. We anticipate
that individually negotiated terms will more readily pass the requirement of good
faith. It will be easier to show that any imbalance they create is not adverse to the
occupier.
7 UTCCR Reg 4(2)(a).
8 Any amendments made by the parties, or other additional negotiated terms must, on normal
principles, be fair and transparent.
9 The Law Commission has provisionally proposed a similar change in the context of its major
review of UCTA and the UTCCR. See Unfair Terms in Contracts: A Joint Consultation
Paper (2002) Consultation Paper No.166; Scottish Law Commission Consultation Paper
No119, paras 4.42 – 4.54.
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 4.17 These changes will require a degree of public education when the new scheme is
introduced, not only for landlords and tenants, but also for those bodies involved
in enforcement of consumer law. They may also involve extra enforcement work
for those bodies.10 But we do not regard these problems as insuperable.
 4.18 The categories of term we anticipate being included in occupation agreements are
discussed in Part VIII.
Key terms and core issues
 4.19 One feature of the UTCCR is that certain terms relating to what are usually
referred to as “core” issues, are exempt from the fairness requirements of the
UTCCR, so long as they are transparent. We wish to limit this exemption in
relation to housing agreements. We shall therefore recommend that one of the
components of our occupation agreement will be “key” terms. The exemption
from fairness permitted by the UTCCR will apply only to key terms that are also
core issues. Other terms which might be regarded as relating to a core issue will
not be exempt from the UTCCR, unless they are included within the statutory
model agreements. This will enhance for landlords the attractiveness of using the
model agreements, the terms of which will be UTCCR compliant. We discuss this
further below in Part VIII.
The status of the contracting parties
 4.20 At present, the UTCCR apply to “sellers or suppliers” and “consumers”.11 In
relation to agreements covered by our new scheme, we recommend that the
UTCCR should be modified to make it clear that this applies to all landlords and
occupiers. This will mean that all occupation agreements are covered, irrespective
of the “supplier” or “consumer” status of the landlord or occupier.
 4.21 As is well known, most private landlords rent only a very small number of
properties. We received representations that they should not be brought into our
proposed scheme. It was argued that some might innocently or accidentally find
themselves subject to agreements covered by our new scheme. We had some
objections from small landlords both to this proposal and to the proposal to
impose sanctions for failure to provide a written agreement even where the
occupier has not asked for one.
 4.22 However, many other respondents argued that one of the challenges of the new
regulatory framework was to ensure that small landlords better understood the
obligations and rights they were taking on when they entered occupation
agreements. We had representations from organised groups of professional
landlords complaining about unfair competition and bad publicity generated by
amateur landlords who do not do the job properly. Equally, it has been put to us
10 It might be that after implementation it became clear that enforcement of the regulations in
respect of housing agreements would be more efficient if local housing authority staff were
able to take on this work in conjunction with their regulatory work on stock other than their
own. The OFT could recommend adding local housing authorities to the list of “qualifying
bodies’” in Schedule 1 of the Regulations.
11 UTCCR Reg 4(1). “Seller or supplier” is defined as “any natural or legal person who…is
acting for purposes relating to his trade, business or profession…”: ibid, Reg 3(1).
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that “hobby” landlords frequently merely need help in understanding how they
should perform their role, and we believe that our model agreements will provide
them with assistance here.
 4.23 We have no wish to penalise unnecessarily those who make innocent mistakes. But
we do believe that anyone renting out property as someone else’s home should take
the matter seriously enough to ensure that they are acting properly. In any event,
the UTCCR do not impose criminal sanctions. They merely require landlords to
use fair and transparent terms. This does not seem a disproportionate burden to
impose on someone who has contracted to provide a home for another.
 4.24 Any potential prejudice to the innocent non-professional or accidental landlord,
which we think is small, is outweighed by the advantages of a general scheme
which is landlord-neutral, and where agreements are subject to the fairness and
transparency of the UTCCR. In any event, the ready availability of statutory model
agreements will make life very much easier, particularly for the “hobby” landlord.
They have nothing to fear from our proposals.
Structure and language of occupation agreements
 4.25 A very important consequence of the “consumer approach” is that careful
attention must be given to both the structure of occupation agreements and the
language used in them. We recommend that the Secretary of State is given power
to make regulations on both of these matters.
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PART V 
THE AGREEMENT TYPES: THEIR
DEFINITION AND USE
INTRODUCTION
 5.1 We recommend that our scheme should apply to all occupation agreements, save
those that we recommend should fall outside the scope of the scheme.1
 5.2 The definition of the two agreement types we propose will be on a “landlord-
neutral” basis. The reason for this is that this is one of the ways in which
simplification of housing law can be promoted. Our scheme should be broad and
inclusive, embracing the vast majority of occupation agreements. We shall
nevertheless recommend that there should be landlord-specific rules relating to
how each of the tenancy types may be used. In particular, social landlords will be
required to use the type I agreement unless defined conditions are satisfied. The
consultation process revealed strong support for this approach.
AGREEMENT TYPES
 5.3 We recommend that there should be two basic forms of occupation agreement. For
the purpose of this report we refer to them as the type I agreement and the type II
agreement.2
 5.4 The type I agreement will provide extensive security of tenure. It is largely
modelled on the current secure tenancy regime. Type I agreements can only be
created on a periodic basis. Given our proposals on how the type I agreement must
be used, around 90% of occupiers will occupy under type I agreements.
 5.5 The type II agreement will provide a very limited minimum level of security. It is
modelled on the current assured shorthold tenancy. It can be created on both a
periodic and a fixed-term basis.
 5.6 Key features will be common to both types of agreement: for example, the need for
a written agreement with fair terms and the need for due process in proceedings
for possession.
 5.7 In other respects, the rights and obligations arising under the two types will differ.
For this reason we must ensure that the line between the two is clear and does not
lead to unnecessary litigation. We wish to avoid the boundary disputes between
inclusion and exclusion from protection that have bedevilled housing law in the
past.
 5.8 We also want to ensure that those landlords who so desire can enhance or “write
up” the contractual terms of the type II agreement to the benefit of their occupiers.
1 The scope of the scheme is discussed in Part VI.
2 See paras 1.10 – 1.11 for an explanation of our approach to nomenclature in this report.
35
For example, this could involve agreeing not to use all the available grounds for
seeking possession, or granting rights to occupy for a longer fixed period of time.
Default positions
 5.9 In most cases, the agreement type will be clear from the face of the document,
certainly if the model agreements are used. But this will not always occur. For
example:
 (1) the document may not state what the agreement type is; or
 (2) a particular agreement type may have been used which, it is now argued,
was not what was intended.
 5.10 We have decided to recommend default rules to determine the type of the
agreement. Thus:
 (1) the default for a social landlord is the type I agreement; and
 (2) the default for any other landlord is the type II agreement.
 5.11 If a landlord wishes to issue an agreement which is not the default agreement for
that description of landlord, the landlord must give express notice to that effect.
This will be achieved, either by a preamble to the agreement, or by a separate
notice to the occupier. In the absence of such notice, the agreement will be the
relevant default agreement.
Common features
 5.12 The common features of the two types of agreement will be as follows:
 (1) both are contractual agreements for the right to occupy premises as a
home;
 (2) they will be stated in writing;
 (3) they will contain a range of key, compulsory-minimum, special and default
terms;
 (4) those terms (other than key terms) will either be deemed to be fair (by
being contained in a model agreement) or will be subject to regulation as
to fairness and transparency;
 (5) agreements will not be capable of being lawfully determined by the
landlord save by due process in the courts.
Particular features
Type I agreements
 5.13 Type I agreements will have particular features:
 (1) their duration will be indefinite;
 (2) they will have only discretionary grounds for possession;
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 (3) they will contain a broader range of compulsory-minimum terms.
Their underlying feature is security for the occupier.
Type II agreement
 5.14 Type II agreements provide a more flexible form of rental agreement.
 (1) They will be able to be either fixed-term or of indefinite duration.
 (2) They will be subject to mandatory grounds for possession, including the
notice-only ground, as well as the discretionary grounds.
 (3) They will contain a narrower range of compulsory-minimum terms.
 (4) The power to the vary terms of the agreement will be less restricted than
that available to the landlord of a type I agreement.
USE OF THE AGREEMENT TYPES
The social rented sector
 5.15 As we set out in CP 162, the basis of our approach to agreement types is landlord
neutrality. By this we meant that the definition of a particular agreement type is
not to be determined by the identity – private, public or social – of the landlord.
However this principle of landlord neutrality is limited to the question of
definition; it does not answer questions about the use of the two agreement types.
 5.16 Certain classes of landlord either have responsibilities and functions imposed upon
them by statute or have particular concerns and constraints deriving from their
nature, such as charitable status. Local authorities are public authorities for the
purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998. Local authority landlords and registered
social landlords receive public subsidies. Local authorities have responsibilities
towards housing the homeless, even though these are often delegated to registered
social landlords.
 5.17 In the consultation, some social landlords argued that they should have complete
freedom to choose which type of agreement they used. The overwhelming
response, however, was that it was essential to limit the freedom of social landlords
to choose which agreement type they might use. We accept these arguments. We
recommend that there should be constraints on local authority landlords and
registered social landlords regarding their use of type I and type II agreements.
 5.18 Nevertheless, our recommendations create the opportunity for bringing much
greater coherence into the legal treatment of the occupiers of social housing. This
was a matter of significance to the Department for the Environment, Transport
and the Regions3 at the time of the Law Commission reference. Nick Raynsford
MP, then Minister for Housing and Planning, stated, “We also intend to look to
the review as the sensible vehicle within which to take forward our intention,
announced in the Housing Policy Statement (“Quality and choice: a decent home
3 Now Office of the Deputy Prime Minister.
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for all – the way forward for housing”) to look at a single form of tenure for the
social housing sector and other tenure flexibilities.”4
 5.19 Currently, the two major providers of social housing, local authorities and
registered social landlords, operate under different legislative structures. This is
despite the fact that their client groups are very similar and that as a result of large
scale voluntary transfer of social housing, registered social landlords now own
former council estates. (Indeed, the powers and responsibilities of local authority
landlords and registered social landlords are moving increasingly close. For
instance, the Police Reform Act 2002 extended the availability of anti-social
behaviour orders to registered social landlords.)
 5.20 Our recommendations will not eliminate all differences between the occupiers of
local authority landlords and those of registered social landlords. There will still be
significant differences in their respective rights to buy.5 And registered social
landlords will not, simply as a result of being registered social landlords,
automatically be deemed to be public authorities for the purposes of the Human
Rights Act.6
 5.21 Whilst we recommend restrictions on the use of agreement types, we want to
enable social landlords to respond appropriately to housing market and housing
management requirements. We think there are two ways to encourage this.
 5.22 The first is to allow for enhancement of the terms of agreements. At present the
content of the tenancy is prescribed in great detail by the relevant statutes. We seek
to provide landlords with flexibility for them to enhance the terms on which they
offer accommodation to occupiers, for example where they provide additional
services, or where they seek to attract business in areas where there is low demand
for housing. We also consider that our recommendations will be able to encourage
new forms of partnership agreements, for example between local authorities and
private landlords, or where other social landlords want to provide more complex
mixes of social and market housing.
 5.23 Secondly, we want to provide greater flexibility for social landlords in relation to
their use of tenancy types. The need for flexibility was recognised in our terms of
reference. Announcing them, Nick Raynsford MP said that the Law Commission’s
work would “enable social landlords to make better use of their stock” and
“facilitate greater choice and diversity in the housing sector”.
 5.24 Thus we recognise there will be circumstances in which use of the type II
agreement by social landlords will be appropriate. A list of these is set out at
paragraphs 5.30 to 5.50 below.
4 Hansard (HC) 26 March 2001, vol 365, col 433W.
5 The rights to buy and to acquire are not affected by our scheme.
6 We did raise, as a consultation issue, (see CP 162 paras 5.45 – 5.53) whether we should
recommend that all RSLs should be deemed to be public authorities for the purposes of the
Human Rights Act 1998. There was a good deal of support for this idea; but there was also
very considerable hostility to the suggestion, particularly from registered social landlords and
Government respondents. In the light of this, and our conclusion that it was not a necessary
step for the purposes of our scheme, we have not pursued the idea.
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 5.25 We are also anxious that our scheme for occupation agreements should be able to
respond to new social imperatives relating to the provision of rented housing. Our
proposals for the use of agreements should not, therefore, be regarded as fixed for
all time. Rather they should be seen as providing policy makers with flexible tools
to achieve their policy objectives. (For instance, current concern about the housing
of key workers in areas of high housing demand may at some time require a policy
response which would include allowing social landlords to use type II agreements
for schemes for key workers.)
 5.26 The achievement of these objectives requires two things:
 (1) defining the social rented sector; and
 (2) defining the circumstances in which that sector may grant type II
agreements.
Defining the social rented sector
 5.27 We recommend that the definition of social landlords should embrace local
authority landlords, and all registered social landlords other than fully mutual
housing associations.7
Defining the circumstances in which that sector may grant type II
agreements
 5.28 Under the present law, certain categories of housing provision made in particular
by local authorities fall outside the scope of statutory protection altogether. These
exceptions to the current secure tenancy regime constitute one of the sources of
complexity in the current law. The reason why these categories of letting are not
secure tenancies is because there are special factors which justify their exclusion. In
general terms, they do not represent those classes of tenancy which would justify
full secure status.
 5.29 In seeking to devise a more coherent legal framework, we are anxious that the
number of agreements that fall totally outside our scheme should be limited. At
the same time, we accept that it would not be right to require social landlords only
to grant type I agreements. The type II agreement provides a means of giving
social landlords considerable flexibility in those cases where full security is not
justified.
 5.30 We recommend that social landlords should be able to grant type II agreements in
the following classes of case:
 (1) probationary agreements;
7 Local authorities, in response to Government policy, are increasingly using Arms Length
Management Organisations (ALMOs). ALMOs are companies limited by guarantee and not
profit making, which are legally independent from the local authority. They provide housing
services to tenants and leaseholders under a management agreement with the local
authority. They are not, however, legally the occupier’s landlord, and accordingly we do not
think their use would undermine or side-step the obligation of a local authority, as landlord,
to use type I agreements.
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 (2) demotion;
 (3) service occupancies;
 (4) students;
 (5) homeless persons following a decision that full housing duties are owed to
the applicant;
 (6) provision of accommodation on a temporary basis;
 (7) other cases:
 (a) development of co-operative housing;
 (b) supported housing;
 (c) commercial “market” provision.
 5.31 There will of course be no compulsion to grant type II agreements in any of these
contexts; social landlords will always be able to enter type I agreements. However,
in the light of representations made to us during the consultation, we agree that
these are the special cases in which social landlords should have the flexibility to
grant type II agreements.
 5.32 Where the social landlord decides to grant a type II agreement, we recommend
that it should be required to notify the holder or potential holder of the occupation
agreement that an exception to the normal statutory requirement applies.
PROBATIONARY AGREEMENTS
 5.33 We recommend that social landlords should be able to use the type II agreement
during a probationary period. This will be available
 (1) where the occupier was not immediately prior to the grant of the
agreement a type I occupier with any social landlord; or
 (2) where the occupier or a member of his or her family has been subject to
proceedings for and found to have engaged in anti-social behaviour.
This will replace the current “introductory tenancy”.8 The key distinction between
our recommendation and the introductory tenancy is that probationary use of type
II agreements will be able to be granted on an individual basis. Landlords will not
have to adopt the “all or nothing” approach of the current law.
 5.34 The probationary period would initially be for a maximum of 12 months, although
in line with our objective of greater flexibility, landlords would not be obliged to
make them last for the whole of that period. Thereafter, the landlord would have
power to extend the probationary period for a further six months, where the
behaviour of the occupier warrants such an extension. Prior periods as a type II
8 Housing Act 1996, Part V, Ch 1.
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occupier with another social landlord should count towards the probationary
period in certain circumstances.9
 5.35 At the end of the probationary period the occupation agreement will automatically
become a type I agreement. Conceptually, probationary occupiers are type I
occupiers on probation. The end of the probation period will signal the end of the
availability of the notice-only and the other mandatory grounds for possession and
the start of full security of tenure. At this stage the occupier will have the right to
request a written statement of the (revised) agreement.
DEMOTION
 5.36 A second situation in which social landlords will be able to use type II agreements
will be when they have asked a court for an order to this effect in proceedings for
anti-social behaviour.10 If the court decides to make such an order, it will provide
that an occupier, currently under a type I agreement, should have that agreement
demoted to a type II agreement.
SERVICE OCCUPIERS
 5.37 Social landlords should not be obliged to provide service occupiers (such as school
caretakers) with type I agreements (though they will be able to do so if they wish).
We recommend that where the occupier is an employee of the social landlord and
the contract of employment requires him to occupy the premises for the better
performance of his duties, the landlord will be entitled to grant a type II
agreement.11 This exception to the statutory requirement to let on a type I
agreement should extend12 to other categories of public sector employees, for
example the police and fire service employees.
STUDENTS
 5.38 We recommend that where accommodation is provided by a social landlord to an
occupier who is a student and the occupation agreement is granted to enable the
student to attend a designated course at an educational establishment, the
agreement could be a type II agreement.13
9 This will reproduce the effect of Housing Act 1996, s 125 (3).
10 Discussed below, para 15.37.
11 This exception is based upon the current exclusion at Housing Act 1985, Schedule 1, para
2.
12 As does Housing Act 1985, Schedule 1, para 2.
13 Housing Act 1985, Schedule 1, para 10(4) provides that “designated course” means a course
of any kind designated by regulations made by the Secretary of State for the purposes of this
paragraph and “educational establishment” means a university or establishment of further
education. These definitions will be retained.
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DUTY TO ACCOMMODATE FOLLOWING A DECISION UNDER SECTION 193 OF THE
HOUSING ACT 1996
 5.39 Most duties to accommodate arising under Part VII of the Housing Act 1996 are
temporary and will be wholly excluded from the statutory scheme.14
 5.40 We think that the duty which arises after a housing authority has decided that it
owes an applicant full housing duties should be covered by our scheme. We
considered whether, in such cases, social landlords should be under a duty to
provide a type I agreement. But we have concluded that, in general, type I
agreements should only be granted following an allocation under Part VI of the
Housing Act 1996.
 5.41 We think it would not be appropriate for social landlords, in fulfilling their housing
obligations under the homeless persons legislation, to be obliged to provide
accommodation on a type I agreement. In many circumstances this would make
their housing management role much more difficult.
PROVISION OF ACCOMMODATION ON A TEMPORARY BASIS
 5.42 Under the present law, local authorities have a number of ways in which they can
provide housing temporarily without granting a full secure tenancy. We
recommend that the provision of such temporary accommodation should continue
to be an exception to the general requirement to provide accommodation on a type
I basis. Such accommodation will, in future, be provided on the basis of a type II
agreement.
Existing temporary housing exceptions
 5.43 There are currently four situations to which these recommendations will apply:
 (1) where accommodation is provided temporarily on land acquired for
subsequent redevelopment;
 (2) where temporary accommodation is provided while works on other
premises are being undertaken;
 (3) where temporary accommodation is provided for persons moving into an
area to take up employment there; and
 (4) other short-term arrangements.
       These exceptions will in effect reproduce the current law.15
New temporary housing exceptions
 5.44 We also wish to extend the temporary housing exception in two particular
circumstances.
14 See para 6.29.
15 Housing Act 1985, Schedule 1, Paras 3, 5, 6 and 7.
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 5.45 First, in CP168 we discussed what should happen when an occupier makes an
arrangement with a person to occupy the premises, contrary to the landlord’s veto,
or without obtaining the requisite consent from the landlord.16 We wanted to avoid
creating a new form of “tolerated trespasser”. To deal with this, we recommend
that it should be open to the landlord to enter into a temporary agreement with the
new (unauthorised) occupier on the basis of a type II agreement.
 5.46 Secondly, we recommend that social landlords should have the ability to enter into
a temporary agreement with a person who occupies premises after the occupier has
died leaving no one with a statutory entitlement to take over the agreement as
successor.
OTHER CASES
 5.47 Finally, there are three special cases where we think that a social landlord should
be permitted to let on a type II basis.
Development of co-operative housing
 5.48 While fully mutual housing associations or co-operative housing associations are
excluded from the definition of social landlords, circumstances can arise in which a
registered social landlord which is not fully mutual develops homes for subsequent
transfer to a fully mutual housing association. Any occupation agreement made in
these circumstances should be an exception to the requirement to provide type I
agreements and our Bill should provide for this.
Supported housing
 5.49 The application of the scheme to supported housing is a particularly difficult issue.
We discuss this separately in paragraphs Part XVI. There will be circumstances in
this context in which social landlords must be able to grant type II agreements.
Commercial (market) provision
 5.50 Certain RSLs provide accommodation on a commercial “market” basis. This
accommodation has not been funded via public monies and cannot be described as
social provision. Where accommodation is being provided on a commercial (non-
subsidised) basis, the social landlord should be able to choose whether to let on a
type I or a type II basis.
ADDING TO THE LIST OF EXCEPTIONS
 5.51 We recommend that the Secretary of State, and the National Assembly for Wales,
should have the power to add to the list of exceptions. The provision of housing,
particularly in the social sector, is not static – providers continue to innovate, and
in some circumstances, we accept that this will require further exceptions to the
general rule that social landlords should use type I agreements. A particular
current example is the reaction to the crisis in the affordability of housing in
London and other areas of housing pressure. Social landlords have developed, or
are considering developing, schemes to let on assured shorthold tenancies to
particular groups of workers, in particular nurses, teachers and police officers. We
16 CP 168 paras 2.45 – 2.67.
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accept that this is a broad power, and will therefore recommend, in respect of an
English order, that it be subject to the highest level of scrutiny by Parliament,
namely the affirmative resolution procedure.
Private landlords
 5.52 We recommend that all occupation agreements provided by private landlords
should be type II agreements unless the landlord has notified the occupier to the
contrary. If the private landlord fails to provide a written agreement or the written
agreement provided fails to clarify whether it is a type I or a type II agreement, the
agreement shall be deemed to be a type II agreement. The exception, whereby the
private landlord notifies the occupier that the agreement will be a type I
agreement, is similar to the current legal position, when a private landlord
positively grants an assured (rather than assured shorthold) tenancy.
FACILITY TO “WRITE UP” THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT
 5.53 As noted earlier, we are anxious to encourage all landlords, both social and private,
to “write up” the terms of their agreements, so that the contract provides more
than the statutory minimum requirements. We recommend that the scheme should
make it clear that this option is available to all landlords.
THE POSITION IN WALES
 5.54 As noted in Part III, we have concluded that the National Assembly for Wales
should have the power to vary the rule that, in general, social landlords should be
required to use the type I agreement.
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PART VI 
THE SCOPE OF THE SCHEME
INTRODUCTION
 6.1 One of the principal complexities of the present law is the wide variety of types of
housing status that occupiers of rented housing may have. While we cannot get rid
of all of these, our aim is to produce a statutory scheme of protection that reduces
the current number and embraces the vast majority of occupation agreements.
This aim was widely welcomed by consultees.
 6.2 This Part sets out the classes of agreement that will fall within the scheme and
those that will remain outside. It considers the extent to which existing statutory
tests under present schemes of protection can be eliminated, thus making the basic
definition of the scope of our proposed scheme more straightforward. It indicates
the extent to which existing schemes will be mapped on to the scheme we
proposed. First, though, we discuss one of the most controversial of our
recommendations: the abolition of the six-months’ moratorium.
ABOLITION OF THE SIX-MONTHS’ MORATORIUM
 6.3 This rule, which currently applies to the assured shorthold tenancies favoured by
private landlords, prevents a court from making an order for possession on the
notice-only ground for possession within the first six months of the start of a
tenancy.1 In CP 162, we asked whether this rule should go. The issue sharply
divided consultees.
 6.4 Many people coming from the tenant’s perspective thought that the rule provided
some protection for a tenant, albeit limited, against a cavalier landlord. The
problem, however, was that when pressed they were not able to provide empirical
evidence of the practical value of this limited protective measure. We heard of no
cases where, as a result of the existence of the moratorium, a tenant started
proceedings against the landlord, for instance to enforce the statutory repairing
covenant. Indeed, Shelter was one of a number of tenants’ groups which argued
that the period should be extended to 12 months.
 6.5 Others coming from the landlord’s point of view considered the moratorium to be
of little significance in practice. Some argued that the rule did have a negative
impact on the flexibility of the housing market to provide very short-term lettings.
 6.6 From the perspective of the project, we knew that, were the moratorium to be
retained, we would have to provide for a much longer list of exceptions to the
scheme.2 This was because we recognised that there are situations in which it
would not be appropriate to expect a landlord to have to wait for the six months’
period of delay. At the same time, we did not want our ambition to make
1 This will not, of course, apply if the agreement is for a fixed term of more than six months.
The rule only applies to the first agreement of the same premises with the same tenant.
Housing Act 1988 s 21(5).
2 See discussion in CP 162, paras 8.15 – 8.27, 9.92 – 9.162.
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recommendations to simplify the law to undermine important tenants’ rights.
Simplification of the law and individual social justice do not always lead to the
same conclusion.
 6.7 At present, the moratorium has little direct effect. Private landlords overwhelmingly
let on assured shortholds with contractually fixed terms of six months or more.3
Thus, notwithstanding the moratorium, the agreement itself prevents the landlord
from taking possession using the notice-only procedure until at least six months
have elapsed.
 6.8 The question really, therefore, is whether the moratorium has an indirect effect by
persuading landlords to use six month fixed terms, rather than periodic tenancies.
We do not think that it does. First, landlords tell us that they like to use six month
fixed terms because of the contractual stability it brings by “locking in” the tenant
to a fixed period.4 Secondly, if the moratorium was an important factor in
landlords’ decisions to use fixed term agreements, it is surprising that they
continue to use six month (or longer) fixed-term agreements after the initial six
month period covered by the moratorium has expired.
 6.9 It was put to us that if there were no moratorium, a landlord would then rent on a
periodic basis so that if a potential tenant turned up willing to pay a higher rent
than that paid by the tenant already in the premises, the landlord could then
simply evict the existing (perfectly satisfactory) tenant to put in the one willing to
pay the higher rent. But if this consideration really would change landlords’ letting
behaviour, they would now let on periodic tenancies after the first six months. And
they do not.
 6.10 There was one argument about the relationship between housing benefit delays
and the moratorium that caused us sufficient concern that we commissioned some
economic research. The argument was that, should the moratorium be abolished,
there may be situations in which it could be in the economic interest of a landlord
to seek to obtain possession from an occupier on the notice-only ground during
the first six months. This could arise because of the time taken to process a
housing benefit application. The research, conducted by Professor Szymanski of
Imperial College, London, suggested that this might happen.5
 6.11 The argument runs as follows. Once a claim for housing benefit is made, each
claim takes time to be decided. Straightforward claims that are decided in favour of
the claimant will tend to be determined more speedily than complex claims, many
of which will be decided against the claimant. The time taken to determine a claim
for housing benefit may therefore be taken as an indicator as to how likely it is that
the claim will eventually be decided in favour of the claimant. The more time that
has elapsed without the claim being decided, the more likely it is that the claim will
not be decided in the claimant’s favour and the greater the probability that the
3 Twelve month fixed term tenancies, for instance, are the standard in the student market.
4 Although it is also true that there is a comparatively high level of ignorance of the law: many
landlords apparently still believe that to be an assured shorthold, a tenancy must be (at least)
a six-months fixed term, as was the case before the Housing Act 1996 came into force.
5 Copies of the research are available on request from the Law Commission.
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landlord will not receive the anticipated rental income. Landlords who believe this
to be true may use the fact that a claim has not been settled by a particular date as
a trigger for eviction (as a way of minimising losses from unsettled claims).
 6.12 Local authorities differ significantly in the efficiency with which they process
claims. Where a local authority is known to be very inefficient, then almost all
decisions will take a relatively long time to be made. The landlord in such
situations will not be so concerned about delay, at least for the first few months,
because all claims – whether ultimately in favour of the claimant or not – take a
long time to decide. Perversely, where a local authority is relatively efficient and
processes claims rapidly on average, then the fact that an individual claim has not
yet been decided even within a fairly short period of time may lead the landlord to
conclude that the decision is likely to be adverse to the claimant. Under these
circumstances the landlord may decide that it is in his economic interest to start
proceedings for possession (whether or not the specific claim would eventually
have been decided in favour of the claimant). If landlords acted in this way then
some evictions will occur in relation to claims for housing benefit which, had the
landlord held fire, would have been successful. On this argument, the abolition of
the six months’ moratorium could lead to some increase in proceedings for
possession in cases where the landlord has let to an occupier, knowing that the
occupier will apply for housing benefit to cover the rent, and local authorities are
relatively efficient at administering the benefit.
 6.13 It should be noted that, in any event, a landlord who is really concerned about
whether or not the rent will be paid by a tenant who is in arrears can – under the
present law – commence proceedings for possession if there are two months’
arrears of rent, both at the date of the start of proceedings and at the date of the
hearing. The six months’ moratorium does not apply to these cases. In such cases,
however, the landlord cannot take advantage of the accelerated possession
procedure.
 6.14 Our conclusions are that:
 (1) the six months’ moratorium does not apply to assured tenants who are
currently in the social rented sector and who will in future become
occupiers with type I agreements with full security of tenure;
 (2) it does not offer private sector tenants who might wish to assert their
rights against their landlord any significant effective statutory protection;6
 (3) the majority of private sector tenants get as good, if not better, contractual
protection through the terms of their agreements, and we see no reason
why this should change;
 (4) the rule prevents the private rental sector from being as flexible as it could
be; and
6 We hope to consider, in phase 2 of this project, ways in which landlords who are unwilling to
fulfil their contractual obligations under occupation agreements may be persuaded to do so.
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 (5) were it to be retained, it would add significantly to the complexity of our
scheme.
 6.15 Therefore we recommend that the moratorium should not be a part of the scheme
we propose.
 6.16 We remain concerned about the potential problem identified by Professor
Szymanski. At root, the problem he identified is one of the administration of
housing benefit. We think it should be addressed within the housing benefit
scheme, rather than by distorting housing law. Accordingly, if our
recommendations generally are accepted by Government, including abolition of
the moratorium, we suggest that the Department of Work and Pensions might
consider whether a housing benefit application in respect of a new7 letting should
be required to be on an initial six months’ fixed term type II agreement.
CONTRACTS GRANTING THE RIGHT TO OCCUPY AS A HOME
 6.17 We recommend that, unless there are compelling social policy grounds for
excluding them or they are covered by another statutory code, all contractual
agreements granting the right to occupy premises as a home8, whenever created
and regardless of the identity of the landlord, should be included within our
scheme.
 6.18 It will govern letting agreements provided by private landlords, local authorities,
housing associations and charities, and regardless of whether they are, in land law,
leases or licences.
The lease-licence distinction
 6.19 One of the complexities of the present law is that the Housing Act 1988 (as did the
Rent Act 1977 before it) applies only to arrangements that, in law, are leases
(tenancies),9 not licences. This is the result of the statutory formulation which only
applies where a dwelling has been “let”.10 (The Housing Act 1985 appeared to
extend the scope of that Act to licences, but even this has not been without its
7 The problem identified by Professor Szymanski would not apply where a person became
eligible for housing benefit after the initial six months of a periodic letting, in that such a
person would be no more vulnerable if the moratorium were to be abolished than they are
now. While it is conceivable that it would apply if the occupier became eligible shortly after
the start of a periodic agreement, the effect is likely to be marginal, in that it is very unlikely
that this possibility alone would dissuade landlords from their current practise of generally
letting on six months fixed terms.
8 This phrase may cause problems in a small number of cases where a person lives, on a long-
term basis, in an hotel. We have not sought to try to define periods of residence in hotels that
are clearly excluded (eg as holiday lets, or because they are so short-term that they could not
possibly be regarded as a giving the right to occupy as a home) from those where it could be
argued that the nature of the occupation was as a home. We think that in such rare cases, the
matter would be a matter of fact, to be determined if necessary by a court.
9 Lord Templeman in Street v Mountford [1985] AC 809, 816 provided the following
definition of a tenancy, “My lords, there is no doubt that the traditional distinction between
a tenancy and a licence of land lay in the grant of land for a term at a rent with exclusive
possession.”
10 See the early, formative case of Oakley v Wilson [1927] 2 KB 279.
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complications.11) While the practical importance of the distinction has receded in
recent years,12 it nonetheless retains its potential for complexity. We think this
distinction is out of place in a modern system of housing law. We recommend that
our scheme should apply to all contractual occupation agreements, not just those
classifiable as tenancies.
 6.20 While we seek to render the lease-licence distinction irrelevant so far as the
question of which arrangements fall within our proposed scheme are concerned, it
will remain of significance in the determination of certain third-party rights, where
it will still be important to rely on established principles of property law.
INCLUSIONS WITHIN THE SCHEME
 6.21 A consequence of the adoption of this broad approach, taken together with our
recommendations on the “six months’ moratorium” (see above paragraphs 6.3 –
6.16), is that we recommend that a number of arrangements currently excluded
from schemes of protection should be brought within the scope of the scheme we
propose. This will make a significant contribution to the simplification of the law.
 6.22 Most of the classes of letting currently outside statutory protection will be
incorporated in our scheme as type II agreements. Where these are currently
provided by social landlords, specific statutory provision will ensure that these
types of agreement will not be type I agreements, but type II agreements.13
 6.23 The types of agreement we recommend should be brought within the scope of our
new scheme are:
 (1) service occupancies;
 (2) crown tenancies;
 (3) student accommodation provided by universities and local authorities;
 (4) agreements made by fully mutual housing associations (co-operatives);14
11 Housing Act 1985, s 79(3) states: “The provisions of this Part apply in relation to a licence
to occupy a dwelling-house (whether or not granted for a consideration) as they apply in
relation to a tenancy”. However, in Westminster City Council v Clark [1992] 2 AC 288, the
House of Lords held that a licensee could only qualify as a secure tenant if he or she had
been granted exclusive possession of a separate dwelling house. In that particular case Mr
Clarke had signed a “licence” agreement containing a statement that he did not have
exclusive possession of the self contained bedsitting room he was renting in a rehabilitation
hostel owned by the plaintiffs. The agreement also contained a mobility clause entitling the
plaintiffs to move Mr Clarke to another room without notice. The House of Lords found
that the plaintiffs had retained possession of all the rooms of the hostel in order to supervise
and control the activities of the occupiers.
12 This is the result of the creation of the concept of the assured shorthold tenancy by the
Housing Act 1988; as this reduced the level of regulation on private landlords, so the
incentive on them to seek to avoid the provisions of the legislation by the purported use of
licences has also sharply reduced.
13 These are the classes of agreement discussed in paras 5.28 – 5.51 above.
14 The principal issue raised by respondents representing co-operatives was that those provided
with accommodation by a housing co-operative should not remain entitled to that
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 (5) temporary housing provided by social landlords;
 (6) agricultural occupancies under the Housing Act 1988 (although with
important changes to preserve existing substantive rights – see paragraphs
6.55 to 6.60 below); and
 (7) tenancies arising under Part 1 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 at the
end of long leases.
 6.24 Introductory tenancies, created under the Housing Act 1996, should be dealt with
by transitional provisions.
 6.25 Residents in almshouses are currently excluded from the Housing Act 1985 by
special provision to that effect. There is, however, doubt as to whether this
exclusion is necessary following the decision in Gray v Taylor.15 In that case, the
almshouse landlord successfully argued that residents in an almshouse were
excluded from statutory protection because the residents were not regarded as
tenants, but as beneficiaries under a trust, and the payments they made for this
privilege were not rent. On this analysis, residents in almshouse are not in a
contractual relationship with the trustees of the almshouse. In view of the
requirement that our scheme should apply only to contractual agreements,
residents in almshouses will be exempt on that basis.
EXCLUSIONS FROM THE SCHEME
 6.26 As noted above, there will be two classes of exclusion from the scheme.
Agreements coming within other schemes
 6.27 First, we have concluded that there should be specifically excluded from our
proposed scheme those classes of agreement that fall within other statutory
regimes.
 (1) Long leases. We take the view that leases for substantial periods are more
akin to owner-occupation than to rental agreements. Usually they are
acquired only by the payment of a substantial premium. Leases for a term
certain of 21 years or more are currently excluded from the definition of
secure tenancy16 and are indirectly placed outside the scope of assured
tenancies as the result of the current rules on the exclusion from that
scheme of leases at low or no rent.17 We recommend that all leases for 21
years or more should fall outside our scheme. The exclusion will also
extend to agreements for the sale of residual periods of a long lease, even
though they may now have less than 21 years to run. The provisions of
Part 1 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954, which provide for what
accommodation if they were themselves no longer members of the co-operative. We conclude
that this outcome is reasonable and can be achieved by appropriate use of type II
agreements.
15 [1998] 1 WLR 1093.
16 Housing Act 1985, s 115 and Schedule 1, para 1.
17 Housing Act 1988, Schedule 1, para 3.
50
happens when a long lease comes to an end, will be adapted to fit our
proposed scheme.
 (2) Business premises and agricultural holdings/businesses. While we do not
consider that our Bill should be limited to agreements relating to premises
designed, modified or equipped for residential purposes, it is important
that the agreement confers the right to occupy premises as a home. If the
premises in question are not premises designed, modified or equipped for
residential purposes but rather are business premises, the question of
whether our statutory scheme applies will depend upon the contract and
not upon the premises. Rental agreements of business premises for the
purposes of carrying out a business will continue to be covered by Part II
of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954. The business exclusion will also
embrace the exclusion of licensed premises. On a similar basis our scheme
will continue to exclude “agricultural holdings” covered by the
Agricultural Holdings Act 1986, and “farm business tenancies” covered by
the Agricultural Tenancies Act 1995.
 (3) Mobile homes. These are protected by their own statutory scheme – the
Mobile Homes Act 1983.
 (4) Rent Act tenancies. For practical reasons, we have concluded that tenancies
still protected by the Rent Act 1977 should remain within the Rent Act
scheme and, at least for the present, not be brought into the scheme
recommended here.18
 (5) Rent (Agriculture) Act tenancies. For similar reasons, we also recommend
that tenancies protected by the Rent (Agriculture) Act 1976 should
remain within that scheme, rather than being brought into the newly
proposed scheme. The current position is of long standing and the
numbers of people affected are small, and reducing.
 6.28 The consultation revealed broad support for these exclusions.
Other categories of exclusion on social policy grounds
 6.29 There is a number of other categories of agreement that we have concluded should
also be excluded from our proposed scheme. These may be broadly described as
“social policy” exclusions.
 (1) Holiday lettings. These have long been excluded from statutory regulatory
schemes. We think this exclusion should be continued.
 (2) Resident landlords. We think agreements with a resident landlord should
continue to be excluded from the scheme. We have however come to the
view that the current exclusion of the tenants of resident landlords from
the Housing Act 1988 is too broad and should not be replicated in our
scheme. We prefer the definition of resident landlord used for the purpose
of the exclusion of tenancies and licences from the Protection from
18 See para 6.62 below.
51
Eviction Act 1977. That definition depends upon the landlord actually
sharing living accommodation19 with the tenant. This exclusion would be
lost if the resident landlord did not continue to reside in the premises as
his only or principal home (and could not be revived even if the landlord
returned to live in the premises). The exclusion would not apply where the
occupier resides, not with the landlord, but a member of the landlord’s
family. In such a case, a type II agreement would be created, unless the
member of the family in question became the landlord of the occupier by
entering into a direct contractual relationship with the occupier. Then the
normal exclusion would apply.
 (3) Accommodation provided as a temporary expedient to a trespasser. This is
currently excluded from protection and we think it should remain
excluded.
 (4) Housing for the homeless. At present, all accommodation allocated by a
housing authority to an applicant who is owed duties under the provisions
of Part VII of the Housing Act 1996 is excluded from statutory protection.
We think this position should be retained, except that housing provided
under the full housing duty should be included (as a type II agreement).
 (5) Other special categories of accommodation. There is a range of types of
accommodation which could be argued to be homes but which we think is
of a sufficiently distinct character to fall outside the scheme. These
include: residential provision registered under the Care Standards Act
2000; hospitals defined by the National Health Service Act 1977; and
military barracks. We recommend that the Secretary of State should have
an exceptional power to add to this list, by order, to meet particular
situations, analogous to those identified above.
 (6) Supported housing. In CP 162, we suggested that all supported housing
schemes should be excluded from our proposed scheme. We have now
modified this position in the light of strong representations from those
providing sheltered housing. They stressed that a blanket exclusion would
not be appropriate given the enormous variety of schemes in existence.
For example, while some schemes offer very short-term emergency
accommodation to those coming direct from the street, others are more
long-term, often part of a care strategy to assist the person to a position
where he or she could take full responsibility for meeting their own
housing needs. In the light of these representations, we now recommend
that while some supported housing schemes should indeed be excluded
from our scheme, others should come within it. We deal with these issues
more fully in Part XVI below.
19 Under the Protection from Eviction Act 1977, accommodation means any accommodation
other than storage, a staircase, passage, corridor or other means of access. See s 3A (4) &
(5).
52
ABOLITION OR AMENDMENT OF EXISTING STATUTORY TESTS
 6.30 A consequence of this approach is that other tests which, historically, were inserted
in legislation in order to define the scope of that legislation will, in the scheme we
recommend, no longer be required. These include the following.
Rent
 6.31 Our primary requirement is that there should be a contractual agreement. Under
normal principles of the law of contract, for there to be a contract, there must be
“consideration”. Some forms of consideration may not appear to be like “rent” as
usually conceived. However, we think that provided that there is consideration in
the common law sense, then the agreement should fall within the scheme.
Agreements for high or low rent
 6.32 A related feature of earlier schemes was that they should not apply either where no
or only a low rent was paid, or where a high rent was paid.
 6.33 The primary purpose of the low or no rent exception was to exclude from earlier
schemes leasehold agreements where only a small ground rent was paid, in
addition to the premium paid to acquire the leasehold interest. We have accepted
that leaseholds should continue to fall outside the scope of our scheme, but think
that a more sensible way to achieve that exclusion is by placing grants of terms of
21 years or more outside the scheme.
 6.34 In relation to the exclusion of high rents, this can be explained historically on the
basis that earlier types of regulatory legislation were, at least initially, intended to
apply only to those in poorer and cheaper housing. It was assumed that those who
could afford to pay higher rents would have greater bargaining power and would
therefore be in less need of legislative protection.
 6.35 We are not aware of any empirical work that has attempted to assess this
assumption. But in any event we have come to the conclusion that to try to
distinguish between those who should come within a scheme of regulation and
those who should not, simply on the basis of the rent they can pay, is no longer
desirable.
 6.36 Furthermore, the nature of the protections available under the scheme we propose
are very different from those envisaged when the first protective legislation was
introduced. To retain a rent-threshold test would be to retain one element of
complication and inflexibility, which we are striving to remove. We have therefore
come to the conclusion that all occupation agreements should come within the
scheme, irrespective of the rent payable.
The identity of the landlord
 6.37 Another key feature of the present law is that one scheme applies to lettings by one
category of landlords,20 another to lettings created by other landlords. We have
20 Secure tenancies under the Housing Act 1985 can only be created by landlords who satisfy
the “landlord condition”: Housing Act 1985, s 80 (1).
53
concluded that, while there may well be a strong case21 for requiring defined
categories of landlord to use type I rather than type II agreements, we have not
been convinced that the identity of the landlord should be a key aspect of the
definition of the agreement type.
 6.38 We therefore recommend that the identity of the landlord should no longer be a
part of the definition of the agreement types that fall within the scope of the new
scheme. Removal of this requirement will facilitate greater flexibility in rental
housing provision, as the scope of the housing activities of local authorities, other
social landlords and private landlords become increasingly complex and inter-
dependent.
Occupation as only or principal home
 6.39 The current regulatory schemes attach only to a tenant’s occupation of premises as
his or her “only or principal” home. We accept that social landlords, in particular,
will want to ensure that persons in housing need do not have agreements relating
to more than one property. This, however, can be controlled by making it a
condition in the agreement.22 Thus a person occupying more than one home will
be in breach of the agreement, and liable to proceedings for possession being taken
against them. In addition, we recommend that it should still be possible for the
landlord to seek possession against a person who has provided false information
when applying for accommodation. There is no reason why an agreement relating
to a property that is not a person’s only or principal home, but nevertheless is (one
of) their homes should fall outside the statutory framework and be regulated only
by the common law. In addition, this approach avoids the need for complex case
law on what constitutes “occupation” for these purposes. There are cases where
the present law makes it extremely difficult for a landlord to know whether or not a
tenant is still in occupation of the premises.23
 6.40 There may, indeed, be cases where even a social landlord would be willing,
exceptionally, to allow an occupier to continue to rent a home which was not their
only or principal home. Examples are where the occupier works in one place, but
his or her family lives in another, or where the contractual occupier is in long term
hospital care, or in prison. If a landlord is willing to allow such an arrangement, it
could be accommodated by way of variation of the term which would otherwise
require use of the home as the only or principal home of the contractual occupier.
It would be impossible to sanction such an arrangement at the moment without
the occupier losing the statutory security attaching to his or her tenancy.
21 Discussed in paras 5.15 – 5.51 above.
22 We accept that one use to which the current “only or principal home” formula is put is to
limit the rights of secure tenants to buy their property. By recommending that our scheme
should apply to all agreements granting a right to occupy, we are not proposing any change
to the law on the extent of the right to buy. This will remain limited to the person’s “only or
principal” home. This will be dealt with in particular provisions relating to the right to buy.
23 See eg Brown v Brash [1948] 2 KB 247; Crawley B C v Sawyer (1987) 20 HLR 98; Ujima
Housing Association v Ansah (1997) 30 HLR 831; Hammersmith and Fulham LBC v Clarke
(2001) 33 HLR 77.
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Discontinuous occupation
 6.41 There are situations where a landlord may want to grant a right to occupy, but also
provide that for defined periods the occupier should be required to vacate the
premises. Universities wanting to have student residential accommodation
available for vacation-time conferences is an obvious example.24 We consider that it
should be possible to make such arrangements in type II agreements, but not the
high security type I agreements. We therefore recommend that there should be a
compulsory-minimum term that the right to occupy is continuous from the point
at which it first arises until the termination of the agreement, but that in type II
agreements, this term would be subject to the proviso that it did not apply if there
were clearly defined periods during which the right to occupy would be suspended.
Separateness and sharing
 6.42 We recommend that scheme should extend to any premises and any part of any
premises. It is our intention that existing complexities about separateness and
sharing are avoided. Thus occupation agreements will be included whether or not
there is sharing of accommodation or indeed where there is no separate
accommodation. The sole test will be whether the agreement confers the right to
occupy premises as a home.25
 6.43 As already noted above, there will be a specific exception where accommodation is
actually shared with the landlord.26
OPTING IN AND AGREEMENTS WITH COMPANIES AS “OCCUPIERS”
 6.44 Although agreements in the excluded categories outlined above will not be required
to be type I or type II agreements, the parties may nonetheless wish them to be so.
We think that this should be possible in some cases. Some “exclusions” are so
fundamental to the scheme that we do not think it would be appropriate to allow
opting in. Thus, an arrangement where no legally binding contract exists should
not be able to opt in; nor should a contract to rent a garage (as a garage).
Additionally, there would be a danger of our scheme being used to circumvent
other regulatory regimes if premises subject to one of the other statutory scheme –
for example, business tenancies, or agricultural holdings – could opt in. On the
other hand, we think a resident landlord providing accommodation to lodgers, for
instance, should be able to opt in, if he or she so chose.
 6.45 Our recommendation is therefore that an arrangement which is exempt from the
requirement to use a type I or type II agreement can nevertheless be brought
within the scope of such an agreement, if the parties agree, and
 (1) there is a contract,
24 It would be possible for student lettings to be provided on a termly or semester basis, rather
than a full academic year basis; but we are not attracted by this idea as it would add a very
considerable administrative burden which we regard as unjustifiable.
25 This builds on the approach of the House of Lords in Uratemp Ventures v Collins [2001]
UKHL 43, [2002] 1 AC 301.
26 See para 6.29(2) above.
55
 (2) for a home,
 (3) which is not covered by another statutory scheme.
Agreements where the company is the “occupier”
 6.46 Under the current law, agreements where the tenant is a company do not qualify
for the statutory regimes because they are not agreements “with an individual”. On
balance, we think this approach is right, even where there is a contract for a home.
However, we think that the parties to a contract for a home with a company as the
“occupier” should be able to opt into our scheme. We therefore recommend that
an agreement between a landlord and a company to provide a home for a natural
person may be brought within the scheme, provided that the agreement is
sufficiently compatible with the scheme for occupation agreements.
CONTRACTS WITH MINORS
 6.47 Both land law principles – which prevent a person under 18 from holding an estate
in land, including a tenancy – and contract law put obstacles in the way of
landlords renting homes to 16 and 17 year olds. This can present difficulties for
social landlords seeking to house, particularly, vulnerable young people.
 6.48 We want to make it clear that 16 and 17 year olds are able to enter occupation
agreements and that, where necessary, landlords will be able to sue for breach of
contractual obligations. We are seeking to remove unnecessary legal barriers to the
creation of occupation agreements with 16 and 17 year olds. We recommend that
16 and 17 year olds should be treated as adults for all purposes relating to
occupation agreements. (This will also have significance in terms of the availability
of injunctions to restrain anti-social behaviour.)27 The Bill will make clear that
those under 16 years of age cannot hold an occupation agreement.
APPLICATION TO EXISTING AGREEMENTS
 6.49 Our new scheme will apply to all agreements within its scope entered into after the
coming into effect of the new Act. But promoting simplification of the law, which
is a key objective of the project, will not be achieved unless as much as possible of
existing housing legislation can also be repealed.28 This will reverse historic
approaches, whereby – in general – new regulatory law was added on to earlier
legislative provisions. This accumulation of legislative provision has been in large
part responsible for the complexity of the current law. Consultees were in broad
agreement with this approach.
 6.50 We shall, therefore, recommend repeal of most of the earlier legislation that dealt
with the legal status of tenants of residential occupation. These will include:
 (1) Part I of the Housing Act 1988 (assured and assured shorthold tenancies)
 (2) Part IV of the Housing Act 1985 (secure tenancies)
27 See paras 15.23 – 15.33 below.
28 See CP 162 paras 3.4 – 3.73.
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 (3) Chapter 1 of Part V of the Housing Act 1996 (introductory tenancies).
Converting existing agreements
 6.51 A consequence of this recommendation is that existing agreements will be
converted into one of the two types of agreement under the scheme. We anticipate
that there will be a reasonably long period before the key parts of the new Act
come into force. During that time there should be an education campaign to
prepare landlords, tenants and others for the conversion. The conversion should
then all take place at once rather than being staggered. This was strongly urged by
consultees.
The Rent Act 1977
 6.52 Logically, Parts I and VII of the Rent Act 1977, which deal with the definition of
tenants protected by the Rent Acts and their security of tenure, should also be
repealed and tenancies still protected by it should be brought into our new
scheme. With rare exceptions, no new Rent Act protected tenancy has been able to
be created since 15th January 1989 (the date on which the Housing Act 1988
came into force). The population of tenants with Rent Act protection is ageing and
declining in numbers.
 6.53 This very fact resulted in strong representations being made to us during the
consultation, that there would be considerable political danger to making this an
integral part of the new scheme. Even if all rights of Rent Act protected tenants
were to be fully preserved in the new legislation, including rights to fair rents, there
was considerable worry that they could become confused about their rights and
that landlords might take advantage of that confusion. We will therefore
recommend that a power for the Secretary of State to repeal relevant parts of the
Rent Act 1977 should be included in the Bill, but that the question of repeal of the
Rent Act 1977 should be taken no further at this stage.
 6.54 The Rent (Agriculture) Act 1976 provides for agricultural labourers equivalent
protection to that in the Rent Act 1977. Our general reasoning on Rent Act 1977
tenancies therefore applies equally to the 1976 Act.
Agricultural occupancies
 6.55 Just as the Rent (Agriculture) Act 1976 is equivalent to the Rent Act 1977, so
chapter 3 of Part I of the Housing Act 1988 is the agricultural equivalent of the
general assured regime in the Housing Act 1988. However, the way in which the
assured tenancy regime was applied in the agricultural context was significantly
different from the general regime. Agricultural occupancies are a specialised and
particularly complex area of housing law, with a unique political history. To
understand the practical implications of this, we engaged in discussions with the
National Farmers’ Union, the Country Landowners’ Association, the agricultural
division of the Transport and General Workers Union and Shelter. We now
appreciate that a particular feature of the system is the inter-relationship between
the functions of the Agricultural Wages Board and the current low rent threshold
for assured shorthold tenancies, which does not apply to assured agricultural
occupancies. Thus, the tenure position of agricultural labourers is intimately inter-
woven with the system designed to determine wage levels. The result is that any
attempt to change significantly the substantive rights of occupiers under the tenure
regime would have an impact on labour relations within farming. In the light of
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this, we have concluded that it would be inappropriate for us, as a law reform
body, simply to apply our standard system to agricultural occupiers.
 6.56 We therefore recommend that the current legal settlement in this area should be
reviewed by the Government, so that the proper policy considerations can be
considered, with a view to simplifying the law on agricultural occupancies in such a
way as to fit them more straightforwardly within our new scheme. In the
meantime, we make the following recommendations to ensure that agricultural
occupation agreements are brought into the scheme in such a way as to preserve as
far as possible the features of the current assured agricultural occupancy.
 6.57 We recommend continuing to use the definitions of property in “qualifying
ownership” occupied by a “qualifying worker”, which set the scope of which
agreements are covered by special provisions on agriculture. The new scheme
should deem such arrangements to be contracts even where they are not, in order
to reflect the breadth of the current position.
 6.58 At present such an agreement qualifying as agricultural will produce an assured
agricultural occupancy, unless the landlord can and does choose to use an assured
shorthold tenancy instead, and unless it is excluded altogether by the special
provisions on sharing. Use of an assured shorthold is only possible where there is a
tenancy. Many such arrangements will be service occupancies which constitute
licences despite giving exclusive possession. It is also only possible where other
requirements for ordinary assured status are met, in particular where the rent is
above the low rent threshold, which will normally involve the Agricultural Wages
Board protecting the wages to be paid.
 6.59 We recommend that agricultural occupancies in future should be under type II
agreements. The type II agreement should be in a modified and written up form to
reflect the assured agricultural occupancy. It should not allow inclusion of the
notice-only ground for possession or of a term enabling the landlord to repossess
merely because of termination of the employment. It should include an estate
management ground based on the landlord’s current ability to apply to a housing
authority to rehouse the tenant “in the interests of efficient agriculture” under
section 27 of the Rent (Agriculture) Act 1976, as also applied to assured
agricultural occupancies.
 6.60 The exception, where a normal type II agreement can be used to reflect the
current assured shorthold tenancy, should be where the landlord notifies the
occupier that he has chosen not to use the modified agreement in two sets of
circumstances. Those are where:
 (1) the agreement constitutes a tenancy rather than a licence, so that service
occupancies can still benefit from the modified type II agreement; and
 (2) rent is payable which is above the current low rent thresholds in paragraph
3A of Schedule 1 to the Housing Act 1988, so that the Agricultural Wages
Board will be engaged in the same circumstances as at present.
Mapping the current status of existing agreements on to the new types
 6.61 The main principles which we recommend for converting existing agreements to
the new scheme are as follows.
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 (1) In general, existing tenancies and licences should convert to the type of
agreement which they would have been if the new Act had already been in
force when the tenancy or licence was originally granted.
 (2) Despite an element of retrospectivity, the compulsory-minimum terms
and the fairness and transparency principles of the UTCCR should be
applied to existing agreements on conversion.
 (3) Following conversion the occupier should be able to require the landlord
to provide the existing occupier with a fresh written statement of the
agreement which complies with the new Act, and face the normal
sanctions for failure to do so.
 (4) If a landlord seeks to vary the agreement, beyond the changes necessitated
by the conversion process, any such variation shall only be made in
accordance with the terms on variation included in the occupation
agreement.
 (5) Notices issued and proceedings for possession started before conversion
should be able to be continued after conversion, except where they are
incompatible with the new scheme.
 6.62 Subject to detailed exceptions in marginal cases, we make the following
recommendations.
 (1) Regulated tenancies under the Rent Act 1977 should not convert, and
should remain governed by that Act.
 (2) Any remaining protected shortholds and restricted contracts under that
Act should convert to type II agreements on appropriate terms.
 (3) Rent (Agriculture) Act 1976 occupancies should not convert.
 (4) Assured agricultural occupancies should convert to modified type II
agreements of the kind described above.
 (5) Introductory tenancies or licences should remain as such. They should be
promoted into type I agreements in the circumstances where they would
currently become secure. This should mean they will all cease to exist
within a year of the new scheme coming into force, except those still
subject to ongoing court proceedings. The relevant parts of the Housing
Act 1996 should be repealed in due course.
 (6) Secure tenancies or licences should convert to type I agreements, with
their right to buy and right to manage preserved.
 (7) Fully assured tenancies should convert to type I agreements where the
landlord falls within the definition of social landlord under our rules on
the use of the types of agreement. Any right to acquire and similar rights
should be preserved.
 (8) Fully assured tenancies with other landlords should convert to “written
up” type II agreements. These are on similar terms to type I agreements.
The main difference from type I is that they also include the type II
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mandatory repossession for substantial rent arrears. The notice-only
ground for possession would not be available.
 (9) Assured shorthold tenancies should convert to type II agreements, subject
to the following rule on social landlords. Any fixed term will be taken over
into the converted agreement.29 The abolition of the six months’
moratorium would affect periodic shortholds, or those with fixed terms for
less than six months, if they had been granted less than six months before
the conversion. In these cases transitional provisions should preserve the
effect of the moratorium.
 (10) Assured shorthold tenancies with social landlords (as defined under the
rules relating to the use of agreement types) should convert to type I,
unless they fall within the list of exceptions permitting use of type II by
social landlords. We recommend that Housing Corporation guidance
should regulate attempts by registered social landlords to evict under
section 21 of the Housing Act 1988 to avoid existing shorthold tenants
acquiring type I status.
 (11) Those tenancies and licences which currently fail to meet the
requirements for secure or assured status,30 but which fall within the scope
of either or both of sections 3 and 5 of the Protection from Eviction Act
1977 (not being excluded by section 3A), should convert to type II
agreements. For agreements with a social landlord, this will create an
additional transitional class of allowable exceptional uses of type II, but
this will only last until those original agreements end. In some cases,
particularly fully mutual housing co-operatives, the conversion will be to a
form of “written up” type II agreement.
 (12) Those tenancies and licences which are currently not secure or assured
and not covered by sections 3 or 5 of the Protection from Eviction Act
1977 (mainly because of being excluded by section 3A) should remain
outside the scope of housing legislation.31 They will be subject only to
general leasehold law, if they are leases, or any applicable law for licences,
to the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 where
applicable, and to the restrictions on entry in sections 6 and 7 of the
Criminal Law Act 1977.
 (13) Our scheme does not generally apply to trespassers. However, on
conversion there are two groups which will change from being counted as
29 The effect would not be that a wholly new term starts to run. Rather, the end date of the
new type II agreement would be the same as it would have been had the full term of the
assured shorthold tenancy been allowed to run.
30 Other than because they are covered by other statutory regimes, such as those for long
leases, business tenancies, agricultural holdings and so on. So this will cover those excluded
by Schedule 1 to the Housing Act 1985 or Schedule 1 to the Housing Act 1988, and those
who do not meet the current requirements, not reproduced in the new scheme, that the
property is let as a separate dwelling and occupied as the only or principal home.
31 These include: holiday lettings, lettings by resident landlords, accommodation provided as a
temporary expedient to a trespasser, and hostel accommodation.
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trespassers to being occupiers under the new Act. So-called “tolerated
trespassers”32 should convert to type I occupiers, but still subject to the
suspended possession order.33 Under the new scheme the agreement, and
its statutory status, do not terminate until the possession order is enforced.
Given the time before the Act can come fully into force, landlords will in
appropriate cases be able to evict any such tolerated trespassers before
they gain the rights, such as rights on repairs, that are associated with type
I status. The other special case is when someone let in by the tenant or
licensee remains in occupation after the termination of the tenancy or
licence (either by death of the occupier without a successor, or in some
other way not involving a possession order), and the landlord does not
evict but takes “mesne profits” without creating a fresh tenancy or licence.
Our scheme makes special rules for imposing a type II agreement in some
cases where this will happen in future.34 We recommend a similar
approach to convert arrangements to type II agreements where a tenancy
or licence terminated in those circumstances before commencement of the
new Act.
32 Burrows v Brent London Borough Council [1996] 1 WLR 1448.
33 In theory, it would be possible for a private landlord, who is not a social landlord, to have a
former assured tenant as a tolerated trespasser; in this case, the tolerated trespasser would
become a “written up” type II occupier.





 7.1 We have already discussed the implications of our adoption of a “consumer
approach” to this project.1 We consider that this approach requires that:
 (1) there must be an agreement between the landlord and the occupier;
 (2) the new Act should ensure that the agreement is as transparent as
possible; it should both say what it means and mean what it says; and
 (3) the landlord and occupier should be able to understand their respective
rights and obligations from the agreement.
Principles for occupation agreements
 7.2 To implement the consumer approach:
 (1) landlords should be required to put agreements into writing;
 (2) this requirement should be backed up by appropriate sanctions;
 (3) the written agreement should contain a full and clear statement of the
landlord’s and the occupier’s contractual rights and obligations to each
other;
 (4) the written agreement should also contain other information which, as a
matter of public policy, it is desirable for landlords and occupiers to have
(for example, the requirement on the landlord to provide an address in
this country);
 (5) agreements should be in plain language and clearly laid out;
 (6) the Secretary of State should be required to provide, by statutory
instrument, model agreements which will assist those drafting written
agreements and will operate as a default where a landlord fails to meet the
requirements to put an agreement into writing;2
 (7) statutory regulation of the landlord-occupier relationship should as far as
possible be achieved by the incorporation of appropriate terms in the
written agreement; as little as possible should be in separate statutory
provisions which take effect independently of the contract;
1 See above Part IV.
2 Although the compulsory and default terms set out in statutory instruments will be exempt
from challenge under the UTCCR (see UTCCR Reg 4(2)(a)), they should be drafted to be
fair and transparent in the first place.
62
 (8) the written agreement should contain basic explanations of the effect of
any essential but non-contractual statutory provisions, or reference to the
provisions and the nature of their subject matter;
 (9) the law governing the agreement should as far as possible be found in the
new Act, supplemented by consumer legislation and the common law of
contract;
 (10) as far as possible the occupier’s statutory status3 should be linked to the
occupation agreement; it should not be possible to terminate one without
terminating the other;
 (11) nor, as far as possible, should the occupier’s statutory status be able to be
altered without a variation of the agreement; and
 (12) as far as possible all the terms of an agreement should be “fair” and
“transparent” in accordance with the principles the UTCCR;4 and these
principles should be applied to occupation agreements entered into
before, as well as since, 1995.
FORMATION OF THE CONTRACT
 7.3 As already stated, the primary objective of this project is to create a scheme which
can easily be used by ordinary people. In deciding whether or not an occupation
agreement has been made, we are anxious to avoid the imposition of formal
procedural steps that must be completed. While these may be appropriate in some
circumstances, for example when buying or selling a house, we do not think they
are needed for what are often fairly informal arrangements. We therefore think that
the formation of the agreement should be determined by application of the normal
principles of contract law. For there to be a contract, there must be an offer to
enter the contract; the offer must have been accepted; and there must be some
consideration.
 7.4 Formation of the occupation agreement should not be related to land law rules on
formalities for the creation of leases. The agreement should not be rendered
invalid for lack of writing.5
THE REQUIREMENT FOR A WRITTEN AGREEMENT
 7.5 Notwithstanding our approach to the question of how an agreement is made, it is
fundamental to the scheme that the landlord should be required to provide the
occupier with a written statement of the agreement. There was some opposition to
this idea, particularly from small landlords.6 But most respondents accepted that
3 The status of being a type I agreement occupier, a type II agreement occupier or an
excluded occupier.
4 See also the Office of Fair Trading, Guidance on Unfair Terms in Tenancy Agreements
(November 2001).
5 Although we propose that, before a written agreement is provided by the landlord, the
agreement would not be binding on the occupier: see para 7.21 below.
6 The ready availability of model agreements will make it easy for landlords to participate in
the scheme.
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this requirement was an essential part of the new scheme. Thus we recommend
that the landlord must put the agreement in writing and give a written version to
the occupier. The use of electronic,7 rather than paper, copies should be permitted
where the occupier has expressly agreed to this.
 7.6 The Act should not require any specific number of copies, or counter-parts, to be
produced (save the one to be given to the occupier), nor should it require
signatures by either party. While we would expect landlords to obtain a signature
for receipt of the written agreement, and to keep a copy of the agreement for
themselves,8 this will not be a statutory requirement. If they do not obtain a receipt
and court proceedings ensue, receipt will have to be proved on the normal civil
burden of proof.
 7.7 The prudent landlord will also ensure that the agreement is signed before the
occupier moves in, with the occupier being allowed enough time to understand the
agreement before signing it, but again we would not wish the new Act to require
this.9
 7.8 We shall not recommend that the landlord should be prohibited from making a
charge for providing a written statement of the agreement. We anticipate that, in
most cases, landlords will wish to use the model agreements, which will be widely
and readily available and will suit most purposes. They will be very cheap to
acquire.
 7.9 Instead we recommend that agreements should contain a default term providing
that the written statement will be provided free of charge to the occupier. Should a
landlord wish to make a charge, it would have to be by way of a departure from the
default term; this will therefore have to be properly justified if it is to satisfy the
fairness requirements of the UTCCR. If the occupier loses the copy initially
supplied, the landlord should be able to charge a reasonable fee for issuing a
replacement.
 7.10 Given the importance to the scheme of the landlord providing the written
statement, we recommend that once agreement has been reached, the landlord
must provide it, notwithstanding any failure by the occupier to comply with the
terms of the agreement.
 7.11 The requirement to provide a written statement of the agreement will apply to all
agreements entered into on or after the date on which the Act comes into force.
7 By whatever appropriate means such as by email, by downloading from the World Wide Web
or an intranet, or by a disc.
8 They will need to do so in order to take any court action, for instance.
9 The giving of time to read the contract will help protect the landlord against challenges
under the UTCCR. The preamble to the Directive on which the UTCCR are based states:
“Whereas contracts should be drafted in plain, intelligible language, the consumer should
actually be given an opportunity to examine all the terms and, if in doubt, the interpretation
most favourable to the consumer should prevail”. Reg 7(1) requires that “any written term is
expressed in plain, intelligible language”.
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 7.12 In the case of agreements already in existence on that date, landlords should have
had an adequate lead-in time, and we hope that Government will allocate
appropriate resources to ensuring that landlords are aware of and prepared for the
introduction of the new scheme. In these circumstances, we think that it is right to
expect landlords to provide a written statement of the new form of the agreement,
as it has been converted under the scheme.10
Practical issues
 7.13 The scheme needs to take account of a number of practical matters which may
arise in the process of putting an oral occupation agreement into written form.
Putting an agreement into immediate effect.
 7.14 Notwithstanding our assumption that in most cases the agreement will be put into
writing before the occupier goes into occupation, it should be possible for a
landlord and occupier to enter an occupation agreement, for that agreement to be
put into writing, and for the occupier to go into occupation, all on the same day,
with the agreement being binding on both sides from that day. In this situation,
both parties would be fully bound by the lawful terms of the written agreement.
Reaching an agreement for occupation at a future date
AGREEMENTS PUT INTO WRITING
 7.15 Frequently, an occupation agreement will be made and put into writing well in
advance of the date on which the occupier is due to go into occupation. For
example, parties may agree in July that a flat may be occupied as a home starting
in September. In accordance with the principles set out above, both parties would
be fully bound by the contract.
 7.16 The compulsory-minimum terms should make clear which terms come into effect
immediately upon the contract being put into written form and those which have
effect only when the occupier becomes entitled to go into occupation.
 7.17 In this context, we consider that the terms relating to security of tenure (thus
requiring the obtaining of a court order for possession) should only come into
effect once the occupier becomes entitled to go into occupation of the home. Any
termination of the agreement prior to that date will depend upon the contract.
 7.18 We do not intend to specify any compulsory-minimum terms, or recommend any
default terms to the Secretary of State, to govern the termination of the contract
prior to the date on which the occupier is entitled to enter into occupation for the
first time.
AGREEMENTS NOT PUT INTO WRITING
 7.19 We want to encourage landlords to put the agreement into writing as soon as
possible, particularly if they are contracting in advance of a start date. We also
10 Our recommendations on how existing agreements should be treated under the new scheme
are discussed in paras 6.61 – 6.62 above.
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want to ensure that, if there is a dispute about the terms, they are clarified before
the occupier is due to move in. We accept, however, that this will not always
happen.
 7.20 In order to provide an incentive to landlords to put the terms of the agreement
into writing, we recommend that if there is a delay between the agreement being
orally entered into and the start of the occupier’s occupation, then the agreement
should bind the landlord immediately. However, the intended occupier should not
be bound until either a written statement of the agreement is issued or the date for
occupation arrives, whichever is the earlier.
 7.21 During any period when the agreement is not binding on an intended occupier, he
or she should be able to notify the landlord that he or she is treating the contract as
cancelled without loss, and have any deposit or advance payments of rent returned
to him or her.11 This will provide an appropriate incentive to the landlord to put
the agreement into writing as quickly as possible.
 7.22 We do not think landlords should be subject to the full range of sanctions set out
below if they fail to issue a written statement of the agreement before the date on
which the occupier actually goes into occupation.
Failure to provide a written copy of the agreement after the occupier goes
into occupation
 7.23 We want landlords to provide occupiers with their written statement of the
agreement at least from the start-date of the agreement, that is, the date on which
the occupier is entitled to take occupation. Even here, we think that a further
period of grace of two weeks should be allowed for the landlord to put the
agreement in writing. After the expiry of that period, we recommend that two
consequences should follow:
 (1) First the statutory default terms in the agreement should be applied in lieu
of any terms that may have been orally agreed by the parties. The
application of the default terms in this way is designed to provide certainty
and act as an incentive to issue written agreements for landlords who seek
to use terms which are more favourable to them than the default terms.
 (2) Secondly, there should be sanction on the landlord for their failure to
provide a copy of the agreement. We discuss the sanctions in paragraphs
7.35 to 7.53 below.
11 This principle will apply to payments relating to the agreement itself, such as a deposit or an
advance payment of rent, rather than those for what the OFT currently calls “pre-tenancy
agreements”. Those payments, for example a payment to be allowed to hold a place in a
queue for consideration for being given an occupation agreement, should be governed by
general contract law, the provisions of UTCCR and, where relevant, the Accommodation
Agencies Act 1953, rather than by the provisions of the new Act.
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Default terms
 7.24 In our detailed proposals relating to the content of occupation agreements12 we
recommend that some terms must be included in the agreement. We call these
“compulsory-minimum terms”. In addition, we recommend that there are certain
issues which must be dealt with in the agreement, but in relation to which the
parties to the agreement may negotiate their own terms. Default terms dealing
with these issues will be in the model agreements. We call these “default” terms.
Where the parties agree their own terms instead, they will be binding on the
parties, provided that they comply with the standards of the UTCCR. We call
these “substitute” terms.
 7.25 If one of the matters in the “default” category is not actually contained in a
particular agreement, we recommend that the relevant default term in the model
agreement should operate to fill the gap.13
 7.26 Similarly, if a term has been negotiated but is found not to comply with the
UTCCR, the relevant default term will fill the gap. This same principle will also
apply if a term is found, under normal rules of the law of contract, to be void
because it is uncertain; or if a term is invalid in some other way, for example
because it offends anti-discrimination law.
 7.27 These matters will be avoided if the parties decide to use one of the statutorily
prescribed model agreements, which – by definition – will address all the issues
that the agreement must address, and will be UTCCR compliant.
The powers of the court
 7.28 In CP 162, we asked whether, if there was a dispute as to the terms of the
agreement, should there be a procedure for amending the agreement. We invited
views on whether this should be undertaken by the county court, or by Rent
Assessment Committees. Some respondents supported the latter suggestion. The
Independent Housing Ombudsman suggested it was a task his service could take
on. But the clear general view was that this should be a matter for the court.
 7.29 We recommend that the court should have jurisdiction to make a declaration as to
the terms of the agreement, and to issue a correct and complete written statement
of the agreement or to order the landlord to do so. This should be available where
no written agreement has been issued or it has been issued but is incomplete, or
where it does not accurately set out the compulsory-minimum terms or reflect the
expressly agreed key terms.
Cooling off
 7.30 There are now a number of situations where consumer law imposes a cooling off
period to allow the consumer time to back out of an agreement. Examples include
legislation relating to consumer credit agreements,14 timeshare agreements,15 and
12 Discussed in Part VIII.
13 If the missing term was expressly orally agreed, it would be open to either party to seek a
declaration to have it included in the written terms: see para 7.29 below.
14 Consumer Credit Act 1974, s 68.
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long-term insurance contracts.16 We have considered whether our requirement for
a written agreement could be married with a cooling off period to give occupiers
the opportunity to withdraw from an occupation agreement once made. We have
concluded that such a step would not work, given the practicalities of the rented
housing market.
 7.31 In the social rented sector, the legislation and policies relating to allocation act to
limit the number of times a prospective occupier can refuse to accept an offer of a
home. It would be confusing and counter to the realities of social housing also to
give occupiers a formal, legal, right to withdraw from an offer they have already (in
allocations’ terms) accepted. And it would be unnecessary, because the occupier
under a type I agreement can terminate it on one months’ notice.
 7.32 In the private sector, as a general rule most homes are rented on a short term
basis, on six month fixed terms or periodic tenancies. This would continue to be so
under our scheme. The argument for a cooling off period is clearly less forceful
where the occupier is able to withdraw from the agreement within a reasonably
short timescale. In any event, we do not consider it practicable, or fair to landlords,
to allow an occupier to exercise a right to withdraw during a cooling off period
once they have already gone into occupation (even if there was provision for
payment of the equivalent of rent for the relevant period). It would, if it were used
to any degree by occupiers, seriously disrupt landlords’ ability to manage their
properties and result in properties remaining un-let for longer.
 7.33 If a cooling off period was reserved for agreements made in advance of the
occupier going into occupation, it would provide an incentive for landlords to
delay concluding an agreement (and thus falling under the obligation to produce a
written statement of the agreement) until the occupier went into occupation. This
would clearly be undesirable, and would reduce rather than increase the effective
rights of occupiers.
 7.34 More generally, there is something in the argument that providing homes is not
like the provision of other consumer products. Particularly in areas of high demand
for housing, unlike consumer goods or services, it will very often be the case that
there is no real alternative for an occupier, so a right of withdrawal would prove a
somewhat illusory safeguard. In this context, the occupier’s position is best
safeguarded by having a fair agreement that guarantees his or her basic rights. That
is what our agreements aim to provide. We have therefore come to the conclusion
that a cooling off period is not appropriate.
SANCTIONS
 7.35 For these requirements relating to writing to work there will have to be sanctions
against landlords who do not provide a written statement of the agreement. We are
concerned that sanctions should still be effective even where there is ongoing non-
compliance designed to frustrate the purpose of the legislative requirement. At the
same time, we are anxious that sanctions should be proportionate, particularly
15 Timeshare Act 1992, ss 5 and 6.
16 Insurance Companies (Cancellation No. 2) Regulations 1993, SI 1993 No 1327, reg 70.
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against an inexperienced first time small landlord who is not deliberately evading
the writing requirements and who, indeed, may be dealing with an occupier who is
seeking to exploit the rules.
 7.36 We think that use of criminal law sanctions in this context is inappropriate. Under
the present law, there are a number of criminal sanctions which can theoretically
apply to landlords who fail to provide defined types of information. But we have no
evidence that these are significantly used in practice.17 In any event, we do not
think that failure to provide a written statement of an occupation agreement is a
matter that warrants criminal liability.
 7.37 We recommend that there should be two sanctions (apart from the imposition of
default terms):
 (1) the rent sanction; and
 (2) the civil procedural sanction.
The rent sanction
 7.38 Under the present law,18 rent is not “lawfully due” until certain defined
information is available to the tenant. Often this does not, in the end, benefit the
tenant since, once the relevant information is provided, the tenant remains liable
for the whole amount which then becomes lawfully due. The ignorant or ill-
advised tenant may incorrectly assume that they will never have to pay any sum
which is said to be not “lawfully due”.
 7.39 We have decided to develop this basic idea by giving the occupier the equivalent of
limited relief from liability for the rent. We recommend that after the expiry of the
two weeks’ period of grace, the landlord should be deemed to owe the occupier an
amount equivalent to one day’s rent for each day’s delay.
 7.40 The period upon which the calculation is made will start with the date of entry
into possession (not the end of the period of grace). It will end on the date the
written statement of the agreement was actually provided. Thus the minimum
amount owed to the occupier will be a sum equivalent to 15 days rent. This will be
subject to an upper limit of the equivalent of two months’ rent.
 7.41 This amount will be owed as a debt, rather than as a refund or suspension of rent.19
There will be specific provision to enable the occupier to withhold future rent as
one way of recovering the amount.
 7.42 This sanction in itself will not provide an ongoing sanction against a landlord who
still refuses to provide a written statement of the agreement after the first two
17 We recommend that the law on rent books, Landlord and Tenant Act 1985, ss 4 – 7, which
adopts this approach, should be repealed.
18 Landlord and Tenant Act 1987,ss 47(2) and 48(2).
19 For those in receipt of housing benefit, it should be expressed to ensure that it is not treated
as a reduction in the rent due for the purposes of calculating entitlement to housing benefit
under the Housing Benefit (General) Regulations 1987, SI 1987 No 1971.
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months of delay. Some pressure will be maintained on the landlord by the fact
that, on ordinary principles, he or she will be liable for interest on the rent
sanction.20
 7.43 In addition, we recommend that in the case of on-going delay, the court should
have the power, on the occupier’s application, to increase the rent-sanction by up
to one hundred per cent. This power to double the debt will be available where the
court has accepted that the default by the landlord was “wilful”.
The procedural sanction
 7.44 In relation to type II agreements, where notice-only repossession is available under
an accelerated possession procedure, we recommend that there should be a further
procedural sanction.
 7.45 Where the landlord has been asked21 to put the agreement in writing, whether by
the occupier or someone on their behalf,22 and has failed to do so within the first
two months of the occupier entering into occupation, then the period of notice of
intention to take possession proceedings under the notice-only procedure should
be extended from its normal minimum of two months to a minimum of six
months.
 7.46 Furthermore, the period of notice should not be able to expire before six months
from the date on which the requirement for writing has finally been fully complied
with, unless the court is satisfied it would be just and equitable23 to shorten this
period.
Court’s discretion in the case of incompleteness or inaccuracy
 7.47 If the landlord has provided a written statement of the agreement, but it is not
complete or it is inaccurate, we recommend that the court should have discretion
as to whether to impose any or all of the sanctions at the same time as it considers
any application to correct it. In minor cases of breach no sanction might be
imposed. Conversely, the full range of sanctions could be imposed where the
landlord was deliberately attempting to prevent occupiers obtaining a full and
proper statement of their rights under the agreement.24
 7.48 Similarly, the sanctions should be available, but only at the court’s discretion,
where the agreement is varied, whether by agreement or through a variation
20 We will rely on the courts’ ordinary powers to apply interest, and to do so at the penalty
rates available under the Civil Procedure Rules (particularly in cases of Part 36 offers). See
CPR Rule 36.22.
21 Whether in writing or not, but subject to the occupier having the burden of proof as to
whether the request was made. The request should not have to make reference to the Act.
22 Such as their adviser or solicitor, or an enforcement agency such as the local authority
tenancy relations officer or the Office of Fair Trading.
23 “Just and equitable” is the current test for disregarding problems with notices; there will be
similar provision for other problems with notices in the Bill.
24 In consumer law terms this would be equivalent to the criminal sanctions available under the
Consumer Transactions (Restrictions on Statements) Order SI 1976 No 1813, for making
written statements purporting to limit various statutory rights of consumers.
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clause, and the landlord fails either to notify the occupier in writing of the varied
term. (The issue of variation of the agreement is discussed further below at
paragraphs 8.89 – 8.120.)
Sanctions for positively misleading occupiers
 7.49 A possible problem with this approach is that the landlord who ignorantly, rather
than maliciously, omits a compulsory-minimum term from the agreement will be
subjected to the rent sanction, whereas the landlord who deliberately but
maliciously includes a term which purports to give the occupier fewer rights than
the compulsory-minimum term will escape it.
 7.50 For example, a term providing that only one month’s notice has to be given for a
notice-only eviction (whereas the legal minimum is two months) will not be valid,
but it will be in the landlord’s interest to try to use it if most occupiers are unaware
of their rights and believe what is in the agreement without challenging it.
 7.51 The purpose of the requirement for writing is to ensure all parties are aware of
their rights and responsibilities. This will be undermined if there is no disincentive
to counter-balance the benefits of deceiving occupiers. We considered whether the
sanctions set out above would be appropriate for wilful abuse consisting of
attempting to mislead an occupier by the inclusion of a term which was known not
to meet the requirements of a compulsory-minimum term. However, we have
concluded that this would lead to confusion over when the basic sanction was
applicable.
 7.52 Instead we have concluded that the UTCCR should be relied on to remove such
clauses from agreements. The OFT has power to order landlords to stop using
such terms in all current and future agreements, thereby reducing the scope for
abuse by landlords.
 7.53 We believe the issue of penalties should be dealt with by the law of fraud. The Law
Commission has made proposals for the reform of the law on fraud.25 Under clause
2 of the proposed Fraud Bill, a landlord could be criminally liable if he
‘dishonestly makes a false representation’, namely as to what the terms of the
agreement are, intending “to cause loss to another or to expose another to a risk of
loss” where that other person was the occupier. We feel that the issue should
properly be addressed by the law on fraud, rather than by specific provision in
housing law.
25 Fraud (2002) Law Com No. 276; Cmnd 5560.
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PART VIII
THE STRUCTURE AND CONTENT OF THE
AGREEMENT
INTRODUCTION
 8.1 Our aim is that the occupation agreement should, as far as possible, provide an
accurate statement of the legal relationship between the parties to the agreement,
without the need for additional reference to statutory provisions or other sources
of law.
 8.2 A particular feature of the new scheme is that the grounds on which a landlord
may seek possession will operate through the agreement instead of, as currently
happens, being a statutory addition to it. This is discussed in detail in Part IX.
 8.3 Our proposed Bill will prescribe both the content and form of the written
agreement. It will also enable the creation, in delegated legislation, of sets of terms
that can be used in default of a written agreement – “the model agreements”.
 8.4 Most of the required content will take effect as ordinary contractual terms. But
some of the content of the agreement will be required for social policy reasons, to
provide the occupier and landlord with information about matters that, though not
strictly contractual, are nonetheless of crucial practical importance.
 8.5 Not all occupiers will read and understand the whole of their agreement; it is likely
to be a relatively substantial document. Nevertheless, it will be the reference source
from which both landlords and occupiers can find out about their respective rights
and duties when questions arise.
 8.6 This will be a considerable improvement on the current position where, even if a
tenancy agreement sets out the terms accurately and in some detail, neither party
can know the full legal basis of their relationship without reference to numerous
statutory provisions and other legal sources as well. Furthermore, the
harmonisation of agreements implicit in the scheme should make it easier for
housing and legal advisers to give advice to both occupiers and landlords.
 8.7 One feature of the consumer approach is whether a prospective occupier should be
given time to digest the contents of the agreement. We have not recommend that
there should be a “cooling off” period as exists in other consumer contract
contexts. We anticipate that there will be circumstances in which the parties will,
quite properly, want to enter into an agreement speedily.1
 8.8 The UTCCR provides an incentive for landlords to allow prospective occupiers
time to consider the contract. The precise amount of time will need to be
appropriate for the length and complexity of the terms in the agreement.2 One
1 Discussed at paras 7.30 – 7.34 above.
2 Recital 20 of the Directive states “contracts should be drafted in plain, intelligible language,
the consumer should actually be given an opportunity to examine all the terms…”. At para
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factor to be taken into account will be the extent to which the contract deviates
from the prescribed model agreements – the greater the deviation, the more time
should be given.
THE STRUCTURE AND LANGUAGE OF THE AGREEMENT
 8.9 As well as specifying the content of the agreement, we recommend that
requirements as to the presentation of written agreements should be prescribed.
This has been an important feature of existing consumer protection legislation
which we want to extend to occupation agreements. This comprises two elements:
 (1) the layout of the agreement should, so far as possible, aid comprehension
of it; and
 (2) the agreement should be drafted in as plain language as possible.
 8.10 We recommend that, in drafting the model agreements that will be published in
secondary legislation, the Secretary of State should consult widely with the
stakeholders in the rented housing sector – both landlords and occupiers.
CONTENT OF THE AGREEMENT
 8.11 We recommend that the agreement should be made up of four categories of terms.
The first category will be key terms; the second, compulsory-minimum terms; the
third, special terms, and, the fourth, other terms, made up of default terms, or terms
substituted for them, and any further additional terms required by the parties. The
primary object of these requirements is that there should be certainty as to the
terms of an agreement, even where they have been inadequately dealt with by the
parties.
 8.12 We have already noted that the Secretary of State will be required to set out the
key, compulsory-minimum and default terms in model agreements.3 If a landlord
and occupier merely agree a weekly rent for a property and the latter moves in with
no further agreement or planning, they will be subject to the appropriate model
agreement. The landlord will still be obliged to provide a written statement of the
agreement. He can do this simply by issuing a front page, setting out the key terms
and any variations of or additions to the compulsory-minimum or other terms, to
which the relevant model agreement is then attached.
KEY TERMS
 8.13 This category relates to the key terms on those subjects which are essential to the
agreement, either because there can be no agreement without them or because
they need to be covered in practice, but the contents of which cannot be prescribed
in advance.
 8.14 The key terms will be:
19.2 of their Guidance, the OFT regard the requirement of transparency in reg 7 of the
UTCCR as coloured by Recital 20.
3 See para 8.10, above.
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 (1) the name of the landlord and the occupier;4
 (2) an adequate description to identify the property subject to the agreement;5
 (3) the date on which the occupier can enter into possession;
 (4) whether the contract is for an indefinite length of time or is to end on a set
date, and if so what that date is; and
 (5) the nature, amounts and due dates of the consideration.6
 8.15 This basic information is known only to the parties. Thus the legislation can only
set down the topics to be covered in the key terms section of the agreement. The
model agreement will provide suitable wording, but with gaps to be completed by
the parties. If the gaps are not completed, then we recommend that the sanctions
for failure to provide a complete written agreement should be applied.
 8.16 Any subsequent variation of these key terms should be subject to the terms relating
to variation of the agreement.7
 8.17 Details of an address for service, a contact address and any agent’s details will be
dealt with in the compulsory-minimum terms, rather than key terms.
Relationship of key terms with the UTCCR core terms
 8.18 Under the provisions of the UTCCR, certain contractual terms, defined in Article
6(2)8 of the regulations, are exempt from the requirement that they be fair,
provided that they are expressed in plain and intelligible terms. Although the
regulations do not actually use the phrase, these terms are generally referred to as
“core terms”. We had originally thought that what we describe as key terms should
4 It is important that the occupier’s name must be provided. In sole agreements, without any
non-contractual occupants, there will not be a problem. But in joint agreements, or where
certain people are to occupy the premises but not be parties to the contract, it will be
essential that the landlord sets out clearly which people are entering the agreement. The
most common problems are with couples or in student shared houses where a variety of
arrangements can be made.
5 We have considered whether we should recommend that the Secretary of State include in
the secondary legislation a default term about whether fixtures and chattels are included in
the agreement and whether an inventory must be provided. This issue ties in closely with
work ODPM are doing on the regulation of deposits (as disputes are often about the
existence or state of items which could have been listed in an inventory to avoid disputes).
We do not wish to prejudge that work by proposing that there should be a compulsory-
minimum term on this issue in the Act.
6 The consideration will normally be rent, but need not be in all cases. The consideration
could be purely in the form of a premium or could be payment in kind – most commonly
found in relation to “tied” accommodation where the consideration is the entering into, or
work done under, an employment contract – or any combination of these. It may thus
include arrangements which under the current law of landlord and tenant could not be
“rent”.
7 See paras 8.89 – 8.120, below.
8 “In so far as it is in plain intelligible language, the assessment of fairness of a term shall not
relate (a) to the definition of the main subject matter of the contract; or (b) to the adequacy
of the price or remuneration, as against the goods or services supplied…”
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also be called core terms, thus indicating that they should fall within the scope of
Article 6(2). We have however come to the conclusion, not least in the light of
representations made to us by the OFT, that this could lead to confusion. We have
therefore decided to describe these terms as key terms.
 8.19 All the key terms we prescribe, which are also core terms as defined by Article
6(2), will be exempt from the requirement that they be fair. Any other term, which
is not a key term, which might otherwise be regarded as being a core term within
the scope of Article 6(2), should be deemed not do so. Thus, any such term would
remain subject to the UTCCR principles both of transparency and of fairness.
 8.20 For example, a term relating to payment of a deposit, which will not be a key term,
will be subject to UTCCR standards, even if, in other contractual contexts such a
term might be regarded as a core term. Article 8 of the Directive creating the
UTCCR provides that “Member States may adopt or retain the most stringent
provisions compatible with the Treaty in the area covered by this Directive, to
ensure a maximum degree of protection for the consumer”. Thus there will be no
breach of the Directive in extending the scope of the regulations in this way, as the
result is to give consumers greater protection.
COMPULSORY-MINIMUM TERMS
 8.21 The second category of terms is made up of those we recommend must be
included in the agreement. They will represent a “floor of rights and obligations”.
In relation to most of these terms, variations will be permitted, though any
variation will have to be in favour of the occupier.
 8.22 We recommend that agreements should include three broad classes of compulsory-
minimum terms:
 (1) terms relating to security of tenure and the grounds on which landlords
may seek possession against tenants;
 (2) terms on matters relating to the operation of the agreement; and
 (3) terms on issues currently implied by statute or the common law, for
example the landlord’s obligation to keep the structure of the building in
repair.9
 8.23 As noted above, the compulsory-minimum terms will be required to set minimum
standards of protection for occupiers and fundamental obligations on landlords.
However, where appropriate, we also recommend that terms more favourable to
the occupier should be able to be agreed instead of the compulsory-minimum
terms. These might include, for example, a term that omits a ground for
possession by the landlord or expands the landlord’s repairing obligations.
 8.24 Model terms will be set out in the model agreements; these will automatically be
UTCCR compliant. While a term is capable of variation and is varied, the parties
9 Currently found in the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985, s 11.
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will need to ensure that any terms as varied are still compliant with UTCCR
principles by being transparent and fair.10
Terms relating to security of tenure
 8.25 We recommend that the compulsory-minimum terms should deal with the ways in
which the landlord may terminate the occupation agreement. We seek to bring as
many of the existing statutory grounds for possession as possible under a general
ground of possession for breach of the agreement. In addition, we shall provide
terms to enable a landlord under a type I agreement to seek an order for
possession on “estate management” grounds. We shall also provide terms to enable
landlords under type II agreements to seek a mandatory order for possession on
the notice-only ground and for serious rent arrears. The details of these terms are
discussed below in Part IX.11
Terms relating to the operation of the agreement
 8.26 We recommend there should be a number of compulsory-minimum terms relating
to the regulation of the relationship between the occupier and landlord. Under this
head we include terms that deal with matters relating to adding a party to the
agreement, the ability to take in a lodger, transferring rights of occupation to
another, and succession to rights of occupation. The details are set out below in
Parts X to XIV.
Terms relating to issues implied by statute or common law
 8.27 Finally, we also have to make provision for those terms currently implied by statute
or common law into residential tenancies. The most important of these are the
obligations imposed by statute on the landlord relating to keeping the premises in
repair;12 and the common law duty on the landlord to ensure that the occupier has
“quiet enjoyment” of the premises. The parties will not be able to contract out of
these terms, though it may be possible to vary these terms in favour of the
occupier. We discuss these in the following paragraphs.
 8.28 Since the focus of this project was primarily on the status and security of
residential rental occupiers, we did not consult on the specific details of these
terms. Indeed, to have done so would have made an already very substantial
project even greater. However, for the scheme to be able to come into effect, we
need to make provision for these important terms.
 8.29 Our basic approach is to recommend that all those terms and conditions currently
implied into tenancy agreements either by statute or by the common law should be
adapted for and brought into the new scheme as compulsory-minimum terms. We
accept that these terms and conditions may need further revision in the light of
experience of the new scheme. We therefore make these recommendations on the
10 And the UTCCR rules, or any other rules of interpretation or validity, will not be able to
lead to a result which is less than the minimum term.
11 Paras 9.15 – 9.44.
12 Landlord and Tenant Act 1985, s 11.
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basis that this class of compulsory-minimum terms should be regarded as an
interim statement, pending any more fundamental revision of them.
(1) Landlord’s address for service and agent’s details
 8.30 Although the identity of the landlord must be one of the key terms, we recommend
that there should be a compulsory-minimum term that requires additional
information about the landlord and their agent to be provided to the occupier.
This will include information about an address in England and Wales at which the
occupier may serve notices on the landlord. The term should prescribe that this
information should initially appear on the face of the written agreement. Any later
changes will be notified in writing to the occupier. If the landlord fails to notify the
occupier of such changes, then the occupier will be entitled to rely on the original
information, so that service at the original address will be deemed effective.
 8.31 The present law prescribes criminal sanctions for failure to provide this
information. We do not think that criminal sanctions are either appropriate or
effective; we do not recommend that these are brought into the scheme we are
proposing. Failure to provide this information, either at the outset of the
agreement or after any later variation, will render the landlord liable to the same
sanctions that applies to other failures to provide the agreement.13
(2) Repairs, fitness and improvements
 8.32 In 1995, the Law Commission produced a detailed report, with a draft Bill,
entitled “Landlord and Tenant: Responsibility for State and Condition of
Property.”14 The recommendations in that report complement the consumer
approach we advocate in this report. The degree to which Government will adopt
our earlier recommendations is still not settled. Should Government wish to
implement them, this will have the inevitable consequence of changing the current
law.
REPAIRS
 8.33 The most important current provision on repairs is section 11 of the Landlord and
Tenant Act 1985. It imposes repairing duties on a landlord by statutorily implying
a term into tenancies out of which the parties cannot contract. It is very close to
our model of a compulsory-minimum term. It applies to lettings of dwelling-
houses, which are premises let wholly or mainly as a private residence, for less than
seven years.15
 8.34 It requires the landlord to keep in repair the structure and exterior of the dwelling-
house, and any part of the building in which the landlord has an estate or interest
if the tenant’s enjoyment of the dwelling-house or any defined common parts is
13 See paras 7.35 – 7.53, above.
14 (1996) Law Com No. 238.
15 The seven years are calculated by ignoring any part of the term before the grant, but
including any longer term if it is determinable at the lessor’s option before the expiration of
seven years from its commencement. A tenant’s option for renewal beyond the seven years is
ignored.
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affected. It also requires the landlord to keep in repair and proper working order
the installations in the dwelling-house for supply of water, gas and electricity, and
for sanitation and space and water heating.
 8.35 The landlord’s obligation does not extend to reinstatement after destruction or
damage by fire, flood and similar occurrences; matters covered by the tenant’s
common law duty (or any express covenant) to use the property in a tenant-like
manner; or anything which the tenant is entitled to remove from the dwelling-
house.
 8.36 Although the parties cannot contract out of this term, exclusion of it is possible by
county court order. Without such order, the following are void: (a) all exclusions
or limitations on the landlord’s obligations or the tenant’s immunities; (b) any
authorisation of forfeiture or the imposition of a penalty, disability or obligation on
a tenant who seeks to enforce or rely on those obligations or immunities; and (c)
any tenant’s repairing obligations covering the same area.16 We understand that
orders seeking exclusion of the term are rarely sought in practice.
 8.37 There is a corresponding right for the lessor (or any persons authorised by him in
writing) to enter the premises at reasonable times of the day and on giving 24
hours notice in writing to the occupier, in order to view their condition and state of
repair.
 8.38 The case law has qualified section 11 of the 1985 Act by applying the general
limitation on repairing covenants that the landlord is not liable for breach unless
and until he has had notice of the disrepair.17 The landlord must also make good
any damage caused by doing the works needed in order to ensure compliance with
the covenant.
 8.39 Under section 17 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985, where a tenant wishes to
enforce the repairs duties implied by section 11,
the court may order specific performance of the covenant whether or
not the breach relates to a part of the premises let to the tenant and
notwithstanding any equitable rule restricting the scope of the
remedy, whether on the basis of a lack of mutuality or otherwise.
This is extremely useful in practice. It ensures that orders for the carrying out of
works can be obtained while avoiding the more notorious problems caused by the
uneven development of the law on specific performance over the years.
 8.40 We recommend that there should be a compulsory-minimum term in the
agreement the effect of which is to adapt and apply the provisions of section 11 to
all agreements falling within the scope of our scheme.
 8.41 The following points should be noted in relation to this recommendation:
16 Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 ss 11 – 14, as amended by Landlord and Tenant Act 1987, s
60.
17 See McGreal v Wake (1984) 13 HLR 107.
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 (1) the provision will apply to all occupation agreements falling within the
scope of the scheme, including those created by the Crown as landlord of
residential accommodation;18
 (2) the limitation to agreements for less than seven years will be retained;
 (3) the power to seek an order from the court to exclude this term will not be
reproduced in our scheme;
 (4) the restrictions to the scope of the present term to those parts of the
property set out in paragraph 8.34 above will be retained;
 (5) the (current) tenant’s common law duty to use the premises in a tenant-
like manner will be adapted to apply to all occupiers;
 (6) the current provision19 that the standard of repair should be judged against
the age, character and locality of the premises will be retained;
 (7) the current common law requirements that the landlord must have notice
of the breach before he or she becomes liable under the term will be
incorporated into the compulsory-minimum term; and
 (8) the power to order specific performance will be extended to cover all
breaches of this compulsory-minimum term.
 8.42 There should be a default term which enables the landlord to enter the premises
for the purpose of carrying out works required by the terms on fitness and repair.
 8.43 Were the Government to decide to go further in terms of implementing our earlier
recommendations on responsibility for the state and fitness of property, then these
detailed provisions would need to be amended. However, for the purpose of the
present project, we limit the scope of our proposals to adapting the present law to
occupation agreements under our scheme, subject only to the minor modifications
set out above.
FITNESS FOR HUMAN HABITATION
 8.44 At present, the general rule in the context of lettings of land is that you take the
property as you find it. There is no implied term that premises are fit to live in,
even where that is the clear purpose of the letting.20 This is at odds with our
consumer approach; in other contexts, there is a legal presumption that goods
supplied are “fit for purpose”.
 8.45 Section 8 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 implies a term, which the parties
cannot contract out of, that certain lettings will be fit for human habitation at the
18 This will overturn the decision in Department of Transport v Egoroff (1986) 18 HLR 326.
19 Landlord and Tenant Act 1985, s 11(3).
20 This is subject to an exception in relation to lettings of furnished premises: Smith v Marrable
(1843) 11 M & W 5; this only applies at the start of the letting and does not import an
obligation to keep in repair.
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start of the let and will be kept so by the landlord. The history of this provision is
explained in Lee v Leeds City Council.21 However, it has become redundant in that it
only applies to leases for less than three years where the rent is less than £80 per
year in inner London and £52 per year elsewhere. These figures date from when
they were typical of working class rented housing, but now would only ever be
associated with ground rent on a long lease.
 8.46 In our earlier report on responsibility for the state and fitness of property we
recommended that this provision should be revived and updated to apply to all
leases for less than seven years without any rent limit. We recommended there
should be a general obligation to keep premises let fit for human habitation in
accordance with the modernised nine point standard.
 8.47 We note that a major change in circumstances since LC 238 was published is that
the government is now working to a programme of making social landlords achieve
a “decency” standard in all social housing stock by 2010.22 This standard includes
meeting the statutory fitness standard, but goes beyond that to include “reasonably
modern facilities and services” and “a reasonable degree of thermal comfort”. It is
therefore likely that, under this programme, social housing would have to be fit
within five years of our proposed scheme coming into operation.
 8.48 We accept that if our recommendation was introduced with immediate effect for all
occupation agreements, both new and pre-existing, this could have serious cost
implications. Nevertheless, we think that our new scheme should include a
compulsory-minimum term on fitness which adapts the principles set out there.
 8.49 We recommend that, exceptionally, this term should not have immediate effect, but
that the Secretary of State should have power to decide when it should be
introduced. It could be introduced at different times for different types of
agreement, and for new agreements and those in existence at the date our
proposed Housing Act becomes operative.
 8.50 When fully operational, the term should apply to all occupation agreements under
our scheme, though the term should apply only to agreements for a term of less
than seven years. The landlord should not be liable for matters which arise from
the occupiers’ fault, or their failure to look after the premises in a “tenant-like”
way. Nor should the landlord be liable where the "unfitness is incapable of being
remedied by the [lessor] at reasonable expense".
 8.51 For the time being, the standard of fitness should be based on the provisions of
section 604 of the Housing Act 1985, which provides:
“(1) Subject to subsection (2) below, a dwelling-house is fit for
human habitation for the purposes of this Act unless, in the opinion
of the local housing authority, it fails to meet one or more of the
requirements in paragraphs (a) to (i) below and, by reason of that
failure, is not reasonably suitable for occupation,—
21 [2002] 1 WLR 1488.
22 See documents at http://www.odpm.gov.uk/stellent/groups/odpm_control/documents/
contentservertemplate/odpm_index.hcst?n=1187&l=3.
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(a) it is structurally stable;
(b) it is free from serious disrepair;
(c) it is free from dampness prejudicial to the health of the
occupants (if any);
(d) it has adequate provision for lighting, heating and ventilation;
(e) it has an adequate piped supply of wholesome water;
(f) there are satisfactory facilities in the dwelling-house for the
preparation and cooking of food, including a sink with a
satisfactory supply of hot and cold water;
(g) it has a suitably located water-closet for the exclusive use of the
occupants (if any);
(h) it has, for the exclusive use of the occupants (if any), a suitably
located fixed bath or shower and wash-hand basin each of which is
provided with a satisfactory supply of hot and cold water; and
(i) it has an effective system for the draining of foul, waste and
surface water;
and any reference to a dwelling-house being unfit for human
habitation shall be construed accordingly.
 (2) Whether or not a dwelling-house which is a flat satisfies the
requirements in subsection (1), it is unfit for human habitation for
the purposes of this Act if, in the opinion of the local housing
authority, the building or a part of the building outside the flat fails to
meet one or more of the requirements in paragraphs (a) to (e) below
and, by reason of that failure, the flat is not reasonably suitable for
occupation,—
(a) the building or part is structurally stable;
(b) it is free from serious disrepair;
(c) it is free from dampness;
(d) it has adequate provision for ventilation; and
(e) it has an effective system for the draining of foul, waste and
surface water…”
 8.52 If the draft Housing Bill, currently the subject of consultation, reaches the statute
book in essentially its present form, we recommend that this standard be adapted
so as to avoid a “category 1 hazard” as defined in clause 2 (1) of the Bill.
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(3) Occupiers’ improvements
 8.53 There is no general right for tenants or licensees to carry out improvements in the
absence of an express term to that effect. Secure tenants do have statutory rights.23
Assured tenants do not have these statutory rights. However, the Housing
Corporation would expect, as part of its regulatory regime, that RSL tenants
would be given contractually equivalent rights.
 8.54 We recommend that the Bill should provide that type I agreements contain a
compulsory-minimum term giving occupiers the right to make improvements
subject to the landlord’s consent, which may not be unreasonably refused.24
 8.55 Type II occupiers, whether in the social or private sector, are differently placed.
Introductory tenants and licensees do not currently have the right to make
improvements. We do not see why it should be guaranteed to other type II
occupiers. We will recommend in type II agreements that there should be a default
term giving the landlord a veto over proposed improvements by the occupier.
 8.56 The rights to compensation, reimbursement, and rent restriction relating to
improvements should be preserved. They should operate as statutory provisions
outside the agreement, and should apply to type I agreements only.
(4) Quiet enjoyment and non-derogation from grant
 8.57 The covenant of quiet enjoyment is a promise that, without special reasons,25 the
landlord should leave the tenant to enjoy occupation of the premises undisturbed.
Case law has applied this basic concept to a wide range of factual circumstances,
such as obstructing access to the premises, or even failing to keep premises
watertight, which a landlord was obliged to repair. Under the present law it is a
term that is implied into tenancies; it does not apply as a standard implied term to
licences.
 8.58 The common law also implies into tenancies a covenant that the landlord will not
derogate from the grant of the tenancy. Broadly this prohibits the landlord from
doing things that would undermine the purpose of the agreement. In the
23 Housing Act 1985, s 97 provides that a secure tenant or licensee, but not an introductory
tenant or licensee, has the right to make improvements to the premises, provided that they
obtain written consent from the landlord. The landlord must not unreasonably withhold
consent, but can impose reasonable conditions. It is for the landlord to show that a refusal or
a condition is reasonable, and consent will be treated as given if it is withheld unreasonably
or if unreasonable conditions are imposed. On reasonableness the court must have regard in
particular to whether the improvement would make the dwelling less safe for occupiers,
would cause the landlord to incur additional expenditure, or reduce the value of the
property on the market or the rent which could be charged. “Improvements” for these
purposes covers any alteration or addition to the dwelling, including to the fixtures and
fittings, such as a new kitchen, bathroom or toilet, the outside decoration, and the addition
of a television aerial or satellite dish.
24 We discuss the question of consent below, Part X.
25 For example to gain access to inspect the premises or carry out repairs.
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residential letting context, the covenant against derogation from grant effectively
covers much the same ground as the covenant for quiet enjoyment.26
 8.59 We recommend that all agreements should contain a compulsory-minimum term
setting out an equivalent of the current covenant of quiet enjoyment. This
provision will have two main purposes:
 (1) to protect the occupier from harassment by the landlord (or his agents);
and
 (2) to prohibit unnecessary interference with the occupier’s peace and
comfort.
 8.60 We shall also recommend that the model agreement contains a note explaining
these essential features of the meaning of “quiet enjoyment”, emphasising that it is
not a provision designed to deal with noise.
 8.61 We recommend that the issue of the extent to which the landlord has the right to
enter the premises should be dealt with in a default term.27
(5) Warranties as to title
 8.62 Under the current law on leases, the landlord does not have to give any warranty as
to title, and unless the contract for granting the lease states otherwise the
prospective tenant does not even have the right to call for the landlord’s title.28
This principle has a number of practical consequences. The landlord is under no
obligation to the tenant, unless the contract provides otherwise, to have obtained
any necessary permissions from any head landlord or mortgagee to enter the
tenancy agreement. The same principle applies to the obtaining of any planning
permission or permission from insurers.
 8.63 Commonly landlords with mortgages let without the permission of the mortgagee.
If necessary, the mortgagee can repossess against the tenant as well as the landlord.
This can be a considerable problem in practice. A person who thought he or she
had a legally valid tenancy finds that, as against the mortgagee, he or she is an
unlawful occupier. The landlord will usually be in breach of contract where the
tenant is evicted because of action by the mortgagee, but only in rare cases will it
be worthwhile suing. This position is in stark contrast to provisions in consumer
law under which warranties as to title are impliedly made by both sellers of goods
and hirers of goods.29
 8.64 We considered whether occupation agreements should contain a compulsory-
minimum term requiring the landlord to give a warranty of title. However, we have
concluded that this would be a step too far and might well have undesirable
consequences. Nonetheless, although there are no current provisions on the point,
26 Peter Sparkes, in A New Landlord and Tenant (2001), says at p 310 that it “seems to add little
to quiet enjoyment”.
27 See para 8.42, above.
28 See Law of Property Act 1925, s 44.
29 See Sale of Goods Act 1979, s 12(1); Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982, s 7(1).
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we think that this is one area where – given the consumer approach we have
adopted – some innovation is required.
 8.65 We shall therefore recommend that occupation agreements should contain a
compulsory-minimum term modelled on the implied term contained in section
7(1) of the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982.30 The term should require the
landlord to have, and maintain for the duration of the agreement, a right to give
the occupier the right of occupation under the agreement. Failure to obtain some
permission (for example from an insurer) would not constitute breach of the
agreement by the landlord, unless it actually led to the termination of the
occupier’s right to occupy.
 8.66 The original landlord would be liable for breach if he transferred his interest to a
third party, and failed – as part of that transaction – to ensure that the new
landlord agreed to be bound by occupation agreements made by the original
landlord.31
(6) Consultation and information
 8.67 Most current provisions relating to requirements on landlords to provide
information to their tenants and to consult with tenants about changes to their
agreement should continue to be dealt with outside the contractual agreement.
 8.68 There are certain provisions, to which social landlords are subject, relating to
requirements to consult their tenants about matters of housing management. In
relation to local housing authorities, these are statutory requirements;32 registered
social landlords are required by the Housing Corporation to adopt similar rules.
 8.69 We have come to the view that it would be helpful to set these requirements out in
a compulsory-minimum term. It would apply to all type I agreements; and also to
type II agreements when used by social landlords for probationary purposes.33
SPECIAL TERMS
 8.70 The third category is special terms. These reflect social policy concerns. As they
will reflect matters of social policy determined by Government, they will be
capable of variation only by the Secretary of State amending the law.
 8.71 There are three issues which, reflecting the current law, we recommend should be
dealt with in this category:
 (1) anti-social behaviour;34
30 Section 7(1) reads: “In a contract for the hire of goods there is an implied condition on the
part of the bailor that in the case of a bailment he has a right to transfer possession of the
goods by way of hire for the period of the bailment and in the case of an agreement to bail
he will have such a right at the time of the bailment.”
31 This would only apply to occupation agreements that amounted to licenses; agreements that
were, in law, tenancies would bind the new landlord in any event.
32 Housing Act 1985, s 105; and Housing Act 1996, s 137.
33 This will reflect the fact that introductory tenants are currently entitled to the benefit of
these consultation obligations.
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 (2) domestic violence;35 and
 (3) the consequences of providing false information when applying for an
occupation agreement.36
 8.72 We discuss (1) and (2) in Part XV.
 8.73 In relation to (3) we recommend that there should be a special condition in the
agreement that the occupier warrants that they have not knowingly or recklessly
made false statements, or instigated anyone else to do so, in such a way as to
induce the landlord to enter the agreement.37
OTHER TERMS
 8.74 The last category is the other terms. These will include default terms dealing with
matters essential to the operation of the agreement; substitute terms, where the
parties have agreed to replace a default term with one of their own terms; and
additional terms, which relate to matters particular to the specific contract and in
relation to which the parties have agreed a term.
Default and substitute terms
 8.75 We recommend that, following consultation with representatives of the various
interests in rented housing, the Secretary of State should produce terms on
matters not covered by the key or compulsory-minimum terms but which are
nonetheless essential for the creation of an operational occupation agreement.
These will relate to obvious matters, for example the obligations of the occupier to
pay the rent and to look after the property. The model agreements will contain
default terms relating to these matters.
 8.76 Where the parties agree, they may substitute their own terms for the default terms,
here called substitute terms. Any express written substitute term set out in the
agreement will override a default term. The default terms will apply where a
substitute term has been agreed orally but has not been included in the written
agreement, or where a substitute term has been agreed and written into the
agreement but which turns out to be unenforceable for failing the fairness and
transparency principles of the UTCCR.
 8.77 The object of these recommendations is to ensure that, even if the parties do not
expressly agree anything more than the key terms, a complete written agreement is
still available to the parties. This means that all occupation agreements will have to
include terms covering the matters for which there are default terms in the model
34 Currently dealt with in Housing Act 1985, Schedule 2, ground 2A, and Housing Act 1988,
Schedule 2, ground 14.
35 Currently Housing Act 1985, Schedule 2, ground 2A, and Housing Act 1988, Schedule 2,
ground 14A.
36 Currently Housing Act 1985, Schedule 2, ground 5, and Housing Act 1988, Schedule 2,
ground 17.
37 To reproduce the effect of Housing Act 1985 Schedule 2, ground 5 and Housing Act 1988
Schedule 2, ground 17.
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agreement. They can achieve this, either simply by adopting the default terms set
out in the model agreements or by substituting others. The terms in the model
agreements will, by definition, be UTCCR compliant.
 8.78 The matters in relation to which there will be default clauses will include:
 (1) terms relating to occupiers’ responsibilities, such as occupiers’ obligations
relating to repairs, to act in a tenant-like manner, to report disrepair, to
give the landlord access for repairs, and not to make improvements
without consent;
 (2) where relevant, a term that the occupier use the property as their only or
principal home; and
 (3) where relevant, terms proposed as part of the new rules on joint
occupation, lodgers, sub-occupation, transfer and succession.38
 8.79 While each default term should be capable of being imposed on the parties
without amendment, some will need to be contingent on some particular feature of
the property that would not be found in all cases. For example: “If there is a
garden included in the property detailed in the key term, then the occupier will be
responsible for maintaining it in the condition it was in at the start of the
agreement”.
 8.80 The parties will be free to depart from the default terms, subject to the UTCCR
tests of fairness and transparency. While those compulsory-minimum terms which
are variable can only be varied in the occupier’s favour, a default term can be
varied against the interests of the occupier, provided that it still passes the UTCCR
tests.
Additional terms
 8.81 However carefully drafted, the model agreement will never capture all the
particular requirements needed for all occupation agreements. There will therefore
often be a need for additional terms to be agreed by the parties and included in the
agreement. Such terms should be written down just like all the others, to produce
a complete account of all the terms in the written agreement.
 8.82 Where such a term has been agreed orally but is not included in the written
agreement, we think that the rent sanction, normally applied for failure to reduce
the agreement to writing, should not apply.
 8.83 This leaves the question of whether such a term should be valid if it is not put into
writing. If the term is treated as valid, then this could lead to uncertainty as these
terms would then exist outside of the written agreement, and there will be no
direct penalty on the landlord for having produced an incomplete written version
of the agreement. We therefore recommend that any additional term should not be
effective if it is not written down and included in the written statement of the
agreement.
38 These are discussed in Parts XI to XIV.
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 8.84 Where the landlord takes advantage of the model agreements to set out the bulk of
the terms of the agreement, any additional terms would be stated on the front page
of the written agreement.39Having additional terms does not prevent a landlord
from using a model agreement. The landlord could create a written agreement by
joining together a statement of the additional terms and a generally available
model agreement containing the approved form for the key terms and a set of
compulsory-minimum, special and default terms.
 8.85 This approach is subject to two caveats.
 8.86 First, a landlord might agree orally to a favourable additional term to entice a
potential occupier into an agreement. For example: “The occupier shall be entitled
to use the garden.” The landlord should not be allowed to renege on it by the
simple expedient of omitting it from the written agreement. We therefore wish to
enable the occupier to apply to court to rectify the written agreement to reflect the
actual agreed terms. The court would order any additional term to be added to the
agreement.
 8.87 Under normal Civil Procedure Rules principles, there would be cost penalties
against a landlord who refused to correct a written agreement voluntarily or
against an occupier who brought an unwarranted case.
 8.88 Secondly, there might be a term which was not express, but which needed to be
implied into a particular agreement under the normal contractual principles of
using implied terms to ensure the “business efficacy” of the agreement. Our
scheme must not remove the court’s power to imply terms on the basis of business
efficacy outside the areas covered by the compulsory-minimum and default terms.
Obviously, the issue will not come up until one or both of the parties notice the
lacuna. If they agree what should fill the lacuna, they can agree on an additional
term which can be put into writing and added to the agreement. If they do not
agree then they will have to make do as best they can. If there is a dispute in court
about the matter, then the court will have to be asked to judge what, if any, the
contents of any implied term should be, following which the landlord will have to
reduce it to writing in the normal way.
VARIATION OF THE TERMS OF OCCUPATION AGREEMENTS
 8.89 Occupation agreements may last for a considerable period of time. Thus terms
agreed at the commencement of an agreement may cease to be appropriate. If
agreements cannot be varied then landlords will wish to terminate them. Our
scheme must provide a method of varying terms to provide the flexibility necessary
to enable agreements to survive. At the same time we recognise that variations
could detrimentally affect occupiers and could be open to abuse by landlords.
 8.90 We have already discussed the importance to our scheme of putting the agreement
into writing. The requirement of writing must also apply to varied terms. Having
said this we want to avoid unnecessary procedural complexity and onerous
administrative burdens. The ability to vary the agreement must be related to the
importance of the term to be varied.
39 See para 8.12 above.
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Varying terms
 8.91 The availability and extent of the power to vary will be different for each of the sets
of terms in the agreement.
Key terms
 8.92 The key terms of the agreement relate to defining the property subject to the
agreement; the parties to the agreement; and the rent. In relation to the variation
of these terms we recommend:
 (1) There can be no variation of the property which is the subject of the
occupation agreement.40
 (2) The parties to the agreement may be varied by mechanisms relating to
joint-occupiers, successors and so on.41 There should be no variation of
the parties to the contract other than by use of these provisions.42
 (3) The term relating to the rent can be freely varied; the extent to which the
rent term can be varied will depend on the type of agreement, as discussed
below at paragraph 8.102.
Compulsory-minimum terms
 8.93 We have already noted that some of the compulsory-minimum terms, for instance
those relating to repairing obligations, which reflect statutory tests, will need to be
varied if the legislation underlying those terms is changed. Governments will need
the freedom to make changes to these terms from time to time in order to pursue
housing policy objectives. To achieve this, we recommend that the Secretary of
State should have power to vary such compulsory-minimum terms by statutory
instrument. The Secretary of State will have to consider, when varying these
compulsory-minimum terms, whether the variation shall apply retrospectively to
all agreements or only to ones created after the date of commencement of the
statutory instrument. This will be a political decision for the Secretary of State.
The system of notifying occupiers of a statutory variation and the sanctions for
failing to notify should be consistent with the scheme described below.
 8.94 We also recommend that compulsory-minimum terms should be capable of
variation by the parties. In such cases, the variation can only be in the occupier’s
favour.
40 That is consistent with the current provision in Housing Act 1985, s 102(2), the effect of
which should be extended.
41 Discussed below in Parts XI to XIV.
42 This is a separate issue from complying with the compulsory-minimum term requiring up to
date written information about an address for service for the landlord and the name and
address of any agent. Changing that information is not a question of varying the
compulsory–minimum term, but there should be special provisions for the rent sanction and




 8.95 These will not be variable, save by legislative amendment.
Other terms
 8.96 Default terms can be varied if the contract provides a variation clause. The model
agreements for type I and periodic type II agreements will include a default term
dealing with variation. Such term will be deemed to be fair for UTCCR purposes.
 8.97 Where the model terms do not provide a default variation term (as in the case of a
type II fixed-term agreement) or the landlord chooses to use a substitute term, any
variation clause must conform with the requirements of UTCCR.
 8.98 Any term of the contract, once varied, must also comply with the UTCCR .
Rules for the different agreement types
 8.99 We recommend that different rules relating to variation should apply to the
different agreement types.
Variation of type I agreements
 8.100 Type I agreements provide a high level of security for occupiers. This means that
landlords have less control over the premises. Such agreements have the potential
to last for a very long period during which time the conditions surrounding the
agreement may change profoundly. Landlords have to be able to vary both rent
and non-rent terms of the type I agreements.
 8.101 However, the power to vary must be limited so that the security of the type I
agreement is retained and the occupier retains some sense of personal autonomy in
the home. We consider that the practical way in which to achieve this is to allow
unilateral variation, but within limits. In particular, we recommend that there be
mechanisms which support occupiers by requiring landlords to involve them in
decision making about varying the terms of the agreement.
VARYING THE RENT
 8.102 We recommend that the model agreement for type I include a default term
allowing landlords to vary the rent unilaterally. There should also be a compulsory-
minimum term within the type I agreement which sets out the procedure for
varying the rent. The term should provide that at least one month’s notice of any
proposed increase in rent should be given. Rent variation should be limited to
annual rent increases.43
 8.103 If landlords using type I agreements wish to limit their right to rent increases then
they can do so by varying the compulsory-minimum term in the occupier’s favour
and providing for no or less frequent rent variation.
43 In the same way that it is limited within the current assured tenancy regime set out in
Housing Act 1988, s 13.
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VARYING OTHER TERMS
 8.104 We recommend that landlords of type I occupiers should be able to vary other
terms of agreements (other than the terms which cannot be varied save by the
Secretary of State and the key terms other than rent) either by agreement between
the landlord and the occupier or following a prescribed process of consultation
with the occupier.
 8.105 The provision allowing variation by agreement is desirable as it can avoid the
procedural requirements of consultation.
 8.106 The consultation requirements will apply to all landlords who rent on a type I
basis. The requirements should be part of a compulsory-minimum term which sets
out the right of the landlord unilaterally to vary the agreement subject to
completion of the consultation process. As the requirement to consult will be a
term in the contract, failure to consult will be a breach of contract.
 8.107 Failure to consult properly may provide a basis for judicial review and Human
Rights actions where the landlord is, respectively, a public body or public authority.
The relevant principles are those recently restated by the Court of Appeal in R v
North and East Devon Health Authority, ex parte Coughlan:
To be proper, consultation must be undertaken at a time when
proposals are still at a formative stage; it must include sufficient
reasons for particular proposals to allow those consulted to give
intelligent consideration and an intelligent response; adequate time
must be given for this purpose; and the product of consultation must
be conscientiously taken into account when the ultimate decision is
taken.44
The effect of Coughlan is that the requirement to consult is necessarily more than a
mechanistic one for public bodies.
 8.108 In order to provide an equivalent remedy for failure to consult where the landlord
is not a public body, we recommend that the term setting out the consultation
requirements reproduce the Coughlan test as far as possible. Thus to be valid, the
consultation process must be procedurally correct.45 In addition, there must be a
“conscientious” evaluation of the results of the consultation. The decision-maker
should not simply pay lip-service to the consultation process.
Variation of type II fixed term agreements
 8.109 By definition, fixed-term agreements are designed to be fixed. The default position
is that there will be no term permitting variation of agreement during the fixed
term. This will be appropriate where the fixed-term is designed to be of short
duration.
 8.110 Where the fixed-term is for a longer period, the existence of a variation clause may
be desirable. In such cases, the landlord will be free to insert an additional term in
the agreement. Such a term, not being part of the model agreement, will not be
44 [2001] 1 QB 213, 258.
45 This can build on provisions currently found in Housing Act 1985, s 103.
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automatically deemed fair for UTCCR purposes in the way that other default
terms in the model agreement will be.
 8.111 Current indications from the OFT guidance on unfair terms in rental agreements
would suggest for instance that the OFT are likely to require rent increases during
a fixed term rental agreement to be set to some objective framework such as RPI.
 Variation in type II periodic agreements
 8.112 Although periodic type II agreements have the potential for longevity, the landlord
will usually be able to seek possession on the notice-only basis. Thus if variation is
not permitted, the landlord may simply terminate the original agreement and re-
grant it to the original or another occupier with the terms varied. It seems sensible
to include a default term which allows for the variation of the rent and of other
terms (not being key terms or special terms which are not variable). The default
term should provide that the rent is reviewable and revisable on an annual basis. A
landlord will be able to substitute a term to allow for more frequent variation of
rent, but if they do so they will be subject to UTCCR principles.
 8.113 Certain landlords, for instance social landlords or landlords who are co-operatives,
may wish to consult before varying terms within a type II agreement. They will be
able to include an additional “consultation-prior-to-variation” term within their
agreements. However, we shall not recommend that such a term should be either a
compulsory-minimum term or a default term.
PROCEDURE
 8.114 The procedure for varying type II periodic agreements should be the same for both
rent and other variations. Variation should operate by at least two months’ notice
of variation which sets out the variation and informs the occupier that the variation
will come into effect on the date stated in the notice, which must be at least two
months after the date the notice was issued.
 8.115 The notice of variation must additionally inform the occupier that it also takes
effect as a notice of intention to take possession proceedings. Thus the landlord
may commence possession proceedings under the notice-only procedure for
eviction on a date following expiry of the two months’ notice period, if the
occupier does not agree to the variation.46
 8.116 The reason for conflating the variation and possession procedure in this way is to
encourage the private landlord to use it. Otherwise he or she would simply issue
notice-only proceedings for possession. This procedure should assist the landlord
who wants the occupier to continue in possession but on varied terms.
Notification of variations: provision of a copy in writing
 8.117 We recommend that the landlord should not be able to take advantage of the
varied term until any period of notice has expired and written notification of the
term as varied has been provided to the occupier.
46 The principle of “use it or lose it” will equally apply in this context. Thus proceedings must
be started within four months of the end of the notice period: see para 9.13 below.
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 8.118 We also recommend that, following notification of any variation, other than a
variation of the rent, the occupier should have the right to request a written
statement of the agreement complete with the varied term, which must be
provided within two weeks of the request.
 8.119 In those cases where the landlord has taken advantage of our recommendation that
evidence of the written agreement can be provided by attaching the relevant model
agreement to the front page, which sets out the key terms together with any
variations of or additions to the model agreement,47 compliance with the request
will be satisfied by the landlord simply re-issuing the front page, as further
amended by the relevant variation.
 8.120 Failure to provide this within two weeks of the date of the request will trigger the
same sanctions, as does failure to provide the original agreement.48
ISSUES TO BE DEALT WITH OUTSIDE THE CONTRACT
 8.121 Notwithstanding our general approach towards ensuring that the occupation
agreement is the principal source of information about the landlord-occupier
relationship, a number of issues will remain outside the contract.
 (1) The right to buy and the right to acquire. These rights are in essence
statutory schemes which do not directly relate to the landlord-occupier
relationship, but where the right derives from the identity of the landlord
and the status of the occupier. These provisions will be preserved in
appropriately reformulated statutory provisions.
 (2) The right to repair. This is a complex statutory scheme available to tenants
of local authorities setting out procedures for the timely handling of
certain small urgent repairs, likely to affect the tenant’s health, safety or
security. A similar scheme is available to the tenants of registered social
landlords. We recommend that this be renamed the “small repairs
procedure”. It should apply to all type I agreements, and to type II
agreements made by social landlords. It should remain as a statutory
scheme, outside the contract, though we recommend that there be a
compulsory-minimum term in the agreement under which the landlord
contracts to follow the requirements of the statutory small repairs
procedure, where this is relevant.
 (3) Information about safety regulations. We think that at some future time it
may be possible to incorporate into the agreement requirements relating to
the safety of gas and electrical appliances.49 However, for the time being we
recommend that the details of these continue to be set out in their
statutory schemes.
47 See para 8.12, above.
48 See para 7.35 – 7.53, above.
49 Gas Appliances (Safety) Regulations 1992, SI 1992 No 711 and Gas Appliances (Safety)
Regulations 1995, SI 1995 No 1629; Electrical Equipment (Safety) Regulations 1994,  SI
1994 No 3260.
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 (4) Financial matters relating to improvements. The current right to
compensation for improvements, the power to reimburse for improvement
and the limitation on increases of rent following improvements50 should be
preserved as statutory provisions outside the contract.
 (5) Consultation and information requirements. There are a variety of provisions
relating to the provision of information and consultation which should
continue to operate outside the agreement. They apply to social landlords.
These provisions include: the right to receive annual reports on housing
management performance;51 tenant participation compacts;52 publicity for
certain allocation schemes;53 and consultation and balloting requirements
where a social landlord intends to dispose of their interest to another
landlord.54 The only consultation requirement to be brought within the
occupation agreement is that relating to housing management (see above
paragraph 2.36).
 8.122 There will be a requirement to provide information about these extra-contractual
issues in the occupation agreement.
50 Housing Act 1985, ss 99A, 99B, 100, 101.
51 Local Government and Housing Act 1989, s 25.
52 Local Government Act 1999, Part I.
53 Housing Act 1985, s 106.
54 See, for example, Housing Act 1985, s 106A and Schedule 3A, relating to large scale
voluntary transfers under Housing Act 1985, s 32.
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PART IX 
TERMINATION OF AGREEMENTS AND
PROCEEDINGS FOR POSSESSION
INTRODUCTION
 9.1 In this part, we discuss first our recommendations in relation to the termination of
occupation agreements by landlords and requirements relating to taking
proceedings for orders for possession. At the end of the Part, we consider
termination by occupiers.
 9.2 Termination of occupation agreements by landlords is an issue which has become
increasingly regulated by statute over the years. While we wish to retain the basic
substance of the existing rules, we need to adapt them to the consumer approach
we have adopted in this project.
 9.3 In particular, because we want the occupation agreement to be the place where a
clear statement of the rights and obligations of both landlords and occupiers is set
out, we wish to see the grounds for possession set out in the agreement itself. This
will replace the present situation where the grounds for possession are prescribed
in detail in statutory provisions, which operate outside the agreement. We wish the
circumstances in which and the processes by which the agreement may lawfully be
brought to an end to be apparent on the face of the written agreement.1 To achieve
this we recommend that statute should provide a framework for the compulsory-
minimum and default terms which will be set out in the agreement.
 9.4 We will need to preserve in statute the court’s powers over the termination of
agreements by the landlord. It would be inappropriate to seek to give the court
jurisdiction through the contract itself.
TERMINATION BY LANDLORDS
 9.5 In this section, we discuss:
 (1) due process;
 (2) the grounds for possession;
 (3) notice requirements; and
 (4) abandonment.
1 This will not be as revolutionary as it might seem. Many years ago the distinguished housing
policy expert, the late Professor Nevitt, described the Rent Act as the “poor man’s lease” in
that it actually set out in statute what would be found in the well-drawn lease available to the
better off. Our intention is that all occupation agreements should benefit from the same
clarity, but in the agreement itself.
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DUE PROCESS
 9.6 Where a landlord is seeking possession from an occupier at the end of an
agreement, and the occupier refuses to leave the premises voluntarily, it has long
been accepted that the landlord should go through “due process” to regain
possession. This comprises two elements:
 (1) the need for notice; and
 (2) the need for a court order.
 9.7 Such processes conform to the requirements of Article 6(1) of the European
Convention on Human Rights. They also ensure that the relevant substantive
rights within the European Convention are met. In particular, the measures
provide protection for Article 8 rights (the right to respect for a home), and Article
1 of the First Protocol (the general principle of peaceful enjoyment of property).
Our recommendations are framed to ensure that the principle of due process
remains a key feature of the scheme we are proposing.
 9.8 This does not mean that the detail of the existing law should not be changed. For
example, we recommend changes to the existing rules relating to notices, in order
to make them more coherent and efficient.
Notice of intention to take proceedings
 9.9 Even before a landlord can get to court to seek an order for possession, it has
become an almost universal requirement that he or she must start the process by
issuing a notice to the tenant warning the tenant of his intention of going to court.2
These have largely replaced the common law rules relating to the need for a notice
to quit to determine a periodic tenancy.
 9.10 For agreements currently falling outside the principal classes of protection, the
requirement for a notice to quit followed by a court order is set out in the
Protection from Eviction Act 1977.
 9.11 In addition, the new Civil Procedure Rules place great emphasis on the need for
parties to litigation to give the other side notice of their intention to bring
proceedings. This is part of the policy of the CPR that, wherever possible,
proceedings should be settled without the need for a hearing at court.
 9.12 Accordingly, we recommend that the notice requirement be retained. We make
detailed recommendations about the time periods relating to these notices,
designed to make the rules more straightforward.3
Use it or lose it
 9.13 We also want to strengthen the principle of “use it or lose it”. If proceedings are
not in fact taken within a prescribed time after the notice period has expired, the
2 There are some circumstances in which this is not required, for example, where the court
can dispose of the notice requirement on the ground that that would be ‘just and equitable’.
3 See paras 9.45 – 9.60 below.
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validity of the notice will cease, and a new notice of intention to take proceedings
will have to be issued before court proceedings can be started.
Court order
 9.14 It has long been a key feature of housing law in England and Wales that a landlord
should not be able lawfully to regain possession of property let for residential
purposes without first obtaining an order from the court. We recommend that this
principle be retained in our new scheme.
GROUNDS FOR POSSESSION
 9.15 In line with our objective of ensuring that the occupation agreement sets out, as
fully as possible, a statement of the parties’ rights and obligations, we recommend
that the grounds on which a landlord may seek possession should be set out there.
 9.16 We recommend that all occupation agreements should contain, as compulsory-
minimum terms, the grounds on which possession proceedings may be brought.
Being compulsory-minimum terms, the landlord and occupier may agree to alter
the grounds, but any variation will only be in favour of the occupier (for instance a
variation to provide that a particular ground would not be used). If so varied, the
landlord will not be prevented from agreeing a further variation, so long as the
position of the occupier does not fall below the statutorily prescribed compulsory-
minimum level.
 9.17 As with the present law, there will be two categories of grounds:
 (1) discretionary, where possession may be ordered only if a judge thinks that
making the possession order is reasonable; and
 (2) mandatory, where possession must be ordered once the relevant ground
for possession has been proved.
Availability of the grounds
Type I agreements
 9.18 Central to the scheme we propose is that, in relation to type I agreements, only the
discretionary grounds for possession will be available. As noted above,4 this
proposed change will affect registered social landlords who, under the present law,
do have a number of mandatory grounds for possession available to them.
 9.19 Although some registered social landlords in their consultation responses argued
strongly against this proposed change, others saw the logic in what we were
proposing, and accepted that without this change, it would be impossible to create
a single agreement type that would apply to all occupiers from social landlords.
4 See paras 3.37 – 3.38 above.
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 9.20 We also heard numerous complaints that, when exercising their discretion, judges
are too inconsistent in their decisions. We seek to address this issue in our
recommendations on structured discretion.5
 9.21 We accept that there will be some cases where use of an agreement broadly in line
with a type I agreement would be appropriate, but where there would still be
compelling reasons for including a mandatory basis for seeking possession. We
think this may apply where a private landlord created an assured tenancy under the
Housing Act 1988, or where a tenancy has been created by a fully mutual housing
co-operative. In these situations, the flexibility of our proposed scheme means that,
instead of transforming such agreements into type I agreements, they can be
converted into type II agreements, on condition that they are “written up”. This
will mean that any such agreement will contain all of the relevant terms of a type I
agreement, but additionally contains the required term providing a mandatory
ground for seeking possession, for example, relating to rent arrears.
Type II agreements
 9.22 The mandatory grounds will be available for type II agreements.
 9.23 The discretionary grounds will also be available, though we anticipate that in many
cases they will not be required. They will be of particular value in relation to fixed-
term type II agreements.
Definition of the grounds
 9.24 The present law sets out the grounds for possession in very great detail. Each of
the principal Housing Acts has its own set of grounds, all of which differ from each
other. In accordance with our objective of simplification, we recommend a major
rationalisation of the grounds for possession.
Discretionary grounds
 9.25 We recommend that the discretionary grounds on which a possession order may be
sought should fall into two broad classes:
 (1) a general ground, for breach of any of the terms or conditions of the
agreement; and
 (2) circumstances which we have labelled “estate management grounds”
where, in addition to establishing that it is reasonable for a court to make
the order, the landlord has to show other suitable accommodation will be
available to the occupier.
BREACH OF THE AGREEMENT
 9.26 We recommend that the agreement contain a compulsory-minimum term
providing that a landlord may take proceedings for possession for breach of any of
5 See paras 9.82 – 9.90 below.
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the terms in the agreement by the occupier.6 It will not be necessary for the
occupier still to be in breach at the time of taking proceedings. Thus, for example,
a person who persistently pays the rent late will be as much at risk as the person
who has not paid at all.
 9.27 We intend that this term should replace all the current statutory grounds for
possession which are based on fault by the tenant, such as where the tenant has
damaged the house or furniture or not paid rent. Even where a landlord has
forgotten to include a term prohibiting a particular type of activity,7 the default
terms, prescribed in secondary legislation, will reproduce the effect of the existing
grounds.
Overcrowding
 9.28 In relation to overcrowding, ground 9 of Schedule 2 to the Housing Act 1985
currently requires suitable alternative accommodation to be provided in all cases
where the occupier is found to be in breach of the statutory rules on overcrowding.
This might suggest this should become part of the “estate management” basis for
seeking possession, set out below. In our view, however, it appears more
appropriate also to treat overcrowding as a matter for a default term. The landlord
will have the possibility of seeking repossession for breach of the term.
Unreasonable grounds
 9.29 We have considered whether our approach might lead landlords to invent
unreasonable grounds for possession by writing additional terms into agreements.
We do not think this likely. Landlords already have the general ground for
possession based on breach of the tenancy agreement.8 The landlord who seeks to
add a term enabling him to evict for, for instance, moving a piece of furniture to
the other side of the room from where it was placed by the landlord,9 will find that
such a term must pass the fairness and transparency tests of the UTCCR. Even if
it passed them, the court must still think it reasonable to order eviction.
ESTATE MANAGEMENT GROUNDS
 9.30 Both the Rent Act 1977 and the Housing Act 1988 provide that a landlord may
seek possession on the basis that they provide the current tenant with “suitable
alternative accommodation”. By contrast, the Housing Act 1985 prescribes a set of
particular circumstances in which a landlord may seek possession, for example
where a house adapted for use by a disabled person is no longer occupied by a
6 Each of the current Acts includes a possession ground for breach of the contract: see Rent
Act 1977, Schedule 15, case 1; Housing Act 1985, Schedule 2, ground 1, Housing Act 1988,
Schedule 2, ground 12.
7 The main grounds replaced will be Housing Act 1985, Schedule 2, grounds 1, 3 and 4, and
Housing Act 1988, Schedule 2, grounds 10-13, and 15.
8 See Rent Act 1977, Schedule 15, case 1; Housing Act 1985, Schedule 2, ground 1 and
Housing Act 1988, Schedule 2, ground 12.
9 Terms prohibiting movement of furniture have been fairly common in the past in some parts
of the furnished private rented sector. The OFT Guidance on Unfair Terms in Tenancy
Agreements (November 2001) at para 18.8.5 gives the example of a term prohibiting pets in
general, which would, if valid, prohibit even keeping a goldfish.
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person with a disability. Again, before this ground can be used, the landlord must
ensure that suitable alternative accommodation is provided. In both sets of
circumstances, the court must decide that it is reasonable to make an order for
possession. The objective of both approaches is to give the landlord some flexibility
in the use of their estate, while preventing the tenant from being arbitrarily up-
rooted from their home.
 9.31 We think that landlords should continue to have the ability to manage their estates
in a flexible and efficient way, so long as the interests of occupiers are also fully
taken into account.
 9.32 In view of the fact that we anticipate that most type I agreements, which provide
the highest security of tenure, will be made by social landlords, we have concluded
that the approach in the Housing Act 1985 is the more appropriate one for the
scheme we now propose. The Housing Act 1985 was meant to give tenants
security in their homes. Its approach is to balance the social landlord’s need for
efficient use of their stock against the need to provide security and respect for
home and family life, as well as avoiding disrupting the sustainability of
communities by unnecessarily moving those who have created an established
community.
 9.33 We therefore recommend that there is a compulsory-minimum term in the
agreement, to the effect that the landlord may take possession proceedings in a list
of circumstances where, without the occupier being in breach of the agreement, it
is nonetheless in the broader public interest that the landlord should be able to
seek possession.10 In such cases a court may order possession only if it finds that it
is reasonable to do so and that suitable alternative accommodation will be
provided for the occupier who is being displaced.11 We also recommend that there
should be a limited right for landlords to seek possession where a joint occupier
withdraws from or abandons the agreement.12
An additional more general ground?
 9.34 The one difficulty with the list approach is that it may fail to cover closely
analogous situations in which there is a good case for the landlord having the same
flexibility. For the reasons given above, we do not recommend giving landlords a
general power to seek possession, simply where they are able to provide suitable
alternative accommodation, as is possible under the Rent Act 1977 or the Housing
Act 1988. At the same time we think the system needs to be more flexible than is
currently provided for in the Housing Act 1985.
10 This will be based on the list currently found in the Housing Act 1985. The landlord can
choose to leave out any items from the list or to impose more stringent requirements
(favouring the occupier) in relation to them.
11 It will not be essential that the alternative accommodation has to be provided by the same
landlord. The fact that any alternative letting will be on the same (type I) terms will facilitate
this.
12 See paras 11.33 – 11.34 below.
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 9.35 While we do not think that there should be a general power to evict simply for
under-occupation,13 nevertheless there should be scope for repossession in other
analogous circumstances where particular estate management needs pass a
similarly high threshold test. We shall therefore recommend that it should be
possible to allow a landlord to seek possession in other similar cases. The provision
should make clear that it is only applicable in exceptional circumstances and where
there is a particular need of the landlord which justifies eviction. As with the other
estate management grounds, it will be subject to the availability of suitable
alternative accommodation and to the test of reasonableness. By requiring the
landlord to show that exceptional public interest is involved, human rights
considerations will be taken fully into account.
Suitability of alternative accommodation
 9.36 There are currently two sets of provisions relating to the definition of suitable
alternative accommodation.14 While they seek to achieve similar objectives, they
will need to be combined into one. In CP 162 we asked whether these tests might
be simplified. We did not receive any suggestions from consultees on simplifying
them.
 9.37 We recommend that the reformulation should be based on the Housing Act 1985
version, reflecting the general policy that creating a unified social occupation
agreement requires movement towards the secure tenancy regime created by the
Housing Act 1985.
“GHOST” GROUNDS FOR POSSESSION
 9.38 In CP 162 we asked whether the circumstances in which occupiers can lose their
statutory security of tenure – for example, because a closing order had been made
on the property – should also be dealt with by way of terms in the agreements.
(These are sometimes referred to as “ghost” grounds for possession.) We have
decided that they should not. Any eviction should be carried out by the relevant
enforcement agency using their own statutory powers, rather than through the
landlord using powers under the agreement. These powers cannot be realistically
be made part of the agreement because they operate outside the agreement.
Mandatory grounds
 9.39 We recommend that there should be two mandatory grounds for possession,
available for type II agreements only:
 (1) the notice-only ground; and
 (2) serious rent arrears.
13 We recommend that, following the death of an occupier, landlords should have a limited
right to seek possession of premises that, as a consequence are not being used to their full
capacity. See paras 14.9 – 14.10 below. We note that some social landlords do in fact seek to
encourage movement of tenants from under-occupied premises by providing cash incentives;
these practices would in no way be affected by our proposals.




 9.40 The notice-only ground refers to the ground, currently available in section 21 of
the Housing Act 1988, whereby the landlord under an assured shorthold tenancy
may seek possession solely on the basis of issuing a notice to the tenant indicating
that he will be taking court proceedings to obtain an order for possession. The
landlord has the right to do this, irrespective of whether there has been any breach
of the agreement or other default on the part of the tenant, and irrespective of
whether it is reasonable for the court to make an order.
 9.41 We recommend that this ground for possession should be retained in the scheme
we propose. There is a widespread perception that the existence of the notice-only
ground is a fundamental underpinning of the market approach to private sector
renting. It would not be within the scope of a law reform exercise to question the
basic approach.15 It was also pointed out that, in practice, most private landlords
grant agreements for at least six or twelve months. Thus the position of the
occupier is not wholly insecure. But such security is provided by the terms of the
agreement, not statute. We have concluded that this is a feature of the type II
agreement which must be retained. Landlords who do not wish to take advantage
of this ground can always remove it from their agreements with occupiers.
SERIOUS RENT ARREARS
 9.42 Ground 8 of Schedule 2 to the Housing Act 1988 provides that, if a tenant is in
two months’ arrears of rent, both at the date of the issue of the notice of intention
to take proceedings and at the date of the subsequent hearing, the court must
order possession, again irrespective of any default on the part of the tenant (for
instance where the sole reason for rental default is maladministration of housing
benefit). As noted earlier,16 we do not see any justification for the retention of this
ground for possession in relation to type I agreements. But we do see it as essential
for type II agreements, particularly if private landlords are to be encouraged to
enter longer fixed-term type II agreements.
 9.43 We shall therefore recommend that the court have jurisdiction to make a
mandatory order in circumstances similar to ground 8. The amount of rent owing
should be set at two months, as at the date of the issuing of the notice of intention
to take proceedings, and at the date of the court hearing. We shall also recommend
that type II agreements should include a term enabling the landlord to seek a
possession order from the court on this mandatory basis.
ABOLITION OF OTHER MANDATORY GROUNDS
 9.44 No other mandatory grounds will be provided. While, under the current law, there
are other mandatory grounds provided for in the legislation,17 we found no
15 It is noteworthy that, with very limited exceptions, respondents did not seriously question
the continued existence of the notice-only ground.
16 See paras 3.37 – 3.38 above.
17 These grounds are: (1) the landlord’s own need to occupy the property; (2) repossession by
a mortgagee in the event of the landlord defaulting on mortgage payments; (3) eviction from
a holiday home following a winter let; (4) eviction from student accommodation following a
vacation let; (5) eviction to enable a minister of religion to occupy the property as a
residence from which to perform his or her duties; (6) eviction to enable the landlord to
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evidence of their significant use in practice. In the interests of simplification, we
recommend that they should not be taken into the new scheme.
NOTICE REQUIREMENTS
 9.45 In this section we set out our detailed recommendations on matters relating to
notices. We recommend that specimen notices should be attached to the model
agreements. The effects of the rules we recommend are summarised in Diagram
9.1.
Discretionary proceedings
Notices to contractual occupiers
 9.46 Wherever possession is sought on one of the discretionary grounds, we
recommend that a landlord must serve a prescribed notice on the occupier(s)
before the court can entertain possession proceedings.18 The court may lift the
demolish, or carry out work on, the premises; (7) the death of the tenant, where there is no
widow or widower or person who lived with the tenant as husband and wife.
18 These provisions will be similar to those currently found in the Housing Act 1985, ss 83 and
83A and the Housing Act 1988, ss 8 and 8A.
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requirement if it considers it just and equitable to do so. Currently this is usually
on the basis that the tenant has not suffered any disadvantage as he or she was
otherwise aware of what would have been in the notice.
 9.47 We recommend that there is a compulsory-minimum term in all occupation
agreements stating that the landlord will serve such a notice before taking
possession proceedings. The provision should be framed so as not to prejudice the
court’s ability to waive the notice when that would be just and equitable.
 9.48 We recommend that the notice should contain a statement of the factual and legal
basis for seeking possession. The landlord will not, as at present, have to write out
a statutory ground in full. The notice will simply refer to the term in the
agreement under which repossession is sought.19
 9.49 We recommend that current requirements about the length of the notice that must
be given should be simplified. Where possession is sought on a discretionary basis,
all notices must give one calendar month between the date of the issue of the
notice and the date of issue of proceedings in the court.
 9.50 The only exception will continue to be where possession is sought on the basis that
the term in the agreement prohibiting anti-social behaviour has been broken. In
such cases, notice of the intention to take proceedings will be able to be issued on
the same day that proceedings are actually issued.20
 9.51 The issuing of a notice of intention to take proceedings is likely to cause the
occupier some uncertainty, and possibly distress, particularly if he or she is unclear
whether the landlord will in fact take proceedings. We therefore think that there
should be a default term that the maximum period of notice should be three
months. A landlord will be able to vary this term to agree that any notice served by
him will be for a longer period; this would have to be fair within UTCCR
principles.
 9.52 As noted, the minimum period of notice should be one calendar month. We
recommend that the notice should be able to start and end on any day. In
particular, the notice should not be dependent on any rental “period” of a tenancy,
and should not be tied to the day of the week or month on which the rent is due to
be paid.
USE IT OR LOSE IT
 9.53 We do not think that notices of intention to take proceedings should be left
hanging over occupiers, unacted upon. The notice should become ineffective, as
now, after a set period.21 We recommend that this period should be 6 months,
rather than the 12 months currently found. Where the landlord fails to issue
proceedings within the period of validity of the notice, he or she will not be able to
19 We had considered making landlords attach a copy of the written agreement when serving a
notice, but we were persuaded that that would be unnecessarily cumbersome.
20 This reflects the current position.
21 See Housing Act 1985, s 83(3)(b) and (4)(b), and Housing Act 1988, s 8(3)(c).
103
start proceedings until another notice of intention to take proceedings has been
issued.
Notices to non-contracting occupants
 9.54 By analogy with the procedural rules relating to mortgage possession
proceedings,22 we recommend that the CPR should provide that notice that
proceedings have been issued must also be served on others occupying the
premises on a non-contractual basis. This is to ensure that they are put on notice
that their occupation is under threat and they may therefore start to make
alternative arrangements.
 9.55 The CPR should be amended to provide that any person on whom a notice is
served under these provisions may at the court’s discretion be joined in the
possession proceedings where the court has a discretion about granting possession.
Mandatory proceedings
 9.56 In the case of notices of intention to take proceedings on the mandatory grounds,
it should not be possible for the court to waive the notice requirements.
Notice-only ground for possession
 9.57 We recommend that there should be a compulsory-minimum term providing that a
landlord who wishes to use the notice-only ground must give at least two months’
notice of intention to take proceedings. As with other notices, the effective period
of the notice should not be tied to the day on which rent is due.
 9.58 We also think that a maximum period of notice should be prescribed, for the same
reasons.23 As with type I agreements, we recommend that the maximum default
period should be three months.
 9.59 As with notices under discretionary grounds, notice-only notices should become
ineffective if not used to start proceedings within a set time. In the case of notice-
only notices the time limit for taking proceedings following the expiry of the period
of notice should be four months.
Serious rent arrears
 9.60 We recommend that the landlord should be able to use the same notice of
intention to take proceedings as for a discretionary ground, suitably adapted to
meet the requirements of this ground for possession.24 The period within which
proceedings must be taken, following expiry of the period of the notice, should be
the same period of six months as applies to other notices (save notice-only
notices).
22 CPR Rule 55.10.
23 See para 9.51 above.
24 Set out para 9.48 above.
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ABANDONMENT
 9.61 As discussed below (paragraphs 9.109 to 9.121), procedures are available for
occupiers to give notice to their landlords. Practical experience suggests that in
many cases occupiers simply leave the premises without giving their landlords any
form of notice that they are leaving. While many may regard this as deplorable, it is
a fact of life. One of our objectives in reforming housing law is to ensure that the
legislative framework takes into account what is likely to happen in the real world
as well as what ought to happen if people followed the rules.
 9.62 There is a Scylla and a Charybdis to be avoided here. The recovery of possession
must not be made too difficult or time-consuming for a responsible landlord in the
case of a genuine abandonment. However, the irresponsible landlord must not be
provided with an easy method of obtaining possession, which can be used to
circumvent proper procedures when the occupier has not genuinely abandoned the
property.
 9.63 In the case of a true abandonment, it is not in the interests of either party that the
legal position should remain uncertain any longer than necessary. The landlord
will be unable to relet the property; if it is left empty, it will be susceptible to
vandalism and decay. The occupier will remain liable for the rent (although from a
practical point of view the landlord may well be unable to recover it). It does not
seem sensible to require the landlord to take possession proceedings in the normal
way (in view of the length of time this will take).
 9.64 Here we discuss our recommendations where there has been a total abandonment
of the premises – that is, where all the occupiers have quit, leaving the premises
empty. We discuss what should happen where there has been partial abandonment
of the premises, that is, where some occupiers are left in the premises, below.25
 9.65 Although the law does currently provide some means for resolving the issues
contemplated in this context, it is of very uncertain scope. The law on the
surrender of a tenancy is particularly difficult. We regard the requirement that
express surrender can only be achieved by deed as quite inappropriate in this
context.
 9.66 For this reason, we proposed in CP 162 that there should be a process available to
landlords whereby they could lawfully regain possession of residential premises
that had been abandoned, modelled on provisions already available in the Housing
(Scotland) Act 2001.26 This suggestion was widely welcomed by consultees.
 9.67 The definition of abandonment should be that:
 (1) the occupier is no longer using the property as their home, whether they
are required to do so or not; and
 (2) there is evidence of the occupier behaving in a way which indicates an
intention no longer to be bound by the agreement.
25 See paras 11.31 – 11.32 below.
26 Sections 17 – 19; they replaced Housing (Scotland) Act 1987, ss 49 – 51.
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 9.68 We recommend the creation of a procedure to enable the landlord to regain
possession by service of four weeks’ notice – the abandonment notice – on the
occupier of the landlord’s intention to terminate the agreement, where the landlord
has reasonable grounds for believing that the house is abandoned. The landlord
will then be able lawfully to take possession of the house without any further
proceedings. It will only be necessary for the court to become involved if the
occupier, aggrieved by this procedure, applies to the court for a remedy within six
months of the termination of the notice period.
 9.69 The procedure should be available where (whether or not any furniture and other
goods are present at the property) the landlord has reasonable grounds for
believing that the occupier(s) under the occupation agreement has abandoned the
property.
 9.70 It may be that non-contractual occupants are still living in the property. If so, this
may provide evidence that the occupier has not, in fact, abandoned. But if the test
for abandonment is made out, any such occupants would be trespassers, and liable
to eviction as such. The procedure would similarly be available where squatters
had occupied the property.
 9.71 Use of the procedure would be dependent on a reasonable belief on the part of the
landlord that the property is no longer occupied by the contractual occupier and
that the occupier under the occupation agreement does not intend to occupy it as
his or her home.27
 9.72 The landlord should have an immediate right to enter the premises to secure it and
its contents against vandalism. If furniture or other goods are left at the property,
the landlord can be left to deal with these (by relocation, storage, return or
disposal) in accordance with the ordinary law relating to the disposal of personal
property.28
 9.73 The legislation would need to make it clear that the abandonment notice would be
effective to terminate the occupation agreement, regardless of whether it was fixed
term or periodic, and regardless of whether it was a type I or a type II agreement.
 9.74 Provision will need to be made about the method of service of the notice where the
occupier is untraceable. It should be possible in the last resort for the notice to be
served by posting it conspicuously at the main access to the property.
 9.75 The risk that the occupier may have left the property for some purpose other than
abandonment (for example, holiday, relocation of employment, accident or illness)
would be taken care of by the occupier’s right to apply to the court within six
months of the termination of the notice period, for reinstatement of the property if
it has been not been relet, or otherwise for the provision of suitable alternative
accommodation.
27 The genuineness of such a belief can sometimes be in issue; see Tannoch v Glasgow City
Council (2000) 32 HLR 64 decided under the Housing (Scotland) Act 1987, ss 49, 50.
28 See Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977, ss 12, 13, Schedule 1.
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 9.76 We recommend that the occupier should be able to seek damages where the
landlord has failed to comply with the procedure, or did not have reasonable
grounds for believing that the essential facts required for the service of an
abandonment notice in fact existed.
 9.77 We have considered whether the procedure for recovery of possession on
abandonment should only apply where the agreement contains a requirement to
reside or use the property as the occupier’s only or principal home. However, it is
perfectly possible for a property to be “abandoned” in the sense we intend even if
there is no such requirement.
ENDING OF FIXED-TERM AGREEMENTS
 9.78 We recommend that fixed-term type II agreements29 should not automatically
terminate by expiry of the term of the agreement. If either or both parties wish to
terminate the agreement at the end of the fixed term they will have to use one of
the other methods of termination. Either they should give notice or they should
agree to enter a new agreement.
 9.79 If the occupier does not leave and the parties have not agreed a new fixed term, we
recommend that the agreement will take effect as a periodic type II agreement.
The continuation of the agreement will be on the basis that any terms inconsistent
with its becoming a periodic agreement are amended. Thus the term which sets
the end date for the fixed term, which will be redundant, will be effectively deleted.
In addition, the landlord will be entitled to add the term providing for the notice-
only ground for possession. The occupier will also be entitled to add the term
permitting him or her to terminate the agreement on notice.30 This will prolong the
status quo while the landlord and occupier decide what to do. The effect of these
recommendations will be that either party will be able to end the agreement by
giving notice without needing reasons.
 9.80 The effect of these provisions is to vary the agreement. The occupier should have
the right to require the landlord to provide a written statement of the agreement as
so varied. Failure to comply would trigger the normal sanctions.
THE POWERS OF THE COURT
Discretionary grounds
 9.81 Where possession is sought on a discretionary ground, we recommend that the
court must not make an order for possession unless it considers it reasonable to do
so.31
29 Type I agreements will be periodic only.
30 See paras 9.111 – 9.114. The effect will be similar to Housing Act 1988, s 5(2) – (4), but we
do not think it necessary to reproduce the elaborate provisions in section 6 of that Act for
fixing the terms of a new tenancy.
31 This will reproduce the effect of Housing Act 1985, s 84(2)(a). The new Act should also
reproduce the effect of Housing Act 1985, s 85, and Housing Act 1988, s 9, in giving an
“extended discretion” for the court to adjourn cases, and suspend or postpone orders, where
discretionary repossession grounds are being used.
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Structured discretion
 9.82 The long-standing approach to reasonableness was recently restated by Clarke LJ
in Gil v Baygreen Properties Ltd:32
When considering reasonableness, it is the duty of the judge to take
into account all relevant circumstances as they exist at the date of the
hearing in a “broad, common-sense way as a man of the world ...
giving ... weight as he thinks fit to the various factors in the
situation”: see London Borough of Haringey v Stewart & Stewart,33
following the statement of Lord Greene MR in Cumming v Danson.34”
We wish to retain the breadth of this approach.
 9.83 We nevertheless wish to tackle perceived problems, widely expressed in responses
to CP 162, about the variability of decisions on reasonableness. We have
concluded that the general discretion available to judges should be “structured”.
The structuring should ensure compliance with human rights law, so that the court
tests whether the benefits from the legitimate aims to be achieved by eviction are
proportionate to the interference with the rights of the occupier and anyone else
whose home life will be affected by an order for possession made against them.
 9.84 We recommend that the Bill’s provisions on reasonableness should require the
court to consider all the relevant circumstances, including, but not necessarily
limited to, those set out in a statutory list. The court should also consider whether
the benefits to be gained by making the proposed order (as opposed to making any
lesser order, or no order at all) make it reasonable to make it despite the
disbenefits.
 9.85 On one side the court should consider, as far as relevant in the individual case, the
likely effect of an order on the home, family and private lives of the contractual
occupier(s), and then of anyone else known to occupy the property as their home.35
This includes considering how long it is likely to take each person or group to find
another home, and how they will be affected by not having a home. It should
specifically include any undertaking to offer a fresh agreement (of the same
property or elsewhere) the landlord is prepared to give to any of the occupants,
whether singly or jointly.36 It should also include consideration of whether the
32 [2002] EWCA Civ 1340, [2002] HLR 12, at paragraph 41.
33 (1991) 23 HLR 557 per Waite J at p 562 and per Mustill LJ at p 563.
34 [1942] 2 All ER 653, 655.
35 See para 9.54 below for provisions as to notices to non-contractual occupants.
36 The effect would be to make it possible to take proceedings against two joint contractual
occupiers, for a breach of which only one is guilty (though the other is jointly and severally
liable), and to obtain possession by undertaking to give a sole agreement for the same
property to the innocent occupier. This would be as close as we feel it is right to come to
allowing possession proceedings, as opposed to abandonment proceedings, to be taken
against only one of several joint occupiers.
108
occupier would be likely to comply with the terms of suspension of a possession
order.37
 9.86 It should not include consideration of whether the person is likely to be rehoused
under the homelessness provisions in Part VII of the Housing Act 1996, as it is
undesirable to have the court second-guess a process which should follow the
eviction decision rather than being a contributing factor to it.
 9.87 On the other side the court should consider, as far as relevant in the individual
case, the likely effect of making an order, as against not making the order sought,
on the interests of the landlord and a list of others. (This would correspond with
the consideration of the legitimate aims being pursued in the interference with
human rights under Article 8.) The effect on the landlord should include the effect
on the landlord’s interests, including their financial interests, but also any interest
the landlord may have in being able to meet housing need or fulfil other housing
functions.
 9.88 The other groups to be considered are, in the order of priority which would
normally be followed, whichever are relevant on the facts from:
 (1) the landlord’s other occupiers;38
 (2) people on any waiting list for the landlord’s properties;39
 (3) other neighbours who are not renting from the landlord; and
 (4) the local community.40
 9.89 In cases of breach of the agreement this should include consideration of the
importance of the term breached to the relevant groups, the seriousness of past
and likely future breaches,41 the degree to which any of the contractual occupiers
37 This should mean, as ought to happen now, that someone who will remedy the breach
without the imposition of any order should have no order made (the proceedings should be
adjourned on terms or dismissed). Someone who is likely to comply with, but not without, a
suspended possession order, should have one made against them (but subject to the points
about warrants and suspended orders below). Someone who is unlikely to comply with a
suspended order should have an absolute order made.
38 These will tend to be most relevant in anti-social behaviour cases, and will act as a counter-
balance to the fact that we are not recommending a contractual right to require the landlord
to take action against their other occupiers. In cases of rent arrears it may be that the cost of
carrying rent arrears has to be shared out among the landlord’s other occupiers in increased
rents or reduced spending on the properties. In an estate management case the neighbours
might for example be affected by whether an estate modernisation scheme can go ahead.
39 This might be most relevant in the estate management grounds relating to properties no
longer occupied by someone with a special need for the features of that property. It could
also include whether people would want to take up offers of properties on an estate being
terrorised by a particular household.
40 These last two would most commonly be relevant in cases of anti-social behaviour, but could
also be relevant in other cases such as estate management cases where community
regeneration is at stake.
41 As explained above, persistent past breaches should be able to be considered if they provide
evidence of likely future breaches, even if the occupier is not in breach at the moment.
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or other occupants are responsible for the breach,42 and any attempts to resolve the
situation previously, including by the use of alternative dispute resolution.43
 9.90 Where the landlord under type I agreements has adopted, and agreed with its
occupiers, a code of practice relating to estate management or, having complied
with the duty to consult44 has published a written agreement with its occupiers, the
court should be required to take account of these documents in considering the
reasonableness of the order being sought. We recommend that there should be a
reference to such documents in the structuring list. The Secretary of State should
have power to make regulations, which would cover how any agreement should be
drawn up.
Suspended possession orders
 9.91 In Consultation Paper 162, at paragraphs 12.33 – 12.58, we described a problem
that is particularly severe in rent arrears cases, but also applies in other
discretionary grounds cases.
 9.92 The current law requires a full hearing for a possession order, even though it may
be unopposed and landlords are only asking for a suspended order. By contrast the
current law does not require any hearing to be held when the issue of a warrant for
breach of a suspended possession order is at stake, even though it is the warrant
that produces the actual eviction. Indeed, the warrant application is regarded as
essentially an administrative procedure based on a simple allegation by the
landlord, of which the tenant need have no notice, that the terms of the suspension
have been breached. (Although the application for the warrant is without notice,
the courts do now, as a matter of practice, use a standard form to notify tenants
after it has been issued.) The tenant has to read the note on this form to discover
that it is up to him or her to apply to set aside or suspend the warrant.
 9.93 There is widespread use of possession actions, not actually because the landlord
wants to obtain possession, but as a tool to aid debt collection. Hearings relating to
such orders are listed for determination in a matter of a few minutes each. The
42 This will cover the situations where nobody living at the property is really responsible, the
commonest of which is Housing Benefit delays. This should not mean that eviction is
impossible in such cases, merely that the landlord has to show that they cannot be expected
to tolerate the continuing problems even though the occupier is not to blame. In other
common cases, where contractual occupiers find themselves unable to evict or control their
adult children or other household members, who are causing anti-social behaviour, the
landlord may nevertheless still be entitled to possession as he/she cannot be expected to
continue to tolerate the behaviour. In joint agreements, the landlord may wish to try to
improve their chances by offering to grant a new agreement for the same property in the sole
name of the innocent occupier. This would lessen the impact on the innocent party, while
achieving the full effect on the guilty.
43 This should cover both whether the landlord has reasonably tried other means to resolve the
problem and how reasonably the occupier has responded. In particular it should cover the
history of a case in court, so that a sixth application for suspension of a warrant is viewed
very differently from suspension of the original order.
44 See para 8.121(5) above.
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merits of the majority of warrants are not investigated because they are not
challenged. In most cases, the tenant is neither represented nor present in court.45
 9.94 Consultees were opposed to the additional bureaucracy of always requiring a
hearing before the issue of a warrant for breach of a suspended possession order,
and we accept that they have a point. This still leaves the original problem of the
inappropriate use of possession proceedings for collecting rent arrears. We referred
to the solution suggested by Lord Woolf46 and suggested one of our own.47
Responses from housing managers were split on the impact such a change would
have on the management of arrears. Some saw the attraction of such a system,
while others saw suspended possession orders as an important tool in controlling
arrears.
 9.95 We still consider that the broad objective should be to ensure that proportionate
consideration is given to the reasonableness of making an order for possession at
appropriate stages before an agreement is terminated on a discretionary basis
because of rent arrears. However, the effect of a new system on the ability of
landlords to control arrears is clearly of fundamental importance, and it is not a
matter on which we can come to a concluded view. We therefore recommend that
the new Act gives the Secretary of State a power to use secondary legislation to run
pilot schemes to test alternative procedures; and to allow him or her to introduce it
nationally if the pilot schemes prove successful.
The problem of the “tolerated trespasser”
 9.96 One of the issues we wish to tackle is the inelegant concept of the “tolerated
trespasser”.48 Its latest twists are illustrated in Dunn v Bradford MDC.49 In that
case, the Court of Appeal overturned a decision that a tenant, whose tenancy had
ended on breach of a suspended possession order and who had then left following
a period as a tolerated trespasser without the need for a warrant, could not have
her tenancy reinstated to the point at which she left so as to allow her to sue for
disrepair during that period. The root problem is that a tenancy terminates on the
45 The responses indicate that practices vary enormously between courts in different areas. In
some areas, a high proportion of tenants will attend, whereas in others it is very rare for
them to do so. We were told of county courts in which judges routinely signed in chambers
dozens of suspended possession orders drawn up by a housing manger.
46 Access to Justice: Final Report to the Lord Chancellor on the Civil Justice System in
England and Wales (1996), ch 16, paras 20 to 29 available at:
http://www.lcd.gov.uk/civil/finalfr.htm. Lord Woolf recommended a two-stage procedure that
would in effect replace the suspended possession order with an order to pay the rent. Instead
of terminating the agreement, breach of the order would lead to a hearing, if the landlord
wanted an outright possession order. This would replace the current procedure involving the
issue of a warrant followed by an application by the occupier to suspend the warrant.
47 We proposed the abolition of suspended possession warrants and their replacement with an
administratively issued notice from the court, warning an occupier that proceedings for
possession will be commenced if he or she does not rectify arrears. If the occupier continued
in arrears, the landlord would apply for an outright possession order.
48 For detailed criticism of the concept, and support for our approach to its removal, see Susan
Bright, “The concept of the tolerated trespasser: an analysis” (2003) 119 LQR 495.
49  [2002] EWCA Civ 1137, [2003] HLR 15.
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breach of a suspended possession order, however minor, rather than at the point at
which a tenant is actually evicted.
 9.97 We recommend that breach of a suspended possession order should not terminate
the agreement. Instead, we recommend that the agreement should continue in
existence until the point at which the occupier actually leaves the home, either
voluntarily, or having been forcibly evicted under the authority of a warrant for
possession. This approach would mean that the rights and obligations under the
agreement, including landlords’ repairing obligation, would continue. We have
little doubt that this will result in a simplification of the law.
 9.98 We accept that such a recommendation could potentially place a greater burden on
the landlord. However, we believe that these potential difficulties can be resolved if
landlords make a positive choice either to evict or not to evict. In the same way
that we have recommended that notices of intention to take possession proceedings
should have limited validity, so too do we think that landlords who could obtain a
warrant for possession should be encouraged to make up their minds. They should
not let arrangements drag on indefinitely with the former occupier living in a kind
of twilight status. Landlords will therefore limit any potential exposure by
completing the process of eviction, triggered by the occupier’s breach of the
suspended order.
 Mandatory grounds
 9.99 When dealing with cases on the mandatory grounds, we recommend that the new
Act should replace section 89(1) of the Housing Act 1980 with a similar provision
requiring possession orders to be made within 14 days, with up to 6 weeks’
alleviation in cases of exceptional hardship.
Accelerated possession
 9.100 We will also recommend that, in relation to proceedings based on the notice-only
ground for possession, the Rules Committee should reproduce the “accelerated
possession procedure” which currently applies to proceedings based on section 21
of the Housing Act 1988.50 It allows the court to make a possession order without
a hearing, greatly reducing listing times and expense, if the occupier does not raise
a substantive defence in response to the landlord’s claim form and the landlord
does not oppose any application for extra time before possession by the occupier.
Public law challenges
 9.101 Under our proposed scheme, it is clear that the availability of the mandatory
notice-only ground for possession will apply not only to private landlords, but also
to social landlords, in those contexts where use of type II agreements is
permitted.51
 9.102 Decisions by a landlord that is a “public body” for the purposes of public law are
amenable to judicial review. Anything done by a “public authority”, a distinct
50 See CPR Part 55(II).
51 See paras 5.28 – 5.51 above.
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status defined by the Human Rights Act 1998, will be unlawful if it amounts to a
breach of a substantive provision of the European Convention on Human Rights,
such as Article 8, which guarantees respect for the home. The extent to which
“public body” and “public authority” are distinct or co-extensive is a matter of
academic debate, and has yet to be definitively determined by the courts. For
current purposes, they can, we think, be treated as though they apply to the same
classes of landlord.
 9.103 Local authorities are clearly both public bodies and public authorities. The
position in respect of RSLs is more complicated. The Court of Appeal has held in
Donoghue v Poplar Housing and Regeneration Community Association52 that the
question of whether an RSL is a public authority53 or not depends on a close
examination of the history and nature of the particular RSL under consideration.
Thus, in that case, the role of an RSL was found to be “so closely assimilated” to
that of the local authority whose stock it had been created to take over that it was a
public authority. The conclusion rested on a number of specific factors (such as
the fact that it had local authority nominees on its board, it was subject to local
authority guidance and so on). Had one or more of these features not been present
the decision might have gone the other way.54
 9.104 In principle, both judicial review and human rights challenges can be mounted
against decisions to take possession actions. This provides occupiers with a
potential means to challenge the decision of a public body/authority to use a
mandatory ground of possession.
 9.105 In a series of cases on the extent to which human rights challenges could be dealt
with on the hearing of the possession case, the Court of Appeal had held that any
eviction “engaged” article 8(1), the basic guarantee, and so had to be justified
under Article 8(2) as proportionate and necessary in a democratic society.55 That
in turn led to problems with accommodating such challenges to the supposedly
automatic nature (once the primary facts are established) of mandatory grounds,
and other similar rules. However, the House of Lords have recently considered
broadly the same question in Qazi v London Borough of Harrow.56 The case was not
directly concerned with mandatory grounds of possession, but some of the
principles may have application to such circumstances (although it is also arguable
that some of the five speeches are of wider application than others).
 9.106 Mr Qazi’s wife had issued a notice to quit their jointly held secure tenancy, thus
terminating it. Mr Qazi was refused a new tenancy in his own name, and the local
authority landlord took possession proceedings. In the House of Lords, the
minority (Lords Bingham and Steyn) agreed with the approach taken by the Court
52 [2001] EWCA Civ 595, [2002] QB 48.
53 That is, a “functional” public authority under the Human Rights Act 1998, s 6(3)(b).
54 For a case in which a charity providing supported housing was found not to be a “public
authority”, see R (Heather and Others) v The Leonard Cheshire Foundation [2002] EWCA Civ
366, [2002] 2 All ER 936.
55 For a discussion of the case law as it was in April 2002, see CP 162 paras 5.1, 5.54 – 5.57,
5.70 – 5.77.
56 [2003] UKHL 43, [2003] 3 WLR 792.
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of Appeal. The majority (Lords Hope, Millett and Scott), however, all concluded
that it was not necessary for the county court to consider whether the order sought
could be justified under Article 8(2), although on somewhat different bases.
However, it was not contested that Mr Qazi could have applied for judicial review
of the landlord’s decision to seek possession.
 9.107 It will no doubt take some time for the implications of Qazi to be worked out by
the Court of Appeal in various contexts. A great, and unnecessary, complicating
factor, however, is that judicial review must be taken in the High Court, whereas
possession actions are confined to the county court.57 In our view, the county court
is the better forum for decisions on housing matters, whether grounded in public
law principles or in occupation agreements.
 9.108 We therefore recommend that, in such cases, an occupier against whom possession
proceedings have been brought should be able to ask the county court to review
the decision to take possession proceedings on public law grounds. In so doing, the
court would apply the principles applied by the High Court on an application for
judicial review. A model for such an approach exists in the current law on the
determination of homelessness decisions.58
TERMINATION BY THE OCCUPIER
 9.109 In this section we set out our recommendations about the termination of
agreements by the occupier.
Termination by occupier's notice
Periodic agreements
 9.110 The present law provides that an occupier under a periodic tenancy can give notice
to quit the agreement, which must be for at least four weeks. We wish to retain this
possibility. We therefore recommend that there should be a compulsory-minimum
term in periodic agreements that the occupier can give written notice to terminate.
A specimen form of the notice will appear in the model agreement.59
 9.111 A default term should provide that the minimum notice the landlord can expect is
one calendar month between service of the notice and the date on which the
agreement terminates and the occupier leaves. An occupier will be able to contract
to give more than the minimum of one month, and may in fact give more even
when not contractually obliged to do so.
57 The litigation, including Qazi itself, has tended to focus on the question of whether human
rights considerations give a tenant a defence to a possession action, rather than examining
the parameters of the tenant’s rights in judicial review.
58 Housing Act 1996, s 204A. It has been held that the predecessor to this provision gave the
county court a jurisdiction that was equivalent to judicial review, see R v Brent LBC ex parte
Connor (1998) 31 HLR 923, 924 per Tucker J.
59 This will be without prejudice to a consumer’s rights to terminate a contract under the
Consumer Protection (Distance Selling) Regulations 2000, SI 2000 No. 2334.
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 9.112 The minimum period should be a calendar month, starting on the day the notice is
issued.60 The length of notice should not be dependent on any “period” of a
tenancy. Even if the rent is paid in advance quarterly, or once per academic term
or over any other longer time-scale, the notice term should simply require one
month’s notice which need not end on a rent day. The agreement will also need a
default term providing that the landlord will refund the appropriate proportion of
any pre-paid rent or other charges.
Fixed-term agreements
 9.113 In fixed term type II agreements there may be a break clause, allowing one side or
both to terminate the agreement before the end of the fixed term. We recommend
that occupiers’ break clauses in fixed-term agreements should operate as similarly
as possible to occupiers’ notices in periodic agreements. Thus, it should be
possible for an occupier to serve a three months’ break clause notice when there
are two months of a fixed term still to run. This would take effect to terminate the
agreement without further action one month into the subsequent periodic
agreement which had arisen by operation of law, in default of further agreement.
 9.114 There should be a compulsory-minimum term that the agreement should not
terminate until the end of the notice period (unless both parties agree an earlier
date), but otherwise should only terminate when the occupier actually gives up
possession after serving the notice, even if that is later than the end of the notice.
Joint occupiers
 9.115 Where there are joint contractual occupiers, we recommend that there should be a
default term in the agreement that will require that the joint occupiers all take part
in any action that could otherwise be taken by a sole occupier.
 9.116 Where there is provision for notice, one or more joint occupiers should be able to
serve it, even were not all join in. The result will be to terminate the agreement in
relation to those occupiers who have given notice; it will not have the effect of
terminating the whole agreement.
Termination where an occupier does not leave after giving notice
 9.117 Currently the Rent Act 1977 has a specific ground, case 5, whereby a landlord may
seek an order for possession where the tenant fails to leave having issued a notice
to quit to the landlord. This ground only applies where the landlord can show that
it is reasonable to evict because they would otherwise be “seriously prejudiced” as
they have contracted to sell or let the property or taken other particular steps. In
the secure and assured regimes no special provision is made. In these cases, the
legal position is that the tenancy will end on the expiry of a tenant’s notice to quit,
leaving the landlord to repossess against the former tenant who now has the status
of trespasser.
60 The current law relates the dates for such notice to the dates which under the common law
or Protection from Eviction Act 1977, s 5, were dates on which a “notice to quit” could be
issued. This should not be replicated in the new scheme.
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 9.118 We have considered whether our new scheme should contain a version of Case 5.
We have concluded that this would put an unfair burden on the landlord who has
been told that his occupier will leave. It would not be right to require the landlord
to make a full case to persuade a court that it be reasonable for it to make an order
for possession against the former occupier.
 9.119 We want to achieve an outcome that is fair from the landlord’s perspective, given
that the process has been started by the occupier, rather than the landlord. We
have come to the view that in this situation, while the landlord should still be
required to obtain an order from the court, this should be on the basis that the
former occupier becomes a trespasser, with no residual rights to occupy under the
original occupation agreement.
 9.120 We do not think that this position should be allowed to remain indefinitely. Thus,
on the principle “use it or lose it”, there should come a point at which, following
the continued failure of the landlord to take possession proceedings against the
former occupier, the former occupier’s status as trespasser should be regarded as
coming to an end, and a new occupation agreement between the landlord and
occupier should be deemed to have come into being. The landlord will have two
months in which to decide what to do.
 9.121 The same principle will apply both to type I and type II agreements, periodic or
fixed term. However, in any type II agreement where the landlord is entitled to use
a notice-only notice which would have been of the same length as, or shorter than,
the occupier’s notice, then the landlord should be able to treat the occupier’s
notice as a landlord’s notice-only notice. The practical consequence will be that
the landlord will be able to issue the simpler and cheaper accelerated possession
proceedings. These will usually be more convenient than bringing proceedings in
trespass. The landlord will have to accept the consequence that the agreement will




SPECIFIC ISSUES 1: CONSENT
REQUIREMENTS
INTRODUCTION
 10.1 In the following five Parts of this report, we deal with a number of issues that must
be addressed for the scheme we propose to be able to work in practice. These
relate to ways in which the relationship between the landlord and the occupier may
alter during the life of the agreement. These parts discuss four principal issues:
 (1) joint occupation;
 (2) lodgers and sub-occupation;
 (3) transfer of rights of occupation; and
 (4) succession to rights of occupation and the effect of the death of the
occupier.
 10.2 In this context, there can be a tension between the right of the landlord to control
who lives in the premises; and the right of the occupier to use the premises – while
in occupation of them – as he or she wishes. One of the policy choices that must be
made is the extent to which the landlord should be able to consent, or required to
consent, to such events occurring. Our recommendations are based on the current
law, but adapted and modified to fit the scheme we now propose.
 10.3 As the issue of consent arises in a number of different contexts, discussed in
subsequent Parts, we have decided to consider it as a separate issue at the outset to
avoid constant repetition.
CONSENT: THE AVAILABLE OPTIONS
 10.4 Where an occupier asks the landlord if he or she can do something not directly
provided for in the agreement, there are three potential outcomes.
 (1) The landlord has the absolute right to say no to the request. If the
landlord decides to accede to it, that is a matter for the landlord in the
exercise of his or her discretion. In these cases, the occupier cannot force
the landlord to agree to what has been proposed.
 (2) The landlord needs to give consent, but this can be withheld on the
grounds that it is reasonable to do so. This enables the landlord to retain
some control over the premises, but requires him to consider any request
seriously.
 (3) The occupier has an untrammelled right to do what he or she wants,
without the need to obtain the consent of the landlord.
 10.5 Each of these outcomes is already found in the law. They will continue to be
important in the discussion of the specific issues considered in later Parts of this
report.
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TERMS IN THE AGREEMENT RELATING TO CONSENT
 10.6 In accordance with our overall approach, the requirements relating to consent will
be set out in the agreement. Where options 1 and 3 are concerned, the issue will
be straightforward.
 (1) If the landlord has a veto (Option 1), the agreement will make that clear.
Indeed, the landlord can simply ignore the request. There will be no
circumstances in which the request will be deemed to have been granted.
 (2) If the occupier has the untrammelled right to do something (Option 3), it
will not even be necessary to make a request.1 The only circumstance in
which we recommend that the occupier have this right is in the
compulsory-minimum term giving a type I occupier the right to take in a
lodger.2
 10.7 Option 2 requires the occupier to seek consent, but that consent may not be
unreasonably withheld. We recommend that, in such cases, the following apply.
 (1) Any request for consent must be made to the landlord in writing. If this is
not done, the occupier will have no rights in relation to the landlord’s
failure or refusal to give consent, his or her reasons for refusing it, or the
terms on which it is given.
 (2) Failure by the landlord to respond (either by granting or refusing consent
or making a reasonable request for further information3) to a properly
made request for consent within a period of two months should be
regarded as an unreasonable refusal of consent, and the requisite consent
should therefore be deemed to have been given.4 The two month period
should only begin to run from the date on which all information
reasonably required by the landlord to be given has been provided. The
landlord should be required to define what information he requires within
14 days of the request for consent being made. If the occupier fails to
supply sufficient or adequate information, then any further request for
additional information must be made by the landlord within 14 days from
the date of the supply of the insufficient or inadequate information. Where
there is a dispute as to whether and when all such information has been
provided, the county court should have jurisdiction to determine the issue.
 (3) Where the landlord refuses a properly made request for consent he or she
should, if asked, give reasons for refusal. If the landlord fails to give
reasons within two months from the date on which the request was made,
he or she shall be deemed to have given consent. Any challenge to the
1 An additional term may include a stipulation that the occupier should notify the landlord of
certain steps, if the parties so agree. Such a term would of course be subject to the UTCCR
tests of fairness and transparency.
2 See Part XII below.
3 For example, the name and address of any person whom the occupier wants to be joined
into the agreement; or any reference relating to that person.
4 See CP 168, 2.38, 2.15.
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adequacy of reasons or whether they are evidence of reasonableness shall
be resolved by application to the county court. The reasons shall be
deemed adequate and reasonable until a court rules otherwise.
 10.8 Any transaction carried out by the occupier, which
 (1) is subject to the landlord’s veto and to which the landlord has not given
consent, or
 (2) is subject to the landlord’s consent and consent has been reasonably
withheld,
is not binding on the landlord. The agreement should note that the making of any
unauthorised transaction is itself a breach of the agreement which could result in
possession proceedings being taken against the occupier.
The effect on the landlord of an unauthorised occupant entering the
premises
 10.9 A landlord should not be deemed to have accepted an unauthorised occupant as
an authorised occupier at any time before the landlord had actual knowledge that
he or she was unauthorised, or ought reasonably to have discovered this. From that
moment, the landlord has two months within which he or she may receive
payments from the unauthorised occupant without this implicitly creating a
binding occupation agreement.
 10.10 During this period, the landlord may
 (1) take possession proceedings against the unauthorised occupant; or
 (2) grant the unauthorised occupant a type II agreement;5 or
 (3) grant the unauthorised occupant a full type I agreement.6
 10.11 If at the end of this period, the landlord has taken none of these steps, he/she will
be deemed to have granted either
 (1) a type I agreement in the case of a social landlord; or
 (2) a type II agreement in the case of a private landlord.7
 10.12 Where a social landlord grants a type II agreement it should be treated as a
probationary agreement.8
5 This will be one of the circumstances in which a social landlord may grant a type II
agreement on a temporary basis.
6 See CP 168, 2.34 to 2.36
7 See CP 168, 2.37.
8 On probationary agreements, see paras 5.33 – 5.35 above.
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STRUCTURING DECISIONS RELATING TO THE REASONABLENESS OF
WITHHOLDING CONSENT
 10.13 At present, the law on what constitutes a reasonable withholding of consent is
found in case law that has been developed almost exclusively from cases arising in
the commercial lettings market. We recommend that the question of the
reasonableness of withholding of consent in the housing context must be seen
separately.
 10.14 We recommend here that reasonableness should be the subject of a number of
structured questions, to guide the parties and the court, particularly in relation to
those issues which could result in the landlord losing some control over who lives
in the premises. They should also apply to the reasonableness of any conditions
imposed on the giving of consent. This will be very important where a condition
requiring an occupier to accept that the transaction has used up a succession right
is in question.9 The structuring questions should apply whenever a term in the
agreement, whether compulsory-minimum or default, requires consent not to be
withheld unreasonably in relation to joint occupation, lodgers or sub-occupation
agreements, or transfer.10
 (1) In deciding whether consent has been withheld unreasonably or offered
subject to an unreasonable condition, the court should be required to
balance the interests of the current occupier and the proposed new joint
occupier, lodger or sub-occupier or transferee against the interests of the
landlord and the wider community.
 (2) As regards occupiers, the court should be required to consider first the
likely effect of the refusal or imposition of a condition on the home, family
and private lives of the contractual occupier(s) and the newcomer, and
then of anyone else known to occupy the property as their home.
 (3) Consideration should also be given to any financial interest of the
occupier. This will not normally be relevant for occupiers of social
landlords. However, it may be relevant for those with longer fixed term
type II agreements from private landlords where either a premium has
been charged, or the occupier was expecting to generate an income from
lodgers or sub-occupiers, or the occupier is seeking to use a transfer or
sub-occupation agreement to ameliorate the effect of being locked in to a
fixed term.
 (4) In considering the landlord’s interests, the fundamental issue should be: to
what extent are those interests prejudiced by the granting of the consent,
or by not imposing the disputed condition? Where a court is minded to
overturn the landlord’s refusal or imposition of a condition, it should also
9 This is discussed at para 11.19 below.
10 Although in both types I and II the default term will be a landlord’s veto, the landlord may
choose to use a consent term instead.
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take into account the effect on the other groups whose interests would be
affected by the court reversing the landlord’s decision.11
 10.15 In the housing context, any adverse assessment of financial risk to the landlord
should be adequate in most cases to justify withholding of consent.
 10.16 In addition, as social landlords must use their properties to relieve housing need, it
will be important to consider the extent to which reversing a decision to refuse
consent will result in a loss of their ability to ensure that the property is used by
those satisfying their housing needs’ criteria. The court should be required to
consider any evidence as to how soon, if at all, a person, to whom the occupier
wants to extend his/her right of occupation, would have been allocated an
equivalent property if he or she had applied for a vacancy through the waiting list.
In other words, the priority that would attach to the person the occupier seeks to
bring into the agreement should be tested against the priority of others seeking
that sort of property, in that area, from that landlord.
11 Depending on the facts, these would include: people on any waiting list for the landlord’s
properties, the landlord’s other occupiers, other neighbours who are not renting from the
landlord, the local community, and the general public.
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PART XI 
SPECIFIC ISSUES 2: JOINT OCCUPATION
INTRODUCTION
 11.1 So far this Report has proceeded on the basis that there is just a single occupier.
The reality is that many premises are occupied by more than one person. The
scheme we propose must be sufficiently robust and clear to accommodate this fact,
and the fluidity with which many people organise their lives.
 11.2 This Part deals with a number of specific issues relating to the joint occupation of
rented premises. These are:
 (1) joint occupation agreements;
 (2) adding new parties to the agreement;
 (3) joint occupiers leaving the agreement;
 (4) an additional ground for possession if a joint occupier withdraws from the
agreement or abandons the premises;
 (5) the rights of non-contractual occupants in relation to possession
proceedings; and
 (6) amendments to the Family Law Act 1996.
JOINT OCCUPATION AGREEMENTS
 11.3 A distinction must be made at the outset between those joint occupiers who are in
occupation because they are parties to an occupation agreement and other joint
occupants, who are there on a non-contractual basis. These include: the members
of the family of an authorised occupier, guests or some lodgers. We discuss the
position of non-contractual occupants below, paragraphs 11.36 – 11.39.
 11.4 The current law of landlord and tenant provides that where an estate in land is
granted to two or more persons, they (or the first four named, if there are more
than four1) acquire the legal estate as joint tenants. This means that, on the death
of one of them, the survivor(s) take the whole of the estate.
 11.5 Joint tenants are jointly and severally liable for all obligations under the tenancy
agreement, unless there is any provision to the contrary.2 Each tenant is therefore
liable to the landlord in full, although a joint tenant who has met an obligation in
full has a right of recovery from other joint tenants to the extent of his or her
share.3
1 Law of Property Act 1925, s 34(2).
2 See C Harpum, Megarry and Wade, The Law of Real Property (6th ed 2000) paras 9-002 – 9-
008.
3 Chalmers, Guthrie and Co v Guthrie (1923) 156 LTJ 382.
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 11.6 It will often be in the interests of both landlords and occupiers that occupation
agreements are granted to a number of joint occupiers. Landlords have a larger
number of people to proceed against should there be breaches of the agreement in
respect of the rent or other obligations. Occupiers have others on whom they can
rely in respect of these obligations. Additional joint occupiers will also have
contractual rights directly against the landlord, and an automatic right to succeed
to the occupation agreement.4 Nothing in our proposed scheme should discourage
the creation of joint occupation agreements.
 11.7 For the purpose of our scheme, we recommend that where joint occupiers reside in
premises under the terms of an occupation agreement, their occupation should be
on the basis that their liability is joint and several.5 Thus breach by one occupier of
the terms of the agreement (for instance, to pay rent) means that the full liability of
the other party or parties to pay the rent remains unaffected. A joint occupier who
has met an obligation in full has the right of recovery for the other joint occupier(s)
to the extent of their share.
 11.8 If the parties wish to move away from this position and take on unequal liabilities
in relation to the premises, they should be able to do so by negotiating individual
contracts with the landlord. For example, if two or more surviving joint occupiers
wish to re-allocate the way in which they occupy the property, say into two or more
flats, they should negotiate with the landlord a termination of the current
agreement and a grant of two or more new occupation agreements covering the
relevant premises.
 11.9 We recommend that:
 (1) joint holding of occupation agreements should be possible;
 (2) the holders should hold as joint occupiers and therefore be jointly entitled
to the benefits of the agreement; and
 (3) joint occupiers have joint and several liability.
 11.10 Two more specific issues follow from this. They relate to:
 (1) numbers of joint occupiers; and
 (2) survivorship.
4 Because of this, it is important that a landlord should not agree to the creation of a joint
occupation agreement without being aware of the implications of these principles. Consent
to adding a new occupier to the agreement should always be required; this is discussed
below at paras 11.16 – 11.24.
5 We shall leave open the possibility of joint occupiers agreeing between themselves if they
wished to do so how their liability for obligations under the agreement is ultimately to be
borne as between them (even though one of them may have had to pay the landlord in full).
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Numbers of joint occupiers
 11.11 Section 34(2) of the Law of Property Act 1925 limits the number of persons who
may hold a legal estate in land to four. Any more than that hold an equitable
interest only. We regard these principles as irrelevant to housing law.
 11.12 We recommend that there should be no limit to the number of persons to whom
joint rights of occupation in respect of a home may be given under an occupation
agreement, whether initially or by the subsequent addition of a party to the
agreement. We also recommend that the landlord should be entitled to set, in the
occupation agreement itself, a maximum number of occupiers. This number must,
in accordance with normal UTCCR principles, be fair. This is subject to the
overriding statutory rules on overcrowding, currently found in Part X of the
Housing Act 1985, which must not be broken. (These recommendations are
without prejudice to the law relating to the registration of the legal interests of joint
tenants, which should not be changed.)
Survivorship
 11.13 Under current land law, where a joint tenant dies, the survivor(s) takes over his or
her rights under the principle of survivorship. We recommend that this principle be
adapted to those with joint occupation agreements.
 11.14 Thus we recommend that there should be a compulsory-minimum term in type I
and type II periodic occupation agreements that joint occupiers will hold their
interests on the basis that if any occupier dies or the interest of that occupier is
terminated, the remaining occupier(s) will take over the agreement, and all the
rights and obligations going with it.6
 11.15 In relation to fixed term type II agreements only, it would be a default term. The
parties could then agree that on the death of any joint occupier his or her interest
in the agreement is to be transferred in accordance with the provisions of his or her
will or intestacy (or that any joint occupier shall be able to require that this shall be
so by giving notice to this effect to the others) and that this is to take effect for all
purposes.
ADDING NEW PARTIES TO THE AGREEMENTS
 11.16 In recent years, there has been an increasing tendency, particularly amongst social
landlords, to grant joint tenancies to those living together. The focus is particularly
on couples who are husband and wife or living together as husband and wife. We
seek to take these trends forward and to rationalise current best practice by
creating a right which enables the occupier to ask to add another person into the
occupation agreement jointly with him or her, without the need for terminating the
original agreement and creating a new one. The objective is to ensure as much
flexibility as possible.
 11.17 We recommend that there should be a compulsory-minimum term in the
occupation agreement giving the occupier the right to ask to add a person to the
6 This is discussed further in paras 14.21 – 14.22 below.
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agreement as a new joint occupier.7 It would be subject to the landlord’s consent,
which could not be unreasonably withheld.
 11.18 We offer, as guidelines, a number of possible instances where a refusal might be
reasonable.
 (1) Refusal of consent might be justified by considering the implications of the
proposed new joint occupier becoming the sole occupier at a later date.
For example, consent might reasonably be refused if there were doubts
about the ability of the new occupier to shoulder all the obligations under
the agreement; if the new occupier had no need for the type of housing
involved (for example, housing adapted for the disabled); if the application
amounted to an attempt to jump the queue for social housing; or if the
original agreement was for a service occupancy to be held in name of the
employee alone.
 (2) The objects of a charitable registered social landlord should have a major
influence on whether it would be reasonable to add a new joint occupier.
 (3) Any relevant housing management agreement made by the landlord with
representatives of occupiers should be taken into account.
 (4) A landlord might reasonably refuse consent where the proposed new
occupier was shown to be in rent arrears to any landlord, or he or she or
any member of his or her family had been found to have engaged in anti-
social behaviour.
 (5) The landlord will be entitled to take into account the total number of
occupiers who would end up entitled to live in the home. This should not
exceed either the statutory overcrowding limit in the Housing Act 1985
Part X, or the number of occupiers set by the landlord in the agreement.
 11.19 A landlord might be reluctant to allow a new joint occupier to be brought into the
agreement because this could have the effect of anticipating a succession8, thereby
enabling a succession to take place at a later date, which would not otherwise have
occurred. For example, grandmother G (the occupier under the agreement),
daughter D and granddaughter C all live in the same home. Landlord L assumes
that D will succeed on G’s death, as a member of G’s family, but that the
occupation agreement will end on D’s death. G asks to bring D in as joint
occupier. L is unhappy because D will then automatically succeed by survivorship,
as a remaining joint occupier; C would at a later date also have the right to succeed
on D’s death as a member of D’s family. In this situation, instead of the agreement
coming to an end on D’s death, the agreement would not come to an end until C’s
death. In the light of this, we think it should be possible for the landlord to give
consent to the request to add C to the agreement subject to a condition that this
would count as a statutory succession. Assuming that the overall effect of giving
7 This transaction should be capable of being effected with the same degree of informality as a
transfer: see paras 13.26 – 13.32 below.
8 We discuss the impact of the death of a joint occupier in Part XIV.
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permission subject to this condition was reasonable9, this would have the effect of
removing C’s right to succeed.
 11.20 A landlord might also be reluctant to give consent to adding an occupier to the
agreement where he suspected that the original occupier might, after the new
occupier has been added, proceed to disappear. In such a case it might be
reasonable to make the giving of consent subject to a condition that the original
occupier cannot withdraw as a joint occupier for a period of, say, three months.
Questions relating to the reasonableness of conditions will, naturally, depend
heavily on the particular circumstances of the case.
 11.21 Where an occupier is refused permission to add a joint occupier, he or she ought
to have the right to apply to the county court for a declaration that the refusal is
unreasonable. Such a declaration, if made, should also have the effect of ordering
the addition of the proposed new joint occupier into the occupation agreement
jointly with the current occupier, as from the date of the order or some other date
fixed by the court. Similarly, if the landlord sought to impose an unreasonable
condition before granting consent, the occupier should have the ability to ask the
court to make an appropriate order. At the same time, the court should have power
to amend any other terms of the agreement if it considers it necessary to do so.
 11.22 New joint occupiers should not normally become liable for pre-existing liabilities.
A default term in the agreement would provide that the new joint occupier would
only be liable for future breaches under the agreement (save where liability arises
under a continuing breach) 10 and would only be able to take action in respect of
future breaches of the agreement by the landlord. However, it should be regarded
as reasonable for the landlord to impose a condition, on giving consent for the
bringing in of a new joint occupier, that outstanding breaches of the agreement are
rectified; and, as potentially reasonable, that the incoming joint occupier is
required to accept liability for certain specified outstanding breaches.
 11.23 The right to ask to add an occupier should apply to all agreements within the
scheme, whether type I or type II. (The impact of the right will be much greater in
the former case than in the latter, but this should not prevent an occupier under a
type II agreement seeking permission, particularly where the agreement is a longer
fixed-term one.)
 11.24 There should be a default term in the agreement that any decision as to who the
non-contractual occupants are should be a matter for the occupier under the
agreement.
JOINT OCCUPIERS LEAVING THE AGREEMENT
Notice
 11.25 Under the present law, a joint tenancy can only be brought to an end by the
complete termination of the agreement. If one of several joint tenants gives notice
to quit, it brings the whole tenancy to an end, regardless of the wishes or even
9 For example because C was in well paid employment and not in need of social housing.
10 C Harpum, Megarry and Wade, The Law of Real Property (6th ed 2000) para 15-039.
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knowledge of the other(s).11 Attempts to limit this rule have been unsuccessful.12
But it is a rule that can cause considerable injustice.
 11.26 Under the Housing (Scotland) Act 2001, section 13, a joint tenant under a
Scottish secure tenancy has a right to bring his or her interest in the tenancy (and
not the whole joint tenancy) to an end by giving four weeks’ notice to the landlord
and the other joint tenants.
 11.27 We recommend that a joint occupier should be able to terminate his or her interest
in a joint agreement by means of a notice, without bringing the whole of the
agreement to an end. Provision should be made for the remaining joint occupiers
to be warned of what has happened and of its implications for them. The model
occupation agreements should provide information about the required content of
the notice.
 11.28 We recommend that:
 (1) the effect of a notice given to the landlord by a joint occupier under an
occupation agreement (whether type I or type II) is merely to terminate
his or her interest in and rights under the agreement;
 (2) the landlord should be required to give a copy of the notice to all the other
joint occupiers under the agreement within a month of receipt of the
notice, at the same time giving them written warning that they may need
to take steps to protect their position in the home; and
 (3) it should be a default term of any fixed term type II agreement with a
break clause that where only one of two or more joint occupiers operates
the break clause, it will only terminate that occupier’s interest in and rights
under the agreement.
 11.29 Once the joint occupier has issued such notice, and after the period of the notice
has expired, he or she should acquire no further rights and obligations under the
agreement.
 11.30 The statutory model agreements should contain a specimen notice which could be
used either by a joint or sole occupiers terminating the agreement.
Abandonment
 11.31 It may also happen that a joint occupier simply walks away from the agreement,
without giving notice to the landlord. In such a case if should be possible for the
landlord to use the abandonment procedure13 to terminate that occupier’s interest
in the premises.
11 See Greenwich London Borough Council v McGrady (1982) 46 P & CR 223; Hammersmith and
Fulham London Borough Council v Monk [1992] 1 AC 478.
12 Newlon Housing Trust v Alsulaimen [1999] AC 313.
13 Set out at paras 9.61 – 9.77 above.
127
 11.32 In this case, as other joint occupiers will remain in the premises, it will not be
possible for the landlord automatically to regain possession of them, as we
recommend should be able to happen when the premises are completely
abandoned. In such circumstances, the additional ground of possession outlined in
the following paragraphs would also apply.
ADDITIONAL GROUND FOR POSSESSION IF A JOINT OCCUPIER WITHDRAWS
FROM THE AGREEMENT OR ABANDONS THE PREMISES
 11.33 We recommend that in type I agreements there should be a compulsory-minimum
term providing that where there are joint occupiers (say, A, B and C) then if A
gives notice of intention to quit the agreement, or abandons the agreement, the
landlord should have a limited right to bring proceedings for possession against B
and C. The reason for this recommendation is, for example, because:
 (1) the landlord is a social landlord who does not feel that the remaining
occupier(s) has/have the requisite degree of housing need;
 (2) because the property is too large for the remaining occupier(s); or
 (3) because it contains special features (for example, adaptation for a person
with disabilities) which are not needed by the remaining occupier(s).
 11.34 A landlord should take the following steps.
 (1) As where other possession proceedings are contemplated, the landlord
should give written notice of intention to take proceedings to the
remaining joint occupiers. In accordance with our normal rules, the period
of notice will be a minimum of one month and a maximum of three
months.14
 (2) The notice must be issued within six months of the landlord receiving A’s
notice, or within six months of the effective date of the second notice
under the abandonment procedure or the date of the court decision
confirming that notice if it is challenged in court proceedings, whichever is
the later.15
 (3) Following expiry of the notice period, actual proceedings against B and C
would have to be commenced within six months.
 11.35 We recommend that this should be a discretionary ground for possession. In
addition a court would only be able to order possession, subject to the provision of
suitable alternative accommodation, on the basis that the property in question is
no longer appropriate for occupation by the remaining joint occupier(s).
14 Paras 9.49 and 9.51 above.
15 Para 9.68 above.
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RIGHTS OF NON-CONTRACTUAL OCCUPANTS IN RELATION TO POSSESSION
PROCEEDINGS
 11.36 In general, the occupier(s) under an occupation agreement should be able to
determine who else may be present in the property. It would be open to the
landlord to use a substitute term in the agreement on this subject, for example
about the numbers of guests permitted to stay in the home. Most non-contractual
occupants will be there for short periods of time. Some will be there on a longer
term basis, for example members of the occupier’s family.
 11.37 Where a landlord takes possession proceedings against the occupier, we think that
non-contractual occupants who are present in the property with the permission of
the occupier(s) should be given notice of this. Where relevant (particularly, where
the ground for possession is a discretionary one) the non-contractual occupants
should also have an opportunity of intervening in the proceedings in order to argue
against the making of an order.
 11.38 A number of analogous rules already exist.
 (1) In mortgage possession proceedings, the mortgagee must serve a notice at
the premises 14 days before the hearing, addressed to all occupiers there,
stating that possession proceedings are being taken against the
mortgagor.16 The occupiers may apply to be joined as defendants at the
court’s discretion.17
 (2) In landlord and tenant cases if the landlord knows of anyone who may be
entitled to claim relief against forfeiture as an under-lessee, the particulars
of claim must be served on that person.18
 (3) Under section 14(3) of the Housing (Scotland) Act 2001 the landlord is
under a duty before starting possession proceedings to investigate and
establish so far as is reasonably practicable whether there are qualifying
occupiers of the property and, if so, their identities.19 The landlord must
serve copies of any notice seeking possession on any such person. They
have a right to be joined as parties to any subsequent proceedings.
 11.39 We recommend that:
 (1) there should be a default term in the occupation agreement giving the
occupier the ability to decide who else may occupy the property on a non-
contractual basis; this should be subject to the overcrowding provisions of
Housing Act 1985, Part X, and to the contractual occupier’s
16 CPR Part 55.10.
17 CPR Part 19.
18 CPR PD 55.4, paragraph 2.4.
19 These are defined in section 14(6) as other people occupying the property as their only or
principal home who are members of the tenant’s family aged at least 16 or are (with the
landlord’s consent) lawful assignees, sub-tenants or persons given possession of the home or
any part of it, or lodgers.
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responsibilities for preventing anti-social behaviour by other non-
contractual occupants;20
 (2) the CPR should provide that notice of possession proceedings must be
served on (a) any sub-occupier holding under an occupation agreement
granted by a contractual occupier; (b) all members of the family aged over
16 years of a contractual occupier, and (c) any other person aged over 16
years entitled or permitted by a person coming within (a) or (b) to live at
the property. 21
AMENDMENTS TO THE FAMILY LAW ACT 1996
 11.40 Currently section 30 of the Family Law Act 1996 contains matrimonial home
rights for spouses, as opposed to tenants, to occupy properties. They include
 (1) the right to have a payment or tender of rent by a spouse who is not a
tenant treated as made on behalf of the other spouse who is a tenant
(section 30(3)), and
 (2) the right to have a non-tenant spouse’s occupation of a home treated as
occupation (as a residence or as an only or principal home as the case may
be) by the tenant spouse for the purposes of housing legislation (section
30(4)).
 11.41 These rights would normally end on the making of a possession order, because
they usually only last as long as the tenant spouse is entitled to occupy the
property by virtue of a beneficial estate or interest or contract, or a right to remain
in occupation under an enactment (section 30(8)(b)). The rights can be enforced
by an occupation order under section 33. Former spouses (under section 35(13))
and current or former cohabitants (under section 35(13)) can also apply for
occupation orders (sections 35(13) and 36(13)).
 11.42 In relation to secure and assured tenancies, where the tenant’s spouse or former
spouse has matrimonial home rights under the Family Law Act 1996 (or a former
spouse or cohabitant or former cohabitant with rights under an order under
sections 35 or 36 of the Family Law Act 1996) and the tenancy is terminated by
the court, the spouse or former spouse has the same rights, while remaining in
occupation, in relation to, or in connection with any adjournment, stay, suspension
or postponement of possession proceedings as he or she would have if the tenancy
had not been terminated.22
 11.43 We recommend that section 30 of the Family Law Act 1996 should be amended to
refer to occupiers under the new scheme. Where the occupier obtains an
adjournment, stay, suspension or postponement of a possession order, the rights of
other parties to occupy and tender rent should be preserved until the possession
20 Anti-social behaviour is discussed in Part XV.
21 In respect of any occupants of whom the landlord has no specific knowledge, a notice
addressed to the other occupant(s) (excepting [name(s) of authorised occupier(s) under
agreement]) delivered at or posted up at the property should suffice.
22 See the Housing Act 1985, ss 85(5) to (5A) and the Housing Act 1988, ss 9(5), (5A).
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order is enforced. The holders of these statutory rights should be given the right to
be joined to possession proceedings and the same rights as the occupier to defend
themselves against the making of a possession order and to apply after a possession
order for any adjournment, stay, suspension or postponement.
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PART XII 
SPECIFIC ISSUES 3: LODGERS AND SUB-
OCCUPATION AGREEMENTS
INTRODUCTION
 12.1 This part deals with two issues.
 (1) The right of occupiers to take in lodgers;
 (2) The right of occupiers to enter sub-occupation agreements.
LODGERS
 12.2 Under existing law, tenants of local authorities have a statutory right to take in
lodgers. They may do this without the need to seek the permission of the landlord.
Housing association tenants (and other assured tenants) do not have the same
right to do this.
 12.3 This is a right that we have concluded should be taken into the proposed scheme.
The arguments in favour are that:
 (1) it encourages full use of accommodation;
 (2) it may assist with the mobility of labour;
 (3) it enables occupiers to obtain some additional income from their homes;1
and
 (4) it also supports a degree of personal autonomy for occupiers.
 12.4 We have previously recommended that any agreement should be excluded from
our scheme if the landlord shares actual living accommodation2 with the occupier.3
For the purpose of the following recommendation, a lodger is an occupant living in
such accommodation under such an excluded agreement.
Type I agreements
 12.5 Given our “landlord-neutral” approach, we recommend that there should be a
compulsory-minimum term in all type I agreements that the occupier shall have
the right to take in a lodger, without the need for the landlord’s consent.
1 This is supported by the tax authorities, which allow income from the letting of a room of
less than £4,250 a year to be tax-free. See the Income Tax (Furnished Accommodation)
(Basic Amount) Order 1996 (SI 1996 No 2953).
2 That is to say, any accommodation, other than storage, staircase, passage, corridor, or other
means of access.
3 See para 6.29(2) above.
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Type II agreements
 12.6 We recommend that, in relation to type II agreements, there should be a default
term that the occupier can ask to take in a lodger, but subject to the landlord’s
consent which cannot be unreasonably withheld.
 12.7 In either case, the lodger will not be legally entitled to a written agreement, though
it may be good practice for a landlord to provide one. Our aim is to ensure that
lodging agreements can be entered with a high degree of informality.
Status of the lodger
 12.8 The lodger will have the right to lodge, only so long as the original occupier who
granted the right continues to live in the premises. If the agreement between the
landlord and the occupier is ended, the lodger will have no rights as against the
(head) landlord to remain in the premises.
SUB-OCCUPATION AGREEMENTS4
 12.9 A sub-occupation agreement arises where an occupier (A) enters into an
agreement with another (B) which gives B the right to occupy the premises instead
of A. The (head)landlord, who entered the original contract with A, should be able
to control who finally ends up in possession of the property, if A departs leaving B
behind. For example, a social landlord will not want a person not in housing need
to occupy the accommodation; a private landlord will not want a person to occupy
who cannot comply with the terms of the sub-occupation agreement. We have
concluded5 that the default position should be that the landlord should have the
right to veto any request by an occupier to enter a sub-occupation agreement.
 12.10 If, despite this, the head landlord gives consent to the creation of a sub-occupation
agreement, this agreement might purport to grant more contractual security that
the original occupier has. To ensure that this only occurs where this has been
positively agreed by the (head) landlord, there should be a default term in the
model agreement that any lawful sub-occupation agreement (that is, a sub-
occupation agreement to which the head landlord has consented) will be a type II
periodic agreement. This will contain the term providing for the landlord to seek
possession on the notice-only basis.
 12.11 The head landlord could become bound by the sub-occupation agreement if the
original occupier (A) leaves. Thus any consent to the sub-occupation agreement
given by the head landlord – essential if the sub-occupation agreement is to be
lawful – should be subject to any conditions regarding its length, security, and
terms that the head landlord may require. Failure to observe any conditions
imposed by the landlord as to the content of the sub-occupation agreement should
not invalidate the consent. But the landlord must be protected against the occupier
4 We are not using this phrase in any narrowly technical sense. The discussion covers any
arrangement whereby the occupier (A) parts with possession of the accommodation.
5 We considered whether the general rule should be that a sub-occupation agreement should
be not be able to be made lawfully without the landlord giving his consent, but, in
accordance with general principles, with such consent not being unreasonably withheld. We
have, however, concluded that this would undesirably weaken the ability of the landlord to
continue to manage his estate.
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attempting to create a sub-occupation agreement with a greater degree of security
or other more generous terms than those allowed by the landlord’s consent and
any conditions attaching to that consent.
 12.12 Thus, where the original agreement is brought to an end, a lawful sub-occupier
will be able to stay in the accommodation on the basis set out in the sub-
occupation agreement – to which the head landlord will have consented when it
was granted, and subject to any conditions that the head landlord imposed when
giving consent. The head landlord will then be able to take proceedings for
possession against the sub-occupier where he can show a ground for possession
exists.
 12.13 The direct contractual liabilities between the (head) landlord and sub-occupier
ought only to arise and relate to breaches of the agreement occurring after their
direct contractual relationship began, following the termination of the original
agreement.
 12.14 To achieve these objectives, we recommend that there should be a default term in
all type I and type II agreements providing for a landlord’s right to veto any
request by an occupier to grant a sub-occupation agreement, whether of the whole
or of part of the property. This will mean that the landlord can give his consent to
the occupier creating a sub-occupation agreement or other parting with
possession, but does not have to do so. In any case where the landlord does in fact
give consent to the creation of a sub-occupation agreement, any sub-occupation
agreement should be a type II periodic agreement.6
 12.15 There should be a further default term that if the landlord does give consent for
the creation of a sub-occupation agreement, the landlord should have the power to
impose conditions as to the type or term of that agreement; and that, while a
breach of these conditions should not invalidate the consent, any sub-occupation
agreement granted without compliance with them should be deemed to be a type
II periodic agreement.
 12.16 If the head landlord and original occupier decide not to adhere to these default
terms and the sub-occupation agreement becomes binding on the head landlord,
then the type of agreement by which he or she will become bound will be the type
of agreement created by the original occupier with the sub-occupier.7 It should be
open to the landlord to stipulate, as a condition of giving his consent to a sub-
occupation agreement, that the terms imposing obligations on the sub-occupier
shall be for the benefit of the head landlord under the Contract (Rights of Third
Parties) Act 1999.
 12.17 If the landlord gives consent to the creation of a sub-occupation agreement or has
included a term in the occupation agreement allowing sub-occupation agreements
to be made lawfully without consent, then the landlord should become bound by
6 CP 168, para 5.46.
7 CP 168, paras 5.55, 5.56 and 5.65.
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the sub-occupation agreement if and when the original occupier under the original
agreement terminates it, either by giving notice, or by exercising a break clause.8
 12.18 If the lawful sub-occupier so requests, the head landlord must supply a written
copy of the occupation agreement and the sanctions for failure to do so should also
apply, but only after the lawful sub-occupier (B) is in a direct contractual
relationship with the head landlord, that is, following the termination of the
original agreement with (A).
 12.19 The Civil Procedure Rules should be amended to provide that if the head landlord
has given consent to a sub-occupation agreement, or has included a term in the
agreement allowing a sub-occupation agreement to be made without consent, then
if the head landlord brings proceedings for possession against the original occupier
(A) or if the landlord uses the abandonment procedure, the head landlord must
serve notice on the sub-occupier (B), who should be entitled to be joined in the
action.
 12.20 We recommend that the sub-occupier (B) should be able to seek an order of the
court converting him or her into the direct occupier of the landlord, but on the
terms of the sub-occupation agreement. The court should be required to do so
unless it would otherwise have granted a possession order against the sub-
occupier, for example, where the sub-occupier is in breach of the sub-occupation
agreement. The CPR should be amended to implement these recommendations.9
 12.21 Where the head landlord becomes the new landlord of the sub-occupier, we
recommend that he should not take the benefit or burden of any breaches of the
sub-occupation agreement that occurred before the change of the sub-occupier’s
landlord. The liability of the head landlord and the former sub-occupier to each
other should be confined to breaches of the agreement taking place after they have
come into a direct contractual relationship. Breaches of the sub-occupation
agreement before this date should give rise to liability between the original
occupier (A) and the sub-occupier only (except in so far as the head landlord had
the benefit of obligations of the sub-occupier).
8 CP 168, para 5.66.
9 CP 168, para 5.66.
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PART XIII 
SPECIFIC ISSUES 4: TRANSFERRING
RIGHTS OF OCCUPATION
 INTRODUCTION
 13.1 In this Part we discuss the circumstances in which a contractual occupier should
be able to transfer his or her rights of occupation to another person, not a party to
the contract.
 13.2 Under the current law in relation to tenancies this is dealt with by the rules on
assignment. In relation to licences it is dealt with by more restrictive contractual
principles on novation and the assignment of benefits of contracts. These
provisions are complex and poorly understood, both by landlords and occupiers
and by their legal advisers.
 13.3 For agreements covered by our new scheme, we wish to replace assignment, and
the contractual principles of novation and assignment of benefits, with a statutory
scheme of transfers, operating largely through compulsory-minimum and default
terms in the agreement. The statutory-contractual scheme should cover the
conditions for, methods of, and effect of a transfer.
 13.4 The ideas on which these recommendations are based were set out in Part VI of
CP 168. Most respondents to CP 168 agreed with our provisional proposals on
transfers without substantive comment on them.
THE DEFAULT POSITION
 13.5 We recommend that, subject to the three exceptions discussed in the immediately
following paragraphs, there is a default term in all type I and type II agreements
which gives the landlord the right to impose a veto on any request by a contractual
occupier to transfer his or her rights to occupy to another.
EXCEPTIONS
 13.6 In the case of type I, but not type II, agreements there should be compulsory-
minimum terms to allow for transfer:
 (1) to a potential successor; and
 (2) by way of (mutual) exchange.
In respect of both types of agreement, it will be possible for transfers to take place
by order of the court under family law.
 13.7 The compulsory-minimum terms permitting transfers to potential successors and
transfers by way of mutual exchange should be subject to the landlord's consent,
which must not be unreasonably withheld. The compulsory-minimum term in
relation to transfers by way of mutual exchange should not apply to type I
occupation agreements entered into by private landlords.
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Transfers to potential successors1
 13.8 A version of this exception is currently to be found in section 91(3)(c) Housing
Act 1985. We believe that this is an important provision2 and that an equivalent
exception should be provided in our new scheme.
 13.9 We recommend that it should be possible, subject to the consent of the landlord
not to be unreasonably withheld, for an occupier to seek to transfer his or her
occupation rights to a person or persons who would have the statutory right to
succeed if the current occupier died. The exception should extend to all type I
agreements, not just those granted by local housing authorities.
 13.10 At present, succession can only be to a single person; thus, only one potential
successor can benefit from this exception. In our new scheme, more than one
person will be able to succeed jointly, and it should be possible to transfer the right
to occupy to joint occupiers.
 13.11 Where there are joint occupiers (whether because they took the agreement in this
way originally, or because a joint occupier was added in later) and one of them
dies, the remaining one(s) will take by operation of the principle of survivorship.3
As any survivor always takes priority, while the joint occupiers remain alive, they
will have no potential statutory successors. Thus, they will not be able to transfer
to a potential successor. However if all the joint occupiers act in unison, they could
seek to transfer the agreement to anyone else who could be their statutory
successor.4
 13.12 If there is more than one potential successor, and all the potential successors agree
that they should all take jointly, then the transfer can proceed, subject to the
landlord’s consent not to be unreasonably withheld. If this is not so, and the
current joint occupiers cannot all agree on who the transferees should be, the
transfer cannot go ahead.
 13.13 If all the occupiers and potential successors agree to leave out one or more of the
potential successors, then the transfer could still proceed to the remaining
successor(s) subject to the landlord’s consent as before. Thus the transferors could
cut out one or more of the people who might otherwise succeed them, but this
degree of choice should be respected.
 13.14 If, even though all the current occupiers agree, the potential successors cannot
agree on who should be left out, the transfer should not be classified as a transfer
to a potential successor but as an ordinary attempt to transfer the right to occupy.
1 Persons with the right to succeed are discussed in Part XIV.
2 For instance, allowing people to pass a tenancy to their carer-successor before they move
into residential care.
3 See below para 14.21. This is subject to para 14.58 – 14.59 which provides for the
possibility of the parties to a type II agreement agreeing that, on the death of any joint
occupier, his or her interest is to be transferred in accordance with his or her will or on
intestacy.
4 There may be more than one such person. In paras 14.46 – 14.47 we discuss the situation
where potential successors cannot agree between themselves who should actually be the
successor.
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In this case, the attempted transfer will, in accordance with the default position set
out above, be subject to the landlord's veto.
 13.15 It will only be necessary for an occupier to use the right to transfer to a potential
successor where they do not intend to remain as contractual occupiers themselves.
(This may assist the elderly person who has to give up occupation to go into a
residential or retirement home, thereby leaving their own home.) Otherwise they
can seek to add the potential successor to the agreement as a joint occupier.
 13.16 As we explain in Part XIV, paragraphs 14.48 – 14.52, transfer to a potential
successor will not count as using up a succession right, unless the landlord makes
this a condition of the consent. Nor will the transferee be regarded as a successor
just because the transferor was a successor; and the transferee will cease to count
as a successor, even though he or she had held an occupation agreement under
which he or she held this status.5 This is because, subject to the exception
mentioned above, only actual succession will count as use of a succession right.
Instead it will be up to the landlord to impose a condition on the transfer, as a
reasonable condition of granting consent, that the transferee must accept that he or
she should be regarded as having used up a succession right.
(Mutual) exchanges
 13.17 The current version of this exception is set out in section 91(3)(a), section 92 of
and Schedule 3 to the Housing Act 1985. We believe that this is an important and
useful right available to secure tenants. We recommend that it be extended to all
type I agreements made by social landlords, not just local authorities. In the light
of responses to CP 168, we have decided that it would be inappropriate to extend
the right to occupiers of private landlords, particularly given that they do not select
their occupiers on the same (social policy) bases that social landlords do.
 13.18 We recommend that type I agreements6 entered into by social landlords should
include a compulsory-minimum term allowing for mutual exchanges, subject to
the consent of the landlord being sought and obtained, which cannot be
unreasonably withheld.
 13.19 Currently, the right takes the form of an assignment of the tenancy to someone
else who is also mutually exchanging. Effectively, it means that the secure tenant
must find another tenant to swap with who is also secure or assured tenant with a
social landlord, or that all the people participating must form a “ring” of such
tenants.
 13.20 We recommend that this mutuality condition should be amended so that it can
apply to what practitioners refer to as “chains” as well as “rings”. The last person
in a “ring” under the current system must assign to the first person in the ring,
5 This would be comparatively rare as the potential successor would have to have their home
at the transferor’s property, and so would not normally have another property on which they
had an agreement covered by the new Act.
6 No provision should be made for this exception as a compulsory feature of type II
agreements. It will therefore be covered by the default veto on transfers. The landlord will
therefore be able to choose to include a similar right if they wish, but will not be forced to do
so.
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thereby completing the circle of exchanges. From our consultation, we conclude
that social landlords, and their tenants, now wish to sacrifice this circularity, so that
“chains” can be included. This is to encourage mobility and facilitate “choice-
based letting” approaches which partly try to mimic patterns of buying and selling
houses.
 13.21 The “chain” approach means that the ring of transfer does not have to be
complete. There can be a void at the top of the chain, and an otherwise empty
house can be filled at the bottom of the chain. This may particularly suit social
landlords in, respectively, high demand and low demand areas, and adds to the
flexibility of the present arrangements.
 13.22 The right to exchange should be set out in a compulsory-minimum term, and be
subject to the landlord’s consent, which must not be unreasonably withheld.
 13.23 The same general criteria of reasonableness should apply in this context as apply
to other circumstances involving the unreasonable withholding of consent. In Part
X, paragraphs 10.13 – 10.16, we discuss “structuring” this reasonableness. Among
the factors that should be considered in this context, should be:
 (1) what voids are left over after a transaction, and
 (2) what prejudice, if any, is caused to the landlord’s allocation policy.
 13.24 This will be particularly important in the context of mutual exchanges where both
or all the occupiers have the same landlord and the same sized properties. In such
cases, there will be no prejudice to the landlord’s waiting list as a result of the
exchange. This is one reason why mutual exchange was created as a statutory right
in the first place.
Family court orders
 13.25 We recommend that relevant family law statutes are amended to ensure that family
courts can continue to make appropriate orders in relation to our new agreements,
as they can in relation to existing tenancies.
FORMALITIES FOR TRANSFERS
 13.26 Under current law, a tenancy can only be assigned by deed, even where the
original tenancy did not have to be granted by deed.7 If no deed is used, a contract
to assign a tenancy may be enforceable in equity, but only if it complies with the
requirements of Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989, section 2
by being in writing, signed by both parties and containing all the terms of the
contract8 (subject to the possible effect of equitable estoppel).
7 Law of Property Act 1925, s 54(2) allows the creation, but not the assignment, by parol of
certain short leases. See Crago v Julian [1992] 1 WLR 372 on whether Law of Property Act
1925, s 53(1)(a) can enable assignment by writing without a deed.
8 Under s 2(5)(a) there is an exemption for short leases from the requirement for writing, but
it only applies to contracts for their creation rather than for their assignment.
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 13.27 We wish to avoid any requirements for deeds. We do not regard them as useful in
the context of residential renting. Instead, we wish to see transfers taking effect
from the point at which all the parties’ intentions are confirmed in writing.
 13.28 We recommend that a transfer should be effective as a legal transfer from the
earliest of the following points in time:
 (1) the intentions of the transferor and transferee to transfer are stated in
writing; or
 (2) the transferor gives up occupation and the transferee takes up occupation
of the accommodation; or
 (3) the first instalment of rent is paid to the landlord by the transferee and not
by the transferor.
 13.29 In cases where there are land registration requirements to be completed, these
must also be carried out.
 13.30 These propositions are all subject to any necessary consents being obtained from
the landlord. If consent is required by the agreement, or if there is a landlord’s
veto, then the transfer should not be effective unless and until the landlord’s
consent is granted and communicated to the transferor or transferee.
 13.31 If the required consents are not obtained, the purported transfer will be of no legal
effect. Thus the landlord will be able to take proceedings against the purported
transferee who will have no legal entitlement to occupy the premises. Alternatively,
the landlord could agree to enter an agreement with the purported transferee; but
this will be entirely a matter for the landlord.
 13.32 Once a lawful transfer has taken place, the landlord should be required to serve on
the transferee a written statement of the agreement, amended to show the change
of occupier, within two weeks of the transfer. The same sanctions for failure to
comply with this requirement should apply as for failure to give a written
statement of the agreement to the original occupier at the start of the agreement.9
Where, exceptionally, the original agreement permits the occupier to transfer
without having to obtain the consent of the landlord, the time limits for this
sanction should not start to run until the landlord is notified of the transfer.
EFFECT OF A TRANSFER
 13.33 The effect of a properly conducted transfer should be to substitute the new
contractual occupier for the old one from that point on, in a clean break. The
former occupier should only be liable under, and benefit from, the obligations and
rights of the agreement in respect of things happening before the transfer.
 13.34 The new occupier should only be liable under, and benefit from, the obligations
and rights of the agreement in respect of things happening after the transfer.
9 See para 7.23 above.
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Transfers of parts of the premises
 13.35 The new scheme of transfers will not make any specific provision for transfers of
part of the property. It is rare for this to be practical in relation to residential
tenancies covered by the current housing legislation, and we would anticipate that
it would continue to be rare under the new Act. We do not see that there should be
any implied right for the occupier to transfer part only of the property.
 13.36 The landlord and occupier can, of course, agree that they want to reduce the space
available to the occupier and bring a new occupier into part of the property under
a separate agreement direct with the landlord. In that case, they can vary the
original agreement (or terminate it by mutual consent subject to entering a new
agreement for the smaller part of the property) on the basis that the landlord will
enter a separate agreement with a new occupier for the other part.
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PART XIV 
SPECIFIC ISSUES 5: THE EFFECT OF
DEATH ON THE OCCUPATION
AGREEMENT
 INTRODUCTION
 14.1 Succession rights have been an integral feature of housing law for a long time. As
usual in housing law, complexity has arisen:
 (1) through the proliferation of statutory schemes, each of which provided
different succession rights;
 (2) through the interface of contract, property and statutory provisions which
suggest different legal approaches to the impact of death on occupation
agreements and succession; and
 (3) as a result of statutory silence on a number of issues which are significant
in practice.
 14.2 In making recommendations for reforming the law, we want to provide a single and
coherent statement of the impact of death upon the occupation agreement which
sets out a clear system of succession rights that will apply to both types of
agreement.
 14.3 Clarity matters to all those involved.
 (1) Landlords will be concerned that the income flow from the property is not
interrupted, that they minimise voids and that they have sufficient
information about what is happening in the property to enable them to
manage it.
 (2) The occupier will be concerned to protect the position of his or her
partner and/or family following his or her death.
 (3) Other people who continue to live in premises following the death of the
occupier need to know their status and, where necessary, have sufficient
time to make alternative living arrangements.
 (4) The beneficiaries of the estate of a deceased occupier will not want the
estate depleted by rent being paid out for what may be an empty property
or property occupied by others who should be paying rent rather than the
estate.
 14.4 We have also taken this opportunity to recommend measures to remedy certain
injustices which have emerged as more fluid family formations have evolved. We
have sought to reflect the contemporary social reality of the family in a manner
that is consistent with the Human Rights Act 1998. Thus we recommend
extending the definition of spouse found in the Housing Act 1985 to include
relationships that have the characteristics of husband and wife, even where both
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partners are of the same sex or where either party has undergone gender
reassignment.
 14.5 We also want to recognise demands placed upon relatives or others who look after
elderly, ill or disabled people. It is often easier to provide the level of care required
if the carer moves into the home of the vulnerable person. Many carers find it
impossible to maintain their own home if they do this. We should recognise the
reality of the sacrifices that such people make in order to provide care and to
protect the position of unpaid carers who give up their own home to provide care
for another in that other person’s home.
 14.6 We are concerned that the current rather limited succession regime of the Housing
Act 1985 precludes succession to a spouse being followed by a succession to a
member of the family, even if that person has lived with the tenant all his or her
life. We want our scheme to recognise the possibility of passing the agreement on
to one’s children, while ensuring that this is done within sensible constraints of
estate management. We believe that the scheme should be able to protect the
normal expectations of a family within rented housing, that the partner and then a
child of the family, if he or she has not set up home elsewhere, should be able to
succeed to the occupation agreement.
 14.7 We believe that clarity in succession is best served by providing a strictly limited
number of ways by which an agreement can be passed to another person following
the death of the contractual occupier.
 14.8 To achieve this, we recommend that our scheme of statutory succession should be
the only way that someone can succeed to an occupation agreement. This is
subject to two exceptions:
 (1) where there is a surviving joint occupier, to whom the right to occupy
passes by operation of the principle of survivorship; or
 (2) where there is a fixed term agreement, which, if the contract specifically
provides for it, can be transmitted by will or intestacy.
Estate management ground for possession
 14.9 Whilst concerned to produce a modern and clear system of succession rights, we
must also take account of the need for social landlords to be able to use their
housing stock efficiently and for the social purposes for which it was provided. We
therefore recommend that social landlords should have available to them a ground
for seeking possession based on under-occupation of the home following the death
of the occupier.
 14.10 The ground will be based on the current ground 16 of Schedule 2 to the Housing
Act 1985. It will only be available where the successor is not a priority successor.1
Proceedings, including the issue of notice of intention to take proceedings, will not
be able commenced until six months after the death. Proceedings will have to be
commenced no later than 12 months after the date of the death. The court will
1 See para 14.29 below.
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have to determine that it is reasonable to make the order sought. In addition, the
social landlord will be required to ensure that suitable alternative accommodation
is provided for the successor.
 14.11 The rest of this Part considers four topics:
 (1) the position where an occupier dies, leaving no other joint occupier or
statutory successor;
 (2) joint occupiers and the principle of survivorship;
 (3) the statutory succession scheme; and
 (4) the position where an occupier under a fixed-term agreement dies.
THE POSITION WHERE AN OCCUPIER DIES, LEAVING NO OTHER JOINT
OCCUPIER OR STATUTORY SUCCESSOR
 14.12 We recommend that both type I and periodic type II agreements not held jointly
and where there is no statutory successor should terminate automatically on the
death of the contractual occupier.
 14.13 Current common law rules on the effect of death on a tenancy are extremely
complex, and do not reflect ordinary people’s expectations of what is fair or
sensible. We want our scheme to reflect reality. Most occupiers have modest
estates; few make wills. Automatic termination will provide certainty. This will be
advantageous both for the estate of the deceased occupier and for the landlord. It
will also avoid the procedural rigmarole of serving notice on the executors or
Public Trustee that landlords are obliged to comply with at present.
 14.14 We acknowledge that this approach could cause hardship to both landlords and the
family of occupiers if the automatic termination of the agreement were to occur
instantaneously with death. The landlord may not know of the death and so
unfairly lose income, as he or she will not know the premises are available for
reletting. The family of the deceased occupier may need time to clear the property
and deal with matters arising from the death. If there are other (non-contractual)
occupants living in the property at the time of death, they will require time to
organise alternative accommodation.
 14.15 On the other hand, allowing the agreement to run on for any significant amount of
time after the death will be expensive either for the estate of the deceased occupier
if the landlord pursues the rent, or for the landlord if, as is more likely, the
landlord does not choose to recover the rent from the estate.
 14.16 We have sought to strike an appropriate balance between the competing demands
of the various parties. We have also sought to propose a rule that is clear and easily
understood by landlords and occupiers.
 14.17 We therefore recommend that an occupation agreement should terminate
automatically one month after the death of the occupier.
 14.18 It could terminate earlier, on a notice being served on the landlord either by the
deceased’s personal representatives, or by any remaining non-contractual
occupants left in the property. Such notice would have to be signed by all the
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remaining occupants. Whilst one remaining occupant might seek to sign a notice
without the knowledge or agreement of the other remaining occupants, that fact
will become apparent when the landlord tries to repossess the property. The notice
will not be effective in these circumstances.
 14.19 We recommend that, subject to the exceptions listed in the following paragraph,
there should be a compulsory-minimum term in type I and periodic type II
agreements providing that:
 (1) occupation agreements should terminate automatically without the need
for a court order following the death of the contractual occupier; and
 (2) the agreement should terminate either at the expiry of one month after the
death of the occupier or on service of a notice by either the personal
representative of the deceased occupier or by all of the remaining non-
contractual occupants of the property, whichever is the earlier.
 14.20 The exceptions to the automatic termination of the agreement following death are:
 (1) where there is a joint occupier who continues to occupy under the
agreement through operation of the principle of survivorship;
 (2) if the occupier was a sole occupier and there is a person who is entitled to
succeed to the agreement as a result of the statutory succession rules; or
 (3) the agreement was a fixed-term agreement, which contains a term
permitting the remainder of any period of right to occupy to be left by will
or on intestacy.
JOINT OCCUPIERS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF SURVIVORSHIP
 14.21 As discussed above,2 joint occupiers are occupiers, who jointly and severally benefit
from the occupation agreement and are jointly and severally liable under it. In the
event of the death of one of the joint holders, the surviving joint occupier(s) will
automatically take over both the benefits and burdens of the agreement. We also
recommend that succession by survivorship should not count as a succession
under the statutory rules, discussed next.
 14.22 We provide for a limited exception to these rules in our provisions for joint holding
of fixed term type II agreements, where this standard position will nevertheless be
the default position.3
THE STATUTORY SUCCESSION SCHEME
 14.23 A statutory right of succession is clearly a benefit to the occupier and a burden on
the landlord. We recommend that the parties should not be able to contract out of
the statutory succession scheme save in those circumstances where, as a condition
2 See paras 11.3 – 11.12 above.
3 See paras 14.58 – 14.59 below.
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imposed as part of a landlord’s consent to adding a joint occupier, transfer or
exchange, it is reasonable to require the giving up the right of succession.4
 14.24 The statutory right of succession will be the only means whereby the benefit of an
occupation agreement can be passed on following the death of the occupier, except
 (1) where there is one or more joint occupiers who survive(s)5; or
 (2) where the remainder of a fixed term agreement is passed on by will or
intestacy.6
The rationale of our proposals
 14.25 To create a coherent regime for statutory succession, we recommend amendment
of the current rules.
 14.26 Further, while bearing in mind the legitimate needs of landlords to control use of
their homes, we think there should be an expansion of the current succession
provisions in the Housing Act 1985. The limited nature of the succession rights in
that Act can be seen from the fact that:
 (1) only one succession is available (which can be either to a spouse or to a
member of the family who has been living with the deceased tenant for the
period of 12 months prior to the death);
 (2) the Act sets out a range of circumstances where the tenant is treated as a
successor, most significantly that he was a joint tenant and has become the
sole tenant. (This prevents any child from being a successor where their
parents have been joint tenants and where one has predeceased the other
so that there is a deemed succession.)
 14.27 We consider that the people who should be within the scope of the statutory rules
of succession are:
 (1) partners of deceased occupiers;
 (2) members of the family of the occupier and/or the occupier’s partner; and
 (3) unpaid carers.
       Partners should be given priority over the other classes of potential successor.
 14.28 We do not recommend there should be two successions in all circumstances. Two
successions will only occur if there is a surviving partner who succeeds and,
following their death, there is a member of the family or carer who also qualifies to
succeed. The succession of the member of the family or carer will operate as a final
4 See, for example para 11.19 above and para 14.50 below.
5 See para 14.21 above.
6 See para 14.58 below.
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succession whether or not there has been a succession to a partner of the original
occupier.7
Spouse/partner – the “priority successor”
 14.29 In general, we expect spouses and partners to occupy under joint occupation
agreements. Thus a surviving spouse or partner will continue to hold the
occupation agreement after the death of their partner.8 The operation of
survivorship in these circumstances will not count as a succession for the purposes
of our statutory scheme.
 14.30 Where spouses and partners have lived together but do not occupy under a joint
agreement, the statutory right of succession will be available to any surviving
spouse or partner. The surviving spouse or partner will have to have been living in
the premises as his or her only or principal home at the time of the death.
 14.31 Spouse or partner should be defined to include not only the person who was the
spouse of the occupier at the time of the occupier’s death, but also the survivor of
couples who have lived together as husband and wife, or of same sex couples who
have co-habited. This definition should embrace couples where either partner has
undergone gender re-assignment.
 14.32 We recommend that the surviving spouse or partner, as thus defined, should
always take priority over any other person with a statutory succession right. Such a
successor can be described as the “priority successor”.
 14.33 The characteristics of priority successors are:
 (1) that they have been the partner of the deceased occupier; and
 (2) that the property which is the subject of the occupation agreement was
their only or principal home at the time of the deceased occupier’s death.
 14.34 A priority succession will always operate as the first succession to an occupation
agreement.
7 We do not therefore consider that our succession regime should operate in the same way as
that in Scotland. The Housing (Scotland) Act 2001 provides for two successions to qualified
persons and further provides that following the death of the second successor the landlord is
obliged to make other suitable accommodation available to someone who would qualify as a
successor if there had not already been two successions. In particular we do not recognise a
need to provide for succession rights to partners of successor children. We consider that our
provisions for adding a party to the agreement provide a more appropriate mechanism for
occupiers to achieve security for those whose home they may wish to protect after their
death. The requirement for consent, that must be given reasonably, means that there is an
opportunity for the landlord to weigh the competing needs of the landlord and the occupier.
Our scheme has the potential to be more extensive than the Housing (Scotland) Act 2001 in
that, in the Scottish system, the vesting of the tenancy in the surviving joint tenant counts as
a succession for the operation of the succession rules. For the purposes of our scheme, a
surviving joint occupier who takes over the agreement on the death of another joint occupier
will not count as a statutory successor to the occupation agreement.
8 See para 14.21 above.
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Member of the family and carers – the “standard successor”
 14.35 We also recommend that, in defined circumstances, members of the family of the
occupier and unpaid carers of the occupier (whether the original occupier or the
successor occupier) can statutorily succeed to the occupation agreement. We
recommend that “member of the family” be defined by a list, based on the
definition in the Housing (Scotland) Act 2001.9 Such a successor can be described
as the “standard successor”.
 14.36 Clearly the reality and complexity of human relationships means that there will be
circumstances where a successor spouse enters into a new partnership relationship,
and then dies. If the new couple have arranged to become joint occupiers under
the occupation agreement, the survivor will take under the principle of
survivorship.
 14.37 However, if they are not joint occupiers, we do not consider that the new spouse or
partner of a survivor spouse or partner should be in a privileged position, over and
above other members of the family. In short, any new spouse or partner of a
priority successor cannot him or herself be a priority successor.
 14.38 Nevertheless, we do consider that the partner or spouse of a priority successor
should receive some protection under the statutory succession rules. The list of
members of the family should therefore also include the new spouse/partner of a
priority successor. Therefore, in the absence of a joint occupation agreement, the
spouse/partner of a priority successor can qualify as a standard successor.
 14.39 In the light of the consultation responses, and the development of the law in
Scotland, we also recommend that the concept of the standard successor should
include unpaid carers who have given up their own home in order to reside with
and provide care to an occupier or a member of the occupier’s family. The carer
must be aged at least 16 years; the premises must be the carer’s only or principal
home at the time of the occupier’s death; and the carer must have had a previous
only or principal home which was given up.
 14.40 The Scottish law does not define “carer”. Recent statutory provisions covering
carers in English law have distinguished between the rights of unpaid carers and
those of professional carers. We are only seeking to provide succession rights to
unpaid carers who provide more than minimal support and care for the occupier
or someone else in his or her family. Statutory succession rights should only extend
to carers who are unpaid and who provide or intend to provide a significant
amount of care to the occupier or the member of the rental occupier’s family.
9 Section 108(1)(b) and (2). This provides: (1) For the purposes of this Act, a person (“A”) is
a member of another’s (“B’s”) family if –… (b) A is B’s parent, grandparent, child,
grandchild, brother, sister, uncle, aunt, nephew or niece; (2) For the purpose of subsection
(1)(b), (a) a relationship by marriage is to be treated as a relationship by blood, (b) a
relationship of the half-blood is to be treated as a relationship of the whole blood; (c) the
stepchild of a person is to be treated as that person’s child, and (d) a person brought up or
treated by another person as if the person were the child of the other person is to be treated
as that person’s child. “Half blood” is an expression found in the Housing Act 1985 as well
as the Housing Scotland Act. It refers to a relationship existing between persons having only
one parent in common.
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Therefore “carer” should be defined as in section 1 of the Carers (Recognition and
Services) Act 1995. Such carers should qualify as standard successors.
Period of residence
 14.41 To be a standard successor, a period of residence must be established. In essence,
the current law rations the right to succeed (other than to spouses) to those who
have spent a year living with the deceased occupier. The requirement of residence
for a 12 month period seems an appropriate and effective rationing mechanism.
 14.42 We recommend that a standard successor (including unpaid carers and
spouses/partners who do not succeed as priority successors) must either:
 (1) have been living in the premises as their only or principal home for a
period of at least 12 months prior to the death of the occupier; or
 (2) have been residing with the occupier for a period of at least 12 months
prior to the death of the occupier and have been living in the premises as
their only or principal home at the time of the tenant’s death.
JOINT SUCCESSORS
 14.43 Where more than one person is entitled to succeed as standard successor we
recommend that more than one person can succeed as joint occupiers. Succession
by joint occupiers should be treated as one succession. All the joint occupiers will
be successors. This will mean that when one joint successor occupier dies the
others will continue to hold the occupation agreement through survivorship, but
that when the final surviving successor dies there will be no further succession.
INTERFACE BETWEEN PRIORITY AND STANDARD SUCCESSION
 14.44 To summarise: we recommend that there should be the possibility of one
succession to a priority successor and one succession to a standard successor. A
priority succession will only occur if there is a priority successor and if there has
not previously been a priority succession or a standard succession. A standard
succession will only occur if there is a standard successor and there has not
previously been a standard succession. A priority succession will always take
precedence over a standard succession, and can never follow a standard
succession.
 14.45 Additionally there can only be one standard succession to an occupation
agreement. It can follow either an occupation agreement held by a contractual
occupier who is not a successor or an occupation agreement held by a priority
successor. It may operate as the first or second succession to an occupation
agreement but must always operate as the final succession.
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Disputes
 14.46 Where there is more than one potential successor, and there is a dispute about who
should become the contractual occupier, we recommend that the landlord should
resolve the matter.10
 14.47 Where there remains dissatisfaction with the solution proposed by the landlord,
the matter should be resolved in the county court.
Succession and its relation with our recommendations on adding joint
occupiers, transfer and exchange.
 14.48 The combined effect of our recommendation enabling an occupier to add another
party to the agreement, subject to the consent of the landlord which cannot be
unreasonably refused, and our succession provisions could mean that the landlord
would “lose control” of the premises, especially the ability to reallocate the
premises, for a considerable period of time. Concern about this may well influence
landlords’ decisions with respect to requests for adding parties to the agreement.
We accept that these concerns are reasonable.
 14.49 At the same time, we regard our recommendation relating to the addition of a joint
occupier as adding to the personal autonomy of occupiers. We do not want
landlords’ worries about loss of control to undermine their willingness to give
consent to occupiers who have applied to add another to the agreement.
 14.50 We think an appropriate balance between these two concerns can be achieved by
enabling landlords to make it a condition of granting consent to the addition of
another that there should be an exclusion of succession. Such an exclusion as a
condition of giving consent would still be subject to the reasonableness
requirement. We recommend that landlords should have power to grant consent to
an application for adding an occupier subject to the condition that the addition
counts as a succession. The imposition of the condition must be reasonable.
 14.51 Such derogations from our succession scheme should extend to consents to
transfer or mutual exchange.
 14.52 These recommendation will not only be of advantage to landlords. They will also
enable occupiers to make reasoned decisions about what type of arrangement
allows them to best provide for the security of their family. They will be able to use
their potential succession rights as a bargaining tool, to enable them to achieve a
constructive outcome with their landlord.
Loss of status as successor
 14.53 There will be circumstances in which a successor loses his or her status as a
successor and becomes a straightforward contractual occupier, attracting fresh
succession rights.
10 This is based on Housing Act 1985, s 89 and is a system that appears to work well.
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 14.54 We recommend that, so long as the successor remains in the same premises under
the same or a different landlord, or acquires an occupation agreement by exercise
of the right of mutual exchange, that person should retain the status of successor.
 14.55 However, if the occupation agreement is terminated and a wholly new agreement
relating to different premises is made, whether by the same or a different landlord,
the occupier should no longer be regarded as a successor.
 14.56 Where a successor dies, and there are no further rights of succession, but the
landlord inadvertently grants an occupation agreement to a new occupier on the
mistaken view that that person was entitled as a successor, the agreement will be a
fully valid one and the occupier should not be deemed a successor.
 14.57 If the occupier has misled the landlord as to his or her status as a successor, this
should provide the basis for possession proceedings in the normal way.
THE POSITION WHERE AN OCCUPIER UNDER A FIXED-TERM AGREEMENT
DIES
 14.58 Our recommendations on the rules to apply when an occupier dies are likely to be
equally appropriate for most occupiers who rent their home on fixed-term
agreements. We therefore recommend that there should be a default term in the
fixed-term type II agreement, the effect of which will be that following the death of
an occupier the same consequences should arise as follow the death of an occupier
with a periodic agreement.
 14.59 Different considerations may apply when the occupier is someone who has paid a
substantial premium for a fixed-term agreement, or where the fixed-term, though
by definition for less than 21 years, was nevertheless for a substantial period. We
consider that such occupiers should be able to agree with the landlord, as a
substitute for the default term, that the remainder of the fixed-term can pass by
will or on intestacy. Though the term will not form part of our model agreement
and therefore will be subject to the scrutiny of the Office of Fair Trading, as it adds





 15.1 Housing law has an important role to play in the control of anti-social behaviour.
The relationship between rented housing and anti-social behaviour and the
background to our proposals are both explained in Part XIII of CP 162 at
paragraphs 13.1 – 13.9.
 15.2 Our original proposals proved very controversial. They stimulated the most
polarised, and the greatest volume of, responses. Following careful analysis of the
responses, we have modified our original proposals. In particular, we have decided
not to proceed with our proposals for summary eviction or further structuring of
discretion in anti-social behaviour cases.
 15.3 In respect of summary eviction, we have accepted the arguments of consultees that
whilst our proposed procedure would have enabled a swift response to anti-social
behaviour, it was likely to be burdensome administratively and was potentially a
disproportionate response to the problem. We have also accepted the view
expressed by the Civil Justice Council and the Association of District Judges,
amongst others, that seeking to structure judicial discretion in anti-social
behaviour cases above and beyond what we had recommended generally in relation
to the structuring of discretion in possession proceedings would, in effect, remove
all discretion from judges. We accept that this would be inappropriate.
 15.4 We have noted that the concerns of respondents, particularly from lawyers who
represent tenants, arose to a large extent from unease at adding to the legal powers
of social landlords when, in their opinion, local authorities in particular were
failing to utilise fully legal powers already available to them. These views were also
shared by voluntary sector organisations that represent tenants’ interests.
 15.5 On the other hand nearly all respondents recognised that there was a need for
landlords to take anti-social behaviour seriously. Responses from organised
tenants’ groups and many local authorities expressed great concern about anti-
social behaviour.
 15.6 Our consultation coincided with the DTLR (now the ODPM) consultation
“Tackling Anti-social Tenants” and our proposals and the responses to them have
to an extent informed proposals within the Anti-social Behaviour Bill.1 That Bill,
currently before Parliament, has inevitably been drafted within the context of the
current statutory framework.
 15.7 We intend that the housing measures contained in the Anti-social Behaviour Bill
should be adapted to the statutory framework we have proposed. We want to
ensure that the measures are consistent with our general approach to housing law,
1 References within this Report to the Anti-social Behaviour Bill are references to the Bill as
amended in committee in the Lords and printed as HL Bill 108 53/2 (7 October 2003).
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which is based on the consumer approach, requires clear statements of the
respective rights and responsibilities of the parties, is flexible and aims as far as
possible for landlord-neutrality.
POLICY OBJECTIVE
 15.8 We are concerned that effective powers to deal with housing-related anti-social
behaviour are available to social landlords. They must be enabled to fulfil their
functions as landlords with responsibilities not only towards their tenants but also
their local communities. However, we stress that the broader functions of local
authorities to police their areas, and any extension of these broader policing roles
to registered social landlords, fall outside of the scope of our project.
 15.9 We consider that social landlords require a legal framework that is sufficiently
flexible in order to enable them to develop effective strategies to tackle anti-social
behaviour within rented housing and to respond to the needs of victims and of the
local community. The legal framework should be designed to meet the following
objectives:
 (1) speed of response;
 (2) predictability of outcomes of legal proceedings;
 (3) ability to protect witnesses;
 (4) where possible, provision of support to enable perpetrators to change their
behaviour and continue as occupiers; and
 (5) appropriate protection of the rights of the alleged perpetrator.
 15.10 The legal powers we recommend for social landlords must be balanced against the
extensive rights that occupiers under type I agreements enjoy. Moreover, our
recommendations aim to ensure that social landlords give sufficient priority to the
protection of the majority of their occupiers, so that enjoyment of their rights is not
diminished by the anti-social behaviour of a very small minority of occupiers.
Domestic violence
 15.11 Anti-social behaviour is generally understood to relate to behaviour that impacts
upon people, not necessarily strangers, who are outside the domestic circle of
friends and family of the tenant. Violence and harassment within the domestic
circle is not generally considered to be anti-social behaviour. However, from the
perspective of housing management, there is little difference in the types of
remedies which should be available. We therefore recommend that the same
powers should be available to respond both to anti-social behaviour and to
violence within the home.
Which landlords?
 15.12 One major feature of our statutory scheme is landlord-neutrality. However, we
consider that this approach cannot apply in an undifferentiated way to the
responsibilities and powers of landlords to respond to anti-social behaviour.
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Private landlords
 15.13 Private landlords are not covered by the requirement to let on type I occupation
agreements. Most will rent properties on the basis of type II agreements. They will
have the notice-only method of terminating the agreement available to them. They
will also have the benefit of the special anti-social behaviour term (see paragraphs
15.20 – 15.22 below).
 15.14 Several responses to CP 162 advocated strong measures to require private
landlords to control the conduct of anti-social tenants. We consider that to suggest
extending the legal responsibility of private landlords towards anti-social behaviour
beyond the terms of the occupation agreement raise quite different issues to those
that need to be considered in relation to social landlords. We have concluded that
these issues fall outside the scope of this project.2
Social landlords
 15.15 At the moment, local authority landlords have different powers and responsibilities
from registered social landlords and non-registered housing association landlords.
We recommend that the powers and duties available to social landlords should be
aligned.
 15.16 The current Anti-social Behaviour Bill provides for the extension of certain powers
to charitable housing trusts to obtain injunctions coupled with powers of arrest
and/or exclusion provisions, where there is breach of the tenancy agreement. We
have thought carefully about the role of charitable housing trusts and, in
particular, their function in providing housing to some very vulnerable tenants and
their public accountability. In the light of these considerations, and on the
assumption that the proposals in the Bill are enacted, we have decided to
recommend that charitable housing trusts should have the same powers as other
social landlords.
A GENERAL DUTY ON SOCIAL LANDLORDS TO DEAL WITH ANTI-SOCIAL
BEHAVIOUR
 15.17 The primary reason why social landlord’s powers to respond to anti-social
behaviour should be expanded is the protection of their occupiers. The Anti-social
Behaviour Bill provides in clause 12 (which inserts a new section 218A into the
Housing Act 1996) for the publication of social landlords’ policies and procedures
on anti-social behaviour.
 15.18 While this is very useful, we consider that social landlords should be required to
give some priority to tackling anti-social behaviour. We are mindful of the concerns
expressed by local authorities and some lawyers about the risk of proliferation of
claims for compensation if an actionable duty were to be imposed on social
landlords. We therefore recommend the creation of a general “target”3 duty on
2 We have recommended that part of the proposals for further work should examine anti-
social behaviour in the private sector: para 2.39 above.
3 See Inner London Education Authority ex p Ali (1990) 2 Admin LR 822. For an example of a
case concerning whether a statutory duty should be categorised as a “target duty” or not, see
R(on the application of A) v Lambeth Borough Council [2003] UKHL 57.
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local authority landlords to take into account, in the management of their rented
property, the need to deal with anti-social behaviour. We also recommend that a
similarly worded duty be placed on registered social landlords, expressed so as not
to take effect in tort, which the Housing Corporation would be obliged to take into
account in the performance of its regulatory functions.
 15.19 We consider that such a target duty would assist social landlords in giving anti-
social behaviour the priority that it requires, but without involving them in
unnecessary claims for compensation.
A SPECIAL ANTI-SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR TERM
 15.20 We recommend that a special term prohibiting anti-social behaviour is inserted
into all occupation agreements, both type I and type II. All types of landlord will
be able to take proceedings against an occupier in breach of this term. Further, if
the landlord has already obtained an injunction to restrain breach of the term
which the occupier breaches, the landlord will be able to ask for a possession order
from the court as part of his enforcement of the injunction, without issuing
separate possession proceedings. It will not be possible to contract out of or amend
this term. We recommend the term should be based on the definition of anti-social
behaviour contained in the Anti-social Behaviour Bill which proposes to insert new
sections153A to153E into the Housing Act 1996.
 15.21 We recommend that the special term should only apply to anti-social behaviour
committed by holders of occupation agreements in the home or in the locality of
the home. The term will also treat other unlawful behaviour that does not cause
nuisance or annoyance as anti-social but only when it involves the use of the
housing accommodation for criminal purposes. Finally our recommended term
will apply to violent behaviour within the home.
 15.22 The effect of the term will be that the occupier agrees not to:
 (1) engage in conduct that (a) is capable of causing nuisance or annoyance to
any reasonable person in the locality; or (b) involves the use, or threatened
use, of violence or causes a risk of significant harm to a person within the
home; or (c) allows, incites or encourages a person residing in or visiting
the home to engage in such conduct;
 (2) use, or threaten to use, the home for criminal purposes or allow, incite or
encourage any other person to use, or threaten to use, the home for such
purposes.
REMEDIES FOR ANTI-SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR
 15.23 We have recommended that occupiers may be evicted for breach of contractual
terms when it is reasonable for a court to make a possession order.
 15.24 In addition, injunctions will be available to all landlords for breach of the special
term prohibiting anti-social behaviour. If the injunction is breached, a landlord will
be able to seek a possession order as a remedy for the breach without issuing
separate possession proceedings. The court will be able to order possession where
it is reasonable to do so. The injunction must contain a warning that breach may
lead to eviction as well as warning of the potential for committal for breach. The
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streamlining of breach and possession proceedings for anti-social behaviour will
enhance the deterrent value of the injunction.
 15.25 Further, social landlords4 should have a free-standing power, not linked to the
agreement, to seek an injunction to protect a wide range of potential victims from
anti-social conduct, with anti-social conduct defined on the same basis as in the
anti-social behaviour special term.
 15.26 Potential victims include:
 (1) those with rights to occupy accommodation owned or managed by the
social landlord,
 (2) those who live in other housing accommodation in the locality of the social
landlord’s accommodation, and
 (3) those engaged in lawful activities in housing accommodation, or the
locality of housing accommodation, owned or managed by the social
landlord.
 15.27 The perpetrators include both those who engage in anti-social conduct and those
who allow, incite or encourage someone else residing in or visiting the social
landlord’s housing accommodation to engage in such conduct.
 15.28 In cases where the anti-social conduct consists of, or includes, the use, or
threatened use, of violence or there is a risk of significant harm to a person in the
locality of the property, additional remedies will be available. These include:
powers of arrest, which may be attached to any injunction; and exclusion orders.
 15.29 Because exclusion orders will operate to remove a person from their home, they
will only be available on a with-notice basis. While an exclusion order is in force,
the respective rights and responsibilities of the parties to the occupation agreement
will continue. Therefore, rent will still have to be paid and repairing obligations
honoured.
 15.30 Breach of the free-standing injunction may lead to possession where the order is
made against an occupier, the landlord requests possession following breach and
the court considers that it is reasonable to order possession. The occupier must be
given notice that breach of the injunction may lead to possession.
 15.31 The purpose of these powers is to provide flexibility for social landlords in their
responses to anti-social behaviour. Thus there will be no need for landlords to
commence separate possession proceedings as well as seeking an exclusion order;
nor will they have to start separate possession proceedings where there has been
breach of an injunction. However, where needed, possession proceedings will still
be available.
4 For these purposes, social landlords will include unregistered housing associations and
charitable housing trusts.
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 15.32 We have already recommended that courts must take certain factors into account
when exercising their discretion in possession proceedings.5 To ensure that the
judge takes full account of the broad impact of such behaviour, in the context of
anti-social behaviour he/she must consider the impact of the behaviour on:
 (1) the landlord’s other occupiers;
 (2) other neighbours who are not renting from the landlord;
 (3) the local community.
 15.33 We have considered whether eviction should be a potential consequence of breach
of an anti-social behaviour order made under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.
We have decided that it would be too complex to try to categorise anti-social
behaviour orders into those where breach could lead to possession proceedings
and those which should not, because the behaviour is not sufficiently connected to
the occupation of housing. In any event, we think our recommendations on
injunctions will be sufficiently flexible and responsive to the needs of landlords. We
have therefore decided not to proceed further with this idea.
EXCEPTIONAL USE OF TYPE II AGREEMENTS TO PREVENT OR RESPOND TO
ANTI-SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR
 15.34 The introductory tenancy introduced by the Housing Act 1996 provided a useful
mechanism for local authority landlords who are concerned to ensure that tenants
demonstrate they understand both the responsibilities and the rights of the secure
tenant.
 15.35 We have recommended that all social landlords should have exceptional power to
use the type II agreement to provide a similar probationary form of agreement.6
The probationary type II agreement will be available for 12 months in the first
instance. After 12 months, a social landlord will be able to extend the probationary
period for a further 6 months, but only if it is of the opinion that the behaviour of
the occupier was such as to warrant such an extension.
 15.36 Social landlords will have flexibility to choose whether their use of the
probationary exception should be limited to individual cases, or to operate on a
more general basis. Indeed they will be able to decide not to use any probationary
type II agreements.
Demotion
 15.37 Social landlords will also be able to use type II agreements when they have asked a
court for an order to this effect, in the context of proceedings for breach of the
special anti-social behaviour term. This order will provide that an occupier,
currently under a type I agreement, should have that agreement demoted to a type
II agreement.
5 See paras 9.81 – 9.90 above.
6 See paras 5.33 – 5.35 above.
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Maximum period for demotion
 15.38 We recommend that where an occupier is demoted under a court order, the
occupier would be promoted back to a type I agreement if:
 (1) the landlord chooses to do so;
 (2) the court so orders, on the application of the occupier after six months; or
 (3) automatically after one year.
 15.39 Demotion orders should only be made where the court is satisfied that otherwise it
would have been reasonable to terminate the agreement for anti-social behaviour
and where the social landlord produces a plan to provide appropriate support for
the occupier. The Secretary of State will be given a power to specify the
requirements of the support to be provided to demoted occupiers. The Secretary
of State will also be given a power to vary the period of time for which such an
order is to last. Failure to provide the planned support will be one possible basis
for the occupier’s application for re-promotion.
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
 15.40 Section 145 and section 149 of the Housing Act 1996 created a discretionary
ground for eviction for both secure tenancies and assured tenancies let by social
landlords where a violent partner forces the other partner to leave the home and
the court is satisfied that the partner who has left is unlikely to return. The ground
(2A in Schedule 2 to the Housing Act 1985 and 14A in Schedule 2 to the Housing
Act 1988) applies to couples who are married or living together as husband and
wife and does not therefore cover same sex couples or other relationships. Either or
both of the couple must be a tenant. It is available where there has been violence
towards the leaving partner or a member of that person’s family who was residing
in the accommodation immediately before the partner left. The ground requires
that the landlord prove that the violence was the cause of the partner leaving and
that he or she is unlikely to return.
 15.41 The Government in the course of their consultation on domestic violence7 have
specifically raised the question of how to increase the effectiveness of this ground
of possession.
 15.42 Clearly the limits on its operation constrain its use at present. More significantly, in
many situations at present, there is no need for social landlords to use the domestic
violence ground. Where a partner who is a joint tenant leaves the family home as a
result of violence, and the landlord is able to reach an agreement with the victim
that he or she will serve a notice to quit, this terminates the tenancy of the
remaining joint tenant, the perpetrator of the violence. The landlord will then be
able to grant a new sole tenancy of the home to the victim.
 15.43 We have recommended that, under our scheme, the service of a notice by a joint
occupier should operate to terminate the occupation agreement in relation to that
occupier only. As regards the other joint occupier(s), the agreement will be
7 Safety and Justice: The Government’s Proposals on Domestic Violence (2003) Cm 5847.
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unaffected.8 Thus, the current method of responding to the continued occupation
of the perpetrator of domestic violence will no longer be available to the social
landlord. Potentially, therefore, the perpetrator could profit from his or her wrong
doing by gaining occupation of the whole property.
 15.44 However, we have recommended above that breach of the anti-social behaviour
special term will be available to landlords as a basis for termination of the
occupation agreement. There is nothing to prevent its being used to control anti-
social behaviour perpetrated against other people within the property.
 15.45 Social landlords will have greater scope to take action than under the current
domestic violence ground. There will be no restriction on the availability of the
ground against spouses and co-habitants only; there will be no need to prove that
violence caused the victim to leave the property; and there will be no need to
demonstrate that the victim has no intention to return to the property. For this
reason, there will be no need to replicate the current domestic violence ground.
 15.46 Social landlords will also be able to use the free-standing injunction power with
exclusion orders and power of arrest in cases of domestic violence.9
 15.47 In either case, social landlords will be able to seek a possession order in
proceedings for breach of any injunction. The possession order will operate to
terminate a joint agreement in the normal way. In cases of domestic violence it will
also terminate the victim’s agreement. However, the court’s consideration of
reasonableness will include consideration of the landlord’s plans for re-housing the
victim. The landlord will have two options.
 (1) If the victim wishes to be re-housed elsewhere, the landlord will be able to
re-gain possession of the property following a suitable offer to the victim.
 (2) Where the victim wishes to remain in the current home then the landlord
will be able to offer her or him a new agreement for that property.
 15.48 These seem more sensible outcomes than those available under the current
domestic violence ground.
8 See paras 11.25 – 11.30 above.





 16.1 In Consultation Paper 162, we suggested that all projects providing an appropriate
level of supported accommodation to vulnerable groups should be excluded from
the statutory scheme and from the Protection from Eviction Act 1977.1 We also
provisionally proposed that the Secretary of State should hold a list of such
projects.
 16.2 The reason for proposing exclusion from statutory protection was to provide a
legal environment that would facilitate supported accommodation for all kinds of
short-term social projects such as hostels, drug rehabilitation projects, and foyers.
The holding of a statutory list would have meant that there would be a level of
certainty about the lack of statutory protection available to such projects,
overcoming current difficulties in identifying the legal status of certain projects.
These considerations remain important to our approach to supported housing.
 16.3 Responses to our proposals indicated that we had failed to appreciate the diversity
of supported housing and the extent to which providers were committed to the
principle that occupiers of supported housing should be given as extensive security
as possible. The suggestion of a list of excluded projects was rejected as too
cumbersome.
 16.4 The following recommendations have been developed following careful
consideration of the responses to CP 162 and the contributions made by a group
of providers of supported housing, who assisted us greatly by participating in a
seminar convened by the Law Commission on 9 July 2002, in other meetings, and
by providing written comments as our proposals progressed. We are very grateful
for their assistance.
DEFINITIONS
 16.5 The proposed system of statutory protection for supported housing projects is
dependent upon the following definitions.
 (1) Direct access accommodation is housing accommodation provided by a
relevant landlord as part of a project or scheme where the normal practice
of the project is to accept anyone who requests accommodation as long as
the project has available accommodation and the person asserts that they
meet the basic criteria for the project. Accommodation must be provided
on a day to day basis meaning that there is no commitment on the
landlord to house beyond that particular night. The purpose of the
accommodation is that it is immediately available to the occupier.
1 See CP 162 paras 9.101 – 9.107.
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 (2) Supported housing accommodation is housing accommodation where a
relevant landlord is contractually obliged to provide support services
and/or the purpose for which accommodation is provided is the provision
of support.
 (3) Support services means the provision of training or the provision of advice,
guidance or counselling which relates to either physical or mental health,
employment or training or the promotion of welfare or any other type of
provision which is consistent with this list. It does not include the
provision of higher education.
 (4) Relevant landlords are social landlords, as defined by the Bill (that is, local
authorities, registered social landlords and housing action trusts), with the
addition of charitable housing trusts who are not registered social
landlords, and registered charities who provide supported housing.
 16.6 The broad definition of relevant landlords is designed to balance the need to
embrace the wide range of organisations which provide supported housing and the
need to ensure that the categories of landlord involved have sufficient public
accountability to justify the extensive powers provided for in our Bill.
 16.7 The definition is extended more widely than social landlord to include: (1)
charitable housing trusts; and (2) charities who provide supported housing but
cannot be charitable housing trusts because their main source of income does not
come from housing. Such charities include the YMCA. It is important to include
both charitable housing trusts and charities who provide supported housing since
they provide a range of valuable services to vulnerable people, while being subject
to appropriate regulation by the Charity Commission.
LEGAL STATUS OF THE OCCUPIERS OF SUPPORTED HOUSING
 16.8 We consider that different types of provision of supported housing should attract
different levels of security. Certain accommodation should be excluded from our
statutory scheme altogether; other accommodation should be excluded from the
usual statutory requirement on social landlords to provide accommodation on a
type I basis; and accommodation provided by relevant landlords on a type II basis
should include a power to temporarily exclude someone from the accommodation
who is behaving dangerously.
Exclusions
 16.9 Direct access accommodation will be excluded from our statutory scheme. A
person’s length of stay in direct access accommodation is irrelevant. This is
because the landlord of direct access accommodation is not in a position to make
an informed choice about the suitability of a person for anything other than
immediate and short-term occupation of the premises.
 16.10 Temporary supported housing accommodation which is intended to provide very
short term accommodation such as short stay or respite accommodation will be
excluded from our statutory scheme. We understand that this exclusion will in
practice exclude only a small number of units of accommodation; however, it is a
useful exception that will allow flexibility of provision.
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 16.11 Once the provision of supported housing accommodation exceeds four months the
provision will be brought within our statutory scheme. We accept that the time
limit of four months is an arbitrary figure which may not represent the most useful
period of exclusion. We will therefore recommend that the Secretary of State has
power to adjust the time period of the exclusion.
 16.12 Accommodation provided temporarily by a relevant landlord for the purpose of
assessment should be excluded from our statutory scheme. Whilst assessment may
be a relatively short process, we also consider that the period for which such
accommodation is excluded should provide the landlord with sufficient time to
prepare the occupier for more permanent accommodation or to organise
alternative accommodation if the landlord decides not to continue to
accommodate the occupier.
 16.13 We consider that an exclusion from the statutory scheme of four months will
provide sufficient time for a landlord to complete these processes. Once the
provision of accommodation for assessment exceeds four months it will be brought
within our statutory scheme. Again we accept that the time limit of four months is
an arbitrary figure which may not represent the most useful period of exclusion.
We will therefore recommend that the Secretary of State have power to adjust the
time period of the exclusion.
 16.14 We will not impose a requirement on landlords to inform occupiers of excluded
supported housing of their status. This would not be practical in the light of the
limited resources of many supported housing providers, and the short term nature
of the accommodation provided. We would expect that as a matter of good practice
landlords will provide the necessary information in a practical and useful format.
Exceptional use of type II by social landlords
 16.15 All other supported housing should in principle be treated consistently with the
normal features of our statutory scheme. Therefore social landlords will be
required to use type I occupation agreements unless the arrangements fall within a
statutory exception to that requirement. Relevant landlords who are not social
landlords will be able to provide accommodation on a type I or a type II basis as
they choose.
 16.16 We consider that there should be a limited statutory exception to the requirement
that social landlords provide accommodation on a type I basis where supported
housing is provided by a social landlord. The type II agreement provides some
important advantages to the landlord of a supported housing project. First it
provides limited security, so that if the occupier no longer requires support
services, or chooses not to use the support services, the agreement can be
terminated on a notice-only basis. Second the landlord who uses a type II
agreement will be able utilise a contractual term allowing it to move the occupier
from room to room (see below paragraph 16.27). Finally in certain circumstances
following a request by a manager the police will be able to order the exclusion of
an occupier from the project for 48 hours – see paragraphs 16.29 – 16.38.
 16.17 The use of the exception to the statutory requirement for social landlords to
provide type I agreements will be subject to the requirement that the social
landlord provide written notification to the occupier that the statutory exception
applies.
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 16.18 Whilst we recognise the need for such flexibility to facilitate the provision of
supported housing, it is important that the exception is limited partly because of
the additional powers of the landlord and partly because it restricts access to the
benefits, primarily long term security, of the type I agreement. In most
circumstances there will be no good reason why someone should be permanently
excluded from these benefits.
 16.19 We therefore propose that in normal circumstances, and where the
accommodation is provided by a social landlord, the exception to the requirement
to accommodate on a type I agreement will cease on the expiry of two years from
the commencement of the type II agreement. This would mean that, if the
landlord was a social landlord, after two years the resident would become a type I
occupier either of that accommodation or of other suitable alternative
accommodation. The landlord would no longer be able to move the resident
around the project, nor would it have the benefit of the police exclusion order. The
normal anti-social behaviour powers of injunction and eviction would be available
to the landlord. Landlords not required to use type I agreements would be able to
choose whether or not the agreement should become a type I agreement.
 16.20 The two year exception should provide a satisfactory solution for the vast majority
of people who require some support for a period of time but who in the long term
are capable of sustaining independent living arrangements with more minimal
support.
 16.21 However we do recognise that landlords will only be prepared to house certain
residents on a long term type II basis. If after two years they were automatically
obliged to offer type I agreements they may respond by evicting and arranging for
re-housing elsewhere on a type II or an excluded basis. This would be counter-
productive.
 16.22 We recommend that the statutory exception to the requirement upon social
landlords to use a type I agreement should be able to be continued beyond two
years where the landlord carries out an assessment of the support needs of the
occupier and provides a written statement of reasons justifying the continuation of
the type II agreement. In particular the statement must justify the continued need
for the availability of the police exclusion order.
 16.23 This means that the organisation most closely affected by decisions to enhance the
rights of occupiers will be making those decisions. It will prevent evictions solely to
avoid the change in status and would enable landlords to be responsive to the
continuing support needs of residents.
Management control
 16.24 We recognise that landlords of supported housing projects may have particular
management constraints over and above the requirement to provide support. They
are likely to have greater needs to move residents around their accommodation to
ensure effective use of accommodation or to deal with particular needs of the
resident. These needs can be dealt with by the use of appropriate terms in the
agreement.
 16.25 Similarly where it is anticipated that at some stage in the future the support needs
of the occupier will change in such a way that the current accommodation is no
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longer appropriate for their needs, then those changes should be dealt with by the
inclusion of an appropriate term in the occupation agreement.
 16.26 We recommend that a set of model default terms for supported housing provided
on a type II basis should be drafted by the Secretary of State, following
consultation with the key stakeholders in the provision of supported housing
including, to the extent possible, representatives of residents.
 16.27 Our scheme provides sufficient flexibility to allow a landlord to enter a type II
agreement which gives the occupier the right to occupy a room in a particular
building, for instance with communal facilities, but reserves the right to move the
occupier should the need arise. If such a term were to be written into the model
type II agreement, it would be deemed to be fair under the UTCCR regulations.
Any variation of such a term would be at risk of being found unfair. A term that
was not provided for in the model agreement could be written into the agreement
but would need to comply with UTCCR requirements of fairness and
transparency.
 16.28 Our scheme does not require distinct accommodation to be provided for occupiers
who are excluded from the scheme, or who are included on a type II basis. The
exclusions focus on the relationship between the provider and the occupier, not on
the particular premises. Therefore a room which is provided for an occupier during
an assessment period and is excluded from the scheme, can continue to
accommodate the occupier during the period of supported housing
accommodation, when the appropriate agreement between the provider and the
occupier is a type II agreement.
Police exclusion order
 16.29 Effective management of supported housing accommodation may require more
speedy exclusions than injunctions will provide. We have therefore designed a
procedure modelled upon an Australian procedure referred to in CP 162 at
paragraph 4.79. Designated managers of supported housing projects let on type II
agreements will be able to request the police to exclude an occupier from the
project.
 16.30 The power, which we describe as a police exclusion order, will be available to
social landlords during the period of exceptional use of type II and to other
relevant landlords for the first two years of provision of accommodation and for a
longer period if they carry out an assessment of the support needs of the occupier
and provide a written statement of reasons justifying the continued need for the
availability of the police exclusion order.
 16.31 The police exclusion order will give the police power to exclude an occupier from
the premises of a supported housing projects for 48 hours without the necessity of
going to court. Breach of the police exclusion order will be a criminal offence.
 16.32 Police exclusion orders will be available to the police following a request from a
designated manager of a supported housing project if they reasonably believe that a
serious act of violence has occurred or the safety of someone on the premises is in
danger from a resident or a visitor or the ability of a resident to benefit directly
from the support provided by the project has been seriously impeded by the
behaviour of a resident or a visitor.
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 16.33 Police exclusion orders will not be available where the resident has failed to pay
rent or has abandoned the project. Nor will they be available where, for instance, a
resident breaches the “no men” rule of a women’s refuge, or a “no alcohol” rule,
unless the breach of the rules results in danger to the safety of someone on the
premises or seriously impedes the ability of a resident to benefit directly from the
support provided by the project. Other breaches of rules will be dealt with through
the normal possession or injunction procedures.
 16.34 We recommend that there should be constraints against the arbitrary exercise of
the police exclusion order to protect the occupier. First the police exclusion order
will only be available on the request of a designated manager of a supported
housing project. Second, the order will exclude the occupier only from the
premises and not for instance from the surrounding area. Third, no more than
three police exclusion orders may be issued against one occupier in any six month
period.
 16.35 We consider that the occupier requires some protection from landlords who obtain
a police exclusion order by acting in bad faith. We recommend that there should
be a statutory duty upon the manager of the project to act in good faith which will
be enforced by means of a statutory tort.
 16.36 However we also consider that the use of this provision must be flexible and
responsive to the potentially difficult situations which can arise in these projects.
Therefore there will be no need for the police to attend the project in order to issue
the order unless they decide that it is necessary to do so. The designated manager
will be able to get the police exclusion order issued over the telephone.
 16.37 Police exclusion orders may be followed by an injunction to exclude the occupier
from the project if the management of the project decide that this is advisable. The
application for the injunction may be issued contemporaneously with possession
proceedings and the injunction in such circumstances will last until effective
eviction. A project would be at liberty to re-admit the excluded person after the
expiry of the police exclusion order or after the expiry of the injunction if they
decided that was the right course.
 16.38 We consider that these recommendations are consistent with the emerging
community safety role of the police and with the increased use of local partnership
approaches in responding to disorder.
Type I occupation agreements
 16.39 All supported housing occupation agreements covered by our statutory scheme
whether type I or type II will include the special anti-social behaviour term.
Injunctions will be available to restrain occupiers from breach of the term.
Following any breach of the injunction, providers will also be able to apply to the
court for a possession order, without having to issue separate possession
proceedings. Social landlords will be able in certain circumstances to obtain
injunctions that exclude occupiers from the project and have powers of arrest
attached to injunctions. Type I agreements will additionally have the benefit of the
demotion procedure. Therefore there are relatively extensive mechanisms to
respond to anti-social behaviour in type I agreements.
 16.40 Supported housing providers have indicated to us that a major area of concern
arises when the occupier is accommodated on a type I basis in supported housing,
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but no longer wishes to receive support, no longer needs support, or no longer
pays for the support provided. We offer two solutions to this problem.
 (1) Under our scheme, occupiers will be able to be evicted from their
occupation agreement for breach of a term where the court determines
that it is reasonable to do so.
 (2) Additionally an estate management ground similar to Ground 15 of the
Housing Act 1985 will be available to landlords.2 Suitable alternative
accommodation will have to be provided to an occupier evicted on this
basis.
 CONCLUSION
 16.41 We consider that these provisions for supported housing projects will clarify the
current confused state of the law on supported housing, maximise the rights
available to occupiers in a manner that is consistent with the management
requirements of the providers of supported housing and ensure that the
responsibilities of both landlords and occupiers within supported housing projects
are explicit.





 MICHAEL SAYERS, Secretary/Chief Executive
6 October 2003
2 See paras 9.30 – 9.33 above.
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ANNEX A
THE HOUSING ADVISORY GROUP
(Members of the group met during 2001-2002; they are listed with their job











Branch Head – Housing (Private Sector)
Office of the Deputy Prime Minister
Paul Docker
Head of Civil Procedure
Lord Chancellor’s Department
Ian Fletcher








Policy Advisor – Immigration & Housing
The Law Society
Maureen Haire
Senior Executive Officer –
Housing Directorate






Council of Mortgage Lenders
Sian Marie James
Executive Officer – Housing Directorate






Chartered Institute of Housing
Phil Morgan
Chief Executive
Tenant Participation Advisory Service
Sally Morshead
Chair – Housing Law Committee
The Law Society
Chris Morter




Senior Executive Officer – Housing Directorate
National Assembly for Wales
Leona Patterson
Branch Head – Housing Management Branch
(Branch 2)
Office of the Deputy Prime Minister
John Tanner












9 JULY 2002 – LIST OF ATTENDEES
Name Organisation
James Berrington Housing Corporation – Policy Advisor
Michele Walsh Housing Corporation – Head of Housing
Policy
Naomi Goode Jenkins & Hand Solicitors
Maurice Condie Byker Bridge Housing Association
Amanda Nott Advance Housing and Support Limited
Chris Melville Hexagon Housing Association
Katherine Bloomer Salvation Army Housing Association
Chris Litherland YMCA Housing
Kate McAllister The Carr-Gomm Society Limited
Paul Webb National Assembly for Wales
Carolyn Hayman Foyer Federation
Fahmeeda Gill National Housing Federation
Sue Baxter SITRA
Colin O’Neill Stonham Housing Association Limited
Georgina Savill                                              Trowers and Hamlins Solicitors






1. 23 February TPAS
Nottingham
RSL tenants’ conference
2. 20 March Small Landlords Association
London
Meeting




4. 26 March Association of Law Teachers
London
Conference presentation
5.   5 April Socio-Legal Studies Association
Aberystwyth
Conference presentation





















11. 20 May Welsh Assembly/Welsh National
Housing Federation
Conference
12. 22 May Essex Citizens Advice Bureau
Witham
Housing Policy meeting
13. 27 May Law Society
London
Housing Law Committee meeting
14. 28 May London School of Economics
London
MSc Housing Alumni meeting
15. 5 June Local Government Association
London
Executive meeting
16. 7 June Rent Assessment Panel
Birmingham
Meeting
17. 12 June Chartered Institute of Housing
Harrogate
Annual Conference
18. 13 June National Union of Students
London
Meeting
19. 13 June Bolton Council
Bolton
Housing special interest group meeting
20. 18 June Law Centres Federation
London
Seminar




22. 19 June Brighton Council
Brighton
Private Sector Forum meeting
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23. 19 June Northumbria University Law
School
Newcastle
North East consultation event
24. 20 June Sheffield Hallam University
Sheffield
Yorkshire consultation event
25. 21 June Shoreditch Our Way
London
Anti-social behaviour meeting
26. 21 June Association of Housing Advice
Services
London
Meeting of Advice workers
27. 25 June Birmingham & Midlands CABs
Birmingham
Housing Policy Advice workers meeting
28. 25 June Camden Council
London
Camden Private Tenants Forum
Meeting
29. 26 June Greenwich Council
London
Greenwich Private Sector Forum




31. 29 June Catholic Housing Aid Society
Birmingham
National Groups Conference
32. 29 June Castle Vale Housing Action Trust
Birmingham
Meeting
33. 1 July North Yorkshire CABs
York
Housing Policy Advice workers meeting




35. 2 July Foyer Federation
Birmingham
Executive Meeting
36. 3July Foyer Federation
Birmingham
Annual practice conference
37. 3 July Law Society & Law Commission
London
Seminar – anti-social behaviour








40. 8 July London CABs
London
Housing Policy Advisers meeting
41. 9 July Law Commission
London
Seminar – supported housing




43. 11 July ODPM Tenant Sounding Board
London
Meeting
44. 15 July Shoreditch Our Way
London
Committee meeting









47. 24 September Camden Federation of Private
Tenants, London
Annual General Meeting
48. 29 October Confederation of Co-operative
Housing, London
Meeting
49. 13 November TPAS Cymru/WTF Conference
50. 14 November TPAS Cymru/WTF Conference workshop
51. 18 November London Tenants Forum Meeting








54. 23 January Manchester Private Landlords Forum
manchest
Regional meeting
55. 30 January Association of Residential Landlords Launch of model agreement
56. 6 February T&GWU
London
Seminar on agricultural occupancies




58. 26 February Small Landlords Association Annual conference
59. 3 March Southampton Private Landlord’s
Association
Meeting
60. 4 March Brent Housing Forum
London
Meeting
61. 4  March Ealing Tenants Association Meeting
62. 22 March CCH Conference
63. 2 April Nottingham Private Landlords Conference
64. 15 April SLSA Annual Conference
Nottingham
Conference
65. 26 April TPAS RSL conference Conference
66. 12 May Small Landlords Association
Bristol
Conference
67. 12 June Chartered Institute of Housing
Conference Harrogate
Conference
68. 21 July Small Landlords Association Bristol Conference
69. 2 August TPAS annual conference Conference
70. 29 August National Federation of Residential
Landlords,  annual conference
Conference
71. 16 September Threshold tenants
 Dublin
Conference




ANNEX D1: RESPONSES TO CP 162
Judges and Judicial Bodies
Association of District Judges
Hon. Manuel J. Kyriakakis, Trial
Court of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts
Total: 2
Local Authorities and Social
Landlords
Birmingham City Council
Byker Bridge Housing Association Ltd
Castle Vale Housing Action Trust
Charter Housing Association
Circle 33 Housing Group
City and Council of Swansea
City of Sunderland
Coin Street Secondary Housing Co-
operative
Crawley Homes
De Montfort Housing Society









Homes for Change Housing Co-
operative
Housing Advice Service Kensington &
Chelsea
The Hyde Group
Jephson Homes Housing Association
Knightstone Housing Association
L & Q Group
London Borough of Camden
London Borough of Hammersmith and
Fulham
Manchester City Council
Neath Port Talbot County Borough
Council
NOMAD
North Cornwall District Council
Northern Counties Housing
Association



















Two Piers Housing Co-operative Ltd










The General Council of the Bar
Housing Law Practitioners Association
The Law Society of England and Wales
Total: 3
Legal Practitioners in Private
Practice
Wendy Backhouse, Hodge Jones &
Allen
P Bourne, Fentimans Solicitors
Edward Counsell, South Western
Chambers
Tim Crook, Richard Body & Co,
Solicitor Advocates
Naomi Goode, Jenkins & Hands
Solicitors
Ian Graham, Trowers & Hamlins
Gary Meyler, Bristol & West Plc
Brian Nelson, Boyce Hatton Solicitors







Association of Residential Letting
Agents
Association of Tenancy Relations
Officers
Borough Forum for Housing
Association Tenants (Hammersmith &
Fulham)
Bournemouth Housing Forum
Brent Private Tenants’ Rights Group





Camden Federation of Private Tenants
Campaign for Fairer Fair Rents
CDS Co-operatives
Chartered Institute of Environmental
Health
Chartered Institute of Housing





Council of Mortgage Lenders
Cymorth (Cymru) Interim Steering
Group
East Lancashire Landlords Association
Eastern Landlords Association
Greenwich Tenancy Relations Officers
Homestamp
Labour Housing Group






London Federation of Guinness Trust
Tenants’ Associations




MIND – The Mental Health Charity
National Association of Citizens
Advice Bureau
National Association of Estate Agents






National Union of Students
North East Housing Law Practitioner’s















South Yorkshire Housing Law Group
TAROE
TPAS




Warrington Federation of Tenant and
Resident Associations
Welsh Tenants’ Federation Ltd
Welsh Tenure Law Review Advisory
Group




Advance Housing and Support Ltd
Blaxhill Estates




Separate responses in this category
to Tessa Shepperson’s website
questionnaire:
Angela Burnett & Co














Samuel Lawrence & Co


















Residential Property Tribunal Service
Total: 4
Academics
Susan Bright, University of Oxford
Dr Ian Budden, University of London
M R Davis, De Montfort University
Professor David Hughes, De Montfort
University
Caroline Hunter, Sheffield Hallam
University
Richard Moorhead, Cardiff Law
School



















































































Mrs A P Williams
Total: 77
Separate responses in this category
















One anonymous response from the
general consultation process





ANNEX D2: RESPONSES TO CP 168
Judges and Judicial Bodies
Association of District Judges
Total: 1
Local Authorities and Social
Landlords
Birmingham City Council
Brighton and Hove City Council
Castle Vale Housing Action Trust




East Thames Housing Association
Fosseway Housing Association
Genesis Housing Group






Leeds Federated Housing Association
London Borough of Camden
London Borough of Hammersmith &
Fulham


















Housing Law Practitioners Association
The Law Society of England and Wales
Total: 3
Legal Practitioners in Private
Practice
Edwin Coe Solicitors




Borough Forum for Housing
Association Tenants (Hammersmith &
Fulham)
Camden Federation of Private Tenants
Chartered Institute of Housing
Civil Justice Council




London Federation of Guinness Trust
Tenants’ Associations
National Farmers’ Union




National Union of Students












T Clark & Son Ltd
Coffin Mew and Clover
Total: 3







Nick Ireland, Minister of State for
Housing, Planning and Regeneration
Lord Chancellor’s Department







Dr Ian Budden, University of London
Martin Davis, De Montfort University
Graham Ferris, Nottingham Trent and
Sheffield Universities
Catherine Williams, Nottingham Trent
and Sheffield Universities
David Hughes, De Montfort University
Total: 5
Members of the Public
Miss J A Brabazon
M Gora
Miss Ann Jerrard
Ms Pauline Taylor
Total: 4
Overall Total: 77
